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PREFACE 
While collecting the information for this study, I sometimes felt I was on holiday – 
sometimes an adventurous and sometimes a tiring holiday, but always an impressive one. 
When travelling to and through the research municipalities, often I was unsettled by the 
huge differences between the departmental capital of Sucre and the research 
municipalities. In Sucre there are Internet cafés, travel agencies, automatic cash 
dispensers, luxurious restaurants, etc. while the research municipalities – some of which 
are only at a few hours drive from Sucre – are in a different world altogether: there are no 
forms of modern communication and pollo picante is the only luxurious meal available. 
More importantly, these municipalities lack the main basic needs. Little children have to 
walk for hours to get to school, there is no basic health care and some communities are 
almost deserted because of the lack of alternative employment.    
I also felt somewhat lost during my first visits to the research municipalities. My first 
fieldwork experiences in Latin America took me to small and large cities, so different 
from the extensive and impressive rural areas I found in Bolivia. How could I possibly 
get things in order in this mountainous area, with small and dispersed communities, with 
non-visible power structures, without a clearly demarcated territorial division, and with a 
friendly but not very accessible population?  
Now – five years later – I know a little more. I owe much in this respect to Lazaro 
Mamani, my research assistant, who taught me about the people, their activities, the 
landscape and rural life in general. I also thank Rafael Meza for driving us safely along 
the narrow dirt roads and for his support during the interviews. 
 
Despite what some PhD students say, I never experienced my research project as a 
lonely, endless affair. On the contrary, for me it was a period of making new friends and 
discovering new things, always in company and with support of other people. Many 
contributed to this study, and I owe much to them.  
 
I should first like to thank the people in the research municipalities, the mayors and 
councillors, the leaders of the popular organizations and the NGOs. I’m especially 
indebted to the following: Tsjalling Beetstra of the Centro de Información 
Departamental, who introduced me to key informants, provided information about the 
municipalities and supported me in arranging the more practical issues of the fieldwork; 
Juan José Bonifaz, who answered the endless questions on the ins and outs of the 
political and administrative structure of the department of Chuquisaca; Edmundo Zelada 
of PADER, who invited me to several seminars on municipal development and engaged 
in stimulating discussions with me; and Maria Ibañez and her colleagues at the 
departmental Unit for Municipal Strengthening in Sucre, who during the periods of 
fieldwork were a great help in collecting all the planning and implementation reports, and 
explaining the administrative procedures to me.  
A special word of thanks goes to Jouke Boerma and Arjan Budding for offering their 
garden apartment to me and – above all – their hospitality. I’m still grateful for the fresh 
vegetables they supplied in order to supplement the diet of chicken and potatoes in the 
field. 
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In the Netherlands, I should like to thank my promoter Menno Vellinga for his 
encouraging e-mails at the end of the journey and for urging me to finish it. Special 
thanks go to my co-promotores: Annelies Zoomers – for asking me over and again why I 
do things the way I do and for urging me to put things clearly – and Paul van Lindert, for 
initiating this research and putting things into perspective. I also thank the Centre for 
Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA), my second home during this 
project: it provided support during my research and the necessary facilities while writing 
this thesis, a process which took five years.  
 
During the last few months of the project, it was sometimes difficult to combine work on 
this thesis with regular work. I’m therefore grateful to Rob van der Vaart (department of 
Geography for Education) for offering time to finish this thesis and my colleagues at the 
department of Development Geography for their interest. I want to mention two persons 
in particular: Otto Verkoren – for his almost fatherly, stimulating words – and Robine 
van Dooren, roommate and fellow sufferer. I also thank the members of OLA (the 
CEDLA-based research group on Latin America) for their critical comments on various 
chapters and for the comforting atmosphere they provided, and Rien Rabbers of KartLab 
for producing the figures and maps. I thank Mirjam Ros-Tonen for editing the text and 
Jeremy Rayner for the English correction.    
 
I’m also indebted to the two ladies at the secretariat: Paula Duivenvoorde – for 
meticulously ‘decoding’ the comments of my promotor – and Anneke van der Loo, for 
her help with the layout of this book, including the more technical challenges of Word.  
 
Finally, I thank Peter de Kwaasteniet – and there’s is no need to say why. 
 
Utrecht, April 2002   
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACLO    Acción Cultural Loyola; an NGO. 
 
ADN    Acción Democrática y Nacionalista; a political party. 
 
Alcalde   Mayor. 
 
Alcaldía    Town hall. 
 
Cacique   Urban-based elite. 
 
Canton  Political-administrative unit, lower than the municipal 
level. 
 
COB Central Obrero Boliviano; the labour union. In the 1980s, 
this union was very powerful. 
 
Comité de Vigilancia Local committee in each municipality, composed of 
representatives of the population, that controls and 
supervises the actions of local government. 
 
Comunidad campesina Peasant community. 
 
Concejal   Municipal councillor. 
 
Concejo municipal  Municipal council. 
 
CONDEPA   Consciencia de Patria; a  political party. 
 
CORDECH  Corporación de Desarollo Regional de Chuquisaca – 
Regional Development Corporation of Chuquisaca, semi-
governmental entity charged in the period 1970-1995 with 
the execution of public works in the provinces. Dismantled 
in January 1996 as a consequence of the implementation of 
the Law on Administrative Decentralisation. 
 
Corregidor  Formal, highest authority of the cantonal level; has police-
type functions, such as the collection of fines and mediation 
in land conflicts between families or communities. 
 
CSUTCB  Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia; Union Confederation of rural 
workers in Bolivia. 
 
Eje Pachakuti   A political party. 
 
FDC  Fondo de Desarrollo del Campesinado; Rural Development 
Fund, co-finances projects within the rural, agricultural 
sector. 
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FIS  Fondo de Inversión Social – Social Investment Fund 
(formerly the Social Emergency Fund); co-finances projects 
mainly within the social sector. 
 
FNDR  Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional – Regional 
Development Fund that particularly co-finances 
infrastructural projects, such as roads and 
commercialisation facilities as markets and silos. 
 
Hacendado   Owner of a hacienda, a large to very large farmer. 
 
Hacienda Latifundio, large to very large farm/estate; in the context of 
this study in the subtropical lowlands; the owner is the 
hacendado; in former times, the land of the hacienda was 
worked by Guaraní, an indigenous group in the lowlands. 
 
HAM Honorable Alcaldía Municipal: municipal government 
 
Junta vecinal Neighbourhood organisation, present in the cities and 
towns; one of the three types of OTB. 
 
LDA  Ley de Descentralización Administrativa – Law on 
Administrative Decentralisation (1995). 
 
LPP  Ley de Participación Popular – Law on Popular 
Participation (1994). 
 
MBL    Movimiento Bolivia Libre; a political party. 
 
Mini-fundio   Small farm, labour intensive with little capital input. 
  
 
MIR    Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario; a political party. 
 
MNR    Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; a political party. 
 
Oficial mayor Head of the municipal administrative staff. 
 
OTB  Organización Territorial de Base: territorially-based 
organisation, the common denominator for all popular 
organisations in the LPP, i.e. comunidades campesinas, 
juntas vecinales, and pueblos indígenas. 
 
PADER  Proyecto de Promoción al Desarrollo Economico Rural; 
project financed by the Swiss, supports the economic 
development of rural municipalities. 
 
Patrón    Relatively negative term for large landowners, hacendados. 
 
PDCR  Proyecto de Dessarrollo de Comunidades Rurales; World 
Bank-financed project that supports and supervises the 
formulation of municipal development plans (PDMs) and 
the implementation of these plans. 
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PDM Plan de Desarrollo Municipal; municipal development plan 
– five-year development strategy of municipalities, the 
product of the participatory planning methodology. 
 
POA Plan de Operaciones Anuales; annual investment plan of 
the municipalities, derived from the PDM, in which the 
projects that will be implemented that year are described. 
 
Prefecto Highest authority at the departmental level, appointed by 
the president. 
 
Prefectura  All services, departments and employees at the 
departmental level. 
 
Pueblo indígena Indigenous community, present in the highlands regions but 
predominantly in the lowlands; one of the three categories 
of OTB. 
 
Sindicato  Peasant union. The most important socio-economic 
organisation in rural Bolivia. The sindicato system was 
established in 1953, after the land reform. Generally, each 
peasant community has its own sindicato, with a rotating 
board, of whom the dirigente is the main organisation. Main 
function of the sindicato is the management of all 
communal affairs, such as the implementation of projects  
  
Subprefecto  Highest formal authority at the provincial level appointed 
by the president. 
 
Subprefectura  All services, departments and employees at the provincial 
level. 
 
UCS    Unión Cívica Solidaridad; a political party 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to and relevance of the study 
In recent decades, decentralisation – the transfer of functions, responsibilities and 
financial resources to lower levels of government – has become a quite common element 
of public policy in developing countries. Decentralisation is expected to have a positive 
effect on the development process by reducing the inefficiency associated with 
centralism, making local government more responsive, increasing intra-regional equity 
and promoting greater local participation. 
Decentralisation has been presented as a crucial element in achieving good 
governance. The concept of governance concerns the ‘relationships between the state and 
society, between the rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed’ (Halfani, 
1994); it is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels, and comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, 
fulfil their obligations and mediate their differences. The main characteristics of good 
governance are participation, transparency, accountability and equity.  
Decentralisation and governance are inseparable processes that support and promote 
local development in all its dimensions. However, there is no guarantee that 
decentralisation will lead to good governance and local development. Decentralisation as 
a process neither comes in a standardised form, which makes it necessary to look at the 
conditions that shape this process. Experiences with decentralisation policies in Latin 
American countries confirm this. Decentralisation appears to have different meanings 
and implications in different countries, and has taken a different form almost everywhere 
in Latin America. Empirical studies have found that decentralisation produces different 
outcomes on various levels of analysis: urban versus rural, and regional versus local. 
Also at the local level, however, there is evidence of a differentiated impact, with some 
groups benefiting more than others.  
 
With this debate in mind, this study analyses the contribution of decentralisation to local 
governance and development in Bolivia. Bolivia, which is one of the poorest countries in 
Latin America, launched its decentralisation process in 1994. One year earlier, Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada had become president after conducting a highly ambitious election 
campaign, the Plan de Todos (Plan of All). This plan contained a number of drastic 
reforms, including the privatisation of a number of public-sector companies, the 
improvement of land tenure and of the pension system, and the introduction of bilingual 
education. The decentralisation model was at the root of all these reforms. The model 
contains two legal initiatives: the Law on Popular Participation (LPP) and the Law on 
Administrative Decentralisation (LDA). The LPP envisions the creation of new 
municipalities, the transfer of funds from the central to the municipal level, and the 
application of bottom-up, participatory planning. The aim of the LDA is to reorganise the 
public sector, particularly at the departmental level, by allocating functions that were 
previously dealt with at higher levels to the prefecture.  
There are several reasons why the decentralisation effort had far-reaching effects in 
Bolivian society, and particularly in rural areas. Before 1994, the concept of municipality 
was confined to the towns and urban settlements, leaving the rural areas out of the 
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political-administrative structure. Now, through the LPP, the territory of the municipality 
encompasses both urban and rural areas. Along with the rural population, women and the 
indigenous population are specifically mentioned as target groups. The aim of 
decentralisation policy in Bolivia is to increase the population’s participation in the local 
decision-making process. Participatory planning is an important tool in that it allows the 
population to influence its own development. In general terms, decentralisation in Bolivia 
is intended to improve local governance and induce local development, particularly in 
rural areas.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study analyses the relationship between decentralisation policy, local governance 
and local development in rural Bolivia. Its central research question is:  
 
‘What is the impact of decentralisation policy on local governance and local 
development in rural Bolivia, and what factors explain this impact?’ 
 
With this in mind, the following sub-questions were formulated: 
 
1. What are the main characteristics of the Bolivian decentralisation process, and how 
do these compare with the characteristics of decentralisation policy in other Latin 
American countries?  
 
2. To what extent does decentralisation policy result in local governance that is 
participatory, transparent and accountable and contributes to equity?  
 
3. To what extent do decentralisation policy and governance contribute to increased 
local development opportunities? 
1.3 Study area 
The study applied a cross-sectional approach, which involved doing research in areas 
with different characteristics. It was decided to limit the research to one department: 
Chuquisaca, which is located in the south-east of Bolivia and is one of the country’s 
poorest departments. Chuquisaca is also a department that had had some experiments 
with decentralisation prior to 1994. Another reason for choosing Chuquisaca was the 
complexity of doing research in different political-administrative units. The department 
of Chuquisaca is predominantly rural and represents different spatial contexts, ranging 
from very high altitudes in the west to the subtropical lowlands in the east. The socio-
economic context is diversified and includes peasant communities as well as indigenous 
communities.  
 Within the department of Chuquisaca six municipalities were selected for indepth 
analysis. The main selection criteria concerned the different spatial contexts, with respect 
to agricultural zone and accessibility, socio-economic variables (the population number, 
ethnicity and the economic structure) and the main characteristics of the institutional 
context, such as the presence of NGOs and the background of the mayor. This led to a 
diverse sample of research municipalities rather than a representative one.   
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1.4 Definition of the main concepts 
Decentralisation in this study refers to the transfer of authority, responsibility and funds 
for public functions from the central government to subordinate, lower government 
organisations or the private sector.  
 
In this study local governance is defined as the process through which local municipal 
decision-making is defined, incorporating both local government, civil society and the 
private sector. In order to be good, governance should comply with four conditions: it 
should be participatory, transparent, accountable and contribute to equity.    
 
Local development refers to the increase of development opportunities at the local, 
municipal level in terms of employment, income and livelihoods. In this way, 
development includes both economic and social development. Also, access to these 
development opportunities should be equal for all groups in society.  
1.5 Methodology 
The fieldwork comprised surveys, interviews and the collection of secondary data, and 
was carried out in three periods between January 1997 and September 2000. The first six 
months were spent interviewing Bolivian and international experts on the implementation 
of decentralisation in Bolivia. These interviews also provided the input for the selection 
of the study area. Based on an appraisal that included the location, socio-economic 
characteristics, municipal administration and presence of NGOs, ten municipalities were 
selected and each was visited before making the final selection. Four municipalities were 
eliminated, one because it was the object of another study, one because of a highly 
conflictive atmosphere, and two because the local government refused to collaborate. In 
the last few months of the first period of fieldwork, structured interviews were held with 
mayors, municipal councillors and other actors. Information was gathered on their 
background, overall management, municipal planning, strategies to mobilise financial 
resources and the difficulties encountered.  A beginning was also made with the 
collection of secondary material, including the implementation reports, financial records 
and annual development plans of the six municipalities.   
During the second period of fieldwork (July 1998-January 1999) a survey was held 
among the leaders of 101 community based organisations (CBOs) and the NGOs 
working in the municipalities. In the selected CBOs, research focused on geographical 
and socio-economic activities, the presence and activities of NGOs, social organisation, 
communal priority setting and the relation with local government. The structured 
interviews with NGOs concentrated on the former and actual activities in the 
municipalities, the position of them within municipal planning and the relationship with 
local government and other actors in the local context. Additional and recent secondary 
material was also collected. The third period of fieldwork (August-September 2000) 
involved collecting more secondary material and interviewing representatives of central 
and departmental government and NGOs. During all three periods of fieldwork, local and 
national newspapers were frequently consulted. Appendix I contains a detailed overview 
of the methodology used in this study.  
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1.6 Outline of the study 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the current literature on decentralisation, good governance 
and local development, with a focus on Latin America. It concludes with a conceptual 
framework that serves as the basis for the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3 the main 
characteristics of the Bolivian decentralisation model are presented. The background to 
the decentralisation policy is discussed and it is established to what extent the Bolivian 
model relates to experiences in other Latin American countries. In Chapter 4, the main 
spatial and socio-economic features of the study area – six rural municipalities in the 
department of Chuquisaca – are outlined, as are the most important actors within the 
institutional context. 
Chapters 5-7 centre on the implementation of decentralisation policy at the local level. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the dimensions of local governance, by discussing, in particular, the 
impact of decentralisation policy on popular participation. Chapter 6 analyses the role of 
decentralisation policy in local development with respect to planning, finance, 
investments and employment generation. In Chapter 7 the various factors explaining the 
differentiated impact of decentralisation policy on local governance and local 
development are discussed.  
After summarising the main findings of this study, Chapter 8 answers the central research 
question by discussing the factors that have been found to condition the impact of 
decentralisation policy on local governance and local development. These findings are 
put in the context of the academic debate presented in Chapter 2, clarifying what insights 
this study contributes to decentralisation, local governance and local development. 
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2 DECENTRALISATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE 
ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPMENT IN 
LATIN AMERICA: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Decentralisation has become a popular concept among both international donor 
organisations and developing countries. Helmsing (2000, p. 1) writes that: ‘…of the 
developing countries with a population of more than five million, 63 are actively 
pursuing decentralisation policies that devolve functions and responsibilities to local 
government.’ 
The increasing popularity of decentralisation should be interpreted within the wider 
context of state reform and democratisation. The belief in a strong central state has 
weakened considerably in recent decades, as the failure of the state to respond adequately 
to the needs of the population became apparent, in particular in the provision of basic 
services. Also, the tendency towards democratisation, which began in the early 1980s, 
raised questions about a broader context for development, and the role of the population 
in local decision-making. This debate generated a new perception of the centralised state 
and its functions. The ideas on the role of government began to shift. Government was 
replaced by an emphasis on governance. Governance refers to the complex system of the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, and includes both 
the public and the private sector. In fact, as Helmsing (2000, based on Stoker 1998) 
observes, ‘governance is a different way of governing’. It is assumed that 
decentralisation offers ample room for better governance – even good governance – 
which ultimately – is assumed - should lead to development. 
  
This chapter presents a review of the literature on decentralisation, good governance and 
the role of local government in local development, in particular within the context of 
Latin America. The first section gives an overview of the changing role of the state from 
a historical perspective. In the second section, the concept of decentralisation is 
introduced, presenting the various forms decentralisation can take and citing the motives 
in favour and against. In the third section the concept of governance is discussed, and in 
the fourth section the focus is on the relation between decentralisation and local 
development, presenting an overview of factors conditioning this relationship. The final 
section analyses the main findings and presents the conceptual framework.  
2.1 The changing role of the state 
In recent decades, much has been written on the changing role of the state in Latin 
America. Many elements in the make-up of the Latin American state date back to 
colonial times (Vellinga 1998, p. 5; Nickson 1995). The outcome was a centralised 
authoritarian state where the legal order and bureaucratic structure required to delegate 
power was lacking and with ‘structural inequalities imbedded in the organisation of the 
economy and society and the social, economic and political exclusion of the poor’ 
(Vellinga 1998, p. 2). Veliz (1980, p. 3-4) attributes the centralist character of the Latin 
American state to a number of factors, such as the absence of feudalism and religious 
conformity, the lack of ‘any occurrence or circumstance over time that could conceivably 
be taken as the counterpart of the European Industrial Revolution’ and the absence of 
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‘those ideological, social and political developments associated with the French 
Revolution’, that impacted heavily on the transformation of western European society.  
The majority of the Latin American countries had achieved independence from Spain by 
1830. The end of colonial rule created a power vacuum. The integrative mechanisms of 
colonial times disappeared (Wiarda 1998, p. 36), the previously privileged groups in 
society lost legitimacy and their successors lacked strong social, economic and political 
base, resulting in anarchy and disruption. Only after 1850 this situation stabilised, with 
the increase of population, the development of a state apparatus and the integration into 
the world economy.  
During the twentieth century, the Latin American state underwent considerable 
expansion, growing in size and increasing its areas of influence. In the 1930s the 
developmental state arose, aimed at developing the domestic market through a strategy of 
import substitution. Its functions came to cover an even expanding area of influence. 
Populism was used as a political formula that included effective mechanisms of class 
control and guaranteed the stability of the market. 
 
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, this model met its limits and entered into crisis. Societal 
support crumbled. The military regimes that emerged reinforced the bureaucratic-
authoritarian character of the state. Bebbington (1997, p. 1757) characterises Latin 
America in those decades as ‘being dominated by bureaucratic authoritarian, often 
repressive, socially exclusive but quite interventionist states’. At the end of the 1970s the 
military regimes withdrew. A trend towards democratisation set in, creating a perspective 
of political and social participation for formerly marginalised population groups. 
 
The debt and financial crisis at the end of the 1970s, the economic collapse of the early 
1980s, and the subsequent implementation of structural adjustment policies meant a 
serious threat to the trend towards democratisation. The three most important pillars of 
the economy in the previous three decades – i.e. an export sector mainly based on 
primary products, import substituting industrialisation and the public sector – were 
seriously affected (Sojo 1996 p. 70). As a result, the state withdrew, leaving several 
policy voids (Glade 1997). The state’s capacity to define and implement policies was 
seriously affected. This applied both to economic policies and to important sectors 
attending people’s basic needs. In this respect, Helmsing (2000, p. 5) points towards the 
increasing gap between state and society. 
 
‘The centralised developmental state became increasingly incapable of performing a 
socially relevant function for growing numbers of urban and rural people, mostly 
employed or self-employed in the rural economy and urban informal sector and living in 
villages or dispersed in the rural areas or in urban squatter settlements.’  
  
The failure of the state to provide public services resulted in an increase of the role of the 
civil society, in particular that of NGOs and community-based organisations in this field. 
A call for a more efficient, smaller state emerged in the 1980s, assigning an important 
place to decentralisation, defined as the transfer of responsibilities and functions from the 
central to the sub-national level. Before turning to the factors that explain this 
phenomenon, we will pay attention to the meaning of decentralisation, the various forms 
it can take, and the arguments in favour or against it.  
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2.2 The concept of decentralisation 
Decentralisation means the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions 
from the central government to subordinate, lower government organisations or the 
private sector1. Generally, four different types of decentralisation can be defined: 
political, administrative, fiscal and economic.2 
 
Political decentralisation intends to give citizens and their elected representatives more 
power in public decision-making. Key words in this process are pluralistic politics and 
representative government. It is also meant to support democratisation by giving citizens 
or their representatives more influence in the formulation and implementation of policies 
that affect their interests. Political decentralisation may lead to the state of devolution, the 
most complete form of decentralisation, as it transfers the authority for decision-making, 
finance and management to semi-autonomous units of local government. In practice the 
responsibility for public services will be assigned to municipalities with an elected mayor 
and elected municipal council. They can raise their own financial resources by levying 
taxes and can independently make investment decisions. The region of influence of these 
local governments will, in general, be a geographical area with sharply defined 
boundaries. 
 
One of the major arguments in favour of political decentralisation is that it can improve 
the relationship between citizens and policy makers by narrowing the gap between them. 
Activities associated with political decentralisation are constitutional or statutory 
reforms, the establishment and development of pluralistic political parties, the creation of 
local political entities and the stimulation of public interest groups. 
  
Administrative decentralisation is aimed merely at distributing the powers, 
responsibilities and financial resources needed for the provision of services within the 
public sector, from the central government and associated offices to field units of 
government agencies, lower-level units or semi-autonomous units. Within administrative 
decentralisation, two degrees can be discerned: deconcentration and delegation. The 
former means the redistribution of decision-making authority and financial and 
management responsibilities among different levels of the central government. It is 
operated mostly in unitary states. The degree to which the local level is incorporated 
varies from a mere change of location, to the establishment of strong and qualified field 
units, which remain, however, under the control and supervision of the central 
government. Therefore, deconcentration entails the least extensive form of 
decentralisation. Delegation implies the transfer of responsibilities for decision-making 
and the administration of public functions to semi-autonomous entities. These entities are 
not entirely administered by the central government. However, they are accountable 
towards the central level. Examples of such delegated entities are certain public 
enterprises and corporations, institutes providing housing and transport, regional 
development corporations and project implementation units. In some cases their special 
status includes the possibility to charge for the services rendered. 
  
Decentralised units must have sufficient financial funds and the power to make 
investment decisions, in order to effectively implement transferred responsibilities in the 
provision of services. Fiscal decentralisation is an instrument serving such financial 
autonomy. The ingredients of fiscal decentralisation can be the raising of own resources 
by charging users for public services; the levying of taxes; co-financing or co-production, 
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in which users support the implementation of service projects with money or the input of 
labour; the transfer of tax revenues from the central level to the decentralised units; and 
the possibility for decentralised units to borrow, by means of loan guarantees. Cases of 
fiscal decentralisation show that sometimes the decentralised level lacks the legal 
authority to levy taxes and borrow funds. When local governments have this authority, 
the tax base is often too small, and as also the ability to operate an efficient tax system is 
missing, no attempts are made to fully exploit this option. 
  
Economic decentralisation is also called market decentralisation. It can be considered – at 
least from a governmental perspective – the most complete form of decentralisation, as 
functions and responsibilities are transferred from the public to the private (market) 
sector. Privatisation and deregulation are used to transfer former governmental functions 
to enterprises, community groups, cooperatives and other NGOs. It can imply that 
services are entirely provided by private enterprises, or through public-private 
partnerships. Through deregulation, legal constraints on the participation of the private 
sector in the provision of former public services can be eliminated or reduced.  
2.2.1 Motives for implementing decentralisation  
The rationale for implementing decentralisation policies varies, and over time the 
emphasis has shifted from economic objectives – such as promoting economic and 
regional development, and increasing efficiency of service delivery – to bringing about 
democratisation. In the new approach to decentralisation, the changing relations between 
state and civil society are taken into consideration (Helmsing 2000, p. 5; Blair 2000, p. 
21).  
 
Economic motives 
In the 1960s and 1970s, decentralisation was often justified on economic grounds. 
Economic arguments include the expectation that decentralisation would reduce 
congestion at the centre, often a rapidly urbanising capital city. It was also thought to 
have a positive impact on efficiency with respect to the provision of public services, 
lower-level government being closer to the clients and being more responsive to local 
demands. This lack of proximity was seen as an explanation of the shortcomings of 
integrated rural development programmes (Rondinelli 1984). Also, decentralisation is 
thought to facilitate the levying of taxes, as people will be more willing to pay for 
services that reflect their own priorities. In some cases, it was thought it would off-load 
obligations from central governments to lower levels, facilitating expenditure cuts and 
reducing the public deficit (Manor 1999; Smith 1985).  
One positive effect of decentralisation concerns the ‘multiplier effect’ in the local 
economies: the execution of centrally financed public works at the local level by local 
contractors, leading to an increase in local employment opportunities. In Guatemala, 
prior to 1986, the central government used to hire firms based in Guatemala City to 
execute public works in the provinces. Now, due to increasing autonomy for tendering, 
local public works are executed with local labour and locally produced materials. This 
way, a considerable part of the funds allocated to local government will be spent within 
the municipality (Rendon Labadan 1996). 
To conclude, decentralisation was expected to reduce regional inequalities and 
enhance local development. Giving more decision-making power to the lower levels of 
public administration was thought to provide incentives to confront regional problems.  
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Political motives 
More recently, authors mention political motives as the main incentive for 
decentralisation. Smith (1985) and Litvack and colleagues (1998) argue that the majority 
of decentralisation policies have been inspired by such motives. They maintain that 
decentralisation must be seen as a result of pressure from below. Manor (1999), however, 
found that pressure from below will seldom be a decisive factor leading to 
decentralisation. Decentralisation is viewed as an instrument to achieve national unity, as 
the increased participation of civil society is thought to have a favourable impact on the 
legitimacy of governments and on ethnic conflicts within the national territory. This 
perspective assumes a democratising effect of decentralisation, fomenting popular 
participation. This explains why many countries decided to implement decentralisation 
policies after the transition from military rule to democracy. The failure of central 
governments and the decline in quality of central leaders further contributed to the 
popularity of decentralisation.  
Smith (1985) emphasises the need to mobilise the poor and involve them in alleviating 
poverty. Democratic decentralisation will help them advance and support in meeting 
local needs. Decentralisation, in general, will support democratisation through the 
learning effect, as a transfer of responsibilities to civil society may lead to increased civil 
awareness and political maturity.  
2.2.2 Problems while implementing decentralisation 
Despite all the arguments in favour of decentralisation, several authors emphasise that, 
thus far, decentralisation in developing countries has almost everywhere fallen short of 
expectations (Smith 1985; Manor 1999). Cheema and Rondinelli mention that: 
 
‘Implementation is not merely a technical process of carrying out preconceived plans, but 
is a dynamic and somewhat unpredictable process of political interaction. A variety of 
political, social, behavioural, economic and organizational factors influence the degree to 
which policies are implemented as they were intended and the degree to which they 
achieve their intended goals’. (1983, p. 26)  
 
The reasons for the disappointing results of decentralisation can be traced back to a 
number of factors. Often only limited power is transferred to the lower levels. Financial 
autonomy at these levels is often restricted, as they are not given access to credit or the 
permission to levy taxes. The limited amount of funds transferred to lower levels hamper 
the implementation of projects. With respect to these financial aspects of 
decentralisation, Manor (1999, p. 28) mentions that the implementation of 
decentralisation projects will often lead to an increase of total government spending, 
causing system failure as only limited funds are available. The limited transfer of 
functions and funds often can be traced back to the lack of political will at the central 
level to really delegate power to the regional and local level. The central level remains 
strongly involved in the politics at these levels, often replacing elected bodies by a 
representative of the central government.  
The lack of capacity at the local level with respect to human resources and 
infrastructure constitutes another factor hampering the implementation of 
decentralisation projects. Often, employees at the local level are not capable of 
performing the functions that are being transferred, simply because they have not 
received the appropriate training. A lack of infrastructural capacity hampers particularly 
rural, often small municipalities, as they cannot meet the technical requirements.  
 26 
 
Prud’homme (1995) offers a critical analysis of present decentralisation projects. He 
concludes that, instead of reducing disparities, decentralisation will increase them at 
several levels. He considers the macro-economic effects of decentralisation generally to 
be negative, and he disagrees with the argument that decentralisation will increase the 
efficiency of public policy. Most of Prud’homme’s criticism stems from the 
implementation of decentralisation as a blueprint scenario. Instead of this, he calls for a 
differential application of the various dimensions of decentralisation, such as systems for 
taxation and public expenditures per sector, function and/or geographical area.  
2.2.3 Decentralisation in Latin America 
Latin American states are very centralist in their organisation and functioning. The 
origins of this phenomenon centralism lie in the past: Spanish colonial rule introduced a 
political-administrative structure with decision-making authority concentrated in central 
government (Nickson 1995). During the twentieth century, most countries began to 
transfer functions to lower-level governments. To properly understand these 
decentralisation processes, we will analyse the factors that have determined the form 
these decentralisation efforts have been taking. 
 
First, paradigms long having dominated the development debate such as the 
modernisation and dependency theories have given way to theories such as public choice 
theory3 that introduced institutional analysis in public policy (Manor 1999, p. 28). 
Second, the donor-driven search for good governance in developing countries has led 
to a critical analysis of the functioning of the state apparatus. The failure of large, 
integrated rural development programmes implemented in a top-down manner was 
attributed to the state’s incompetence and was illustrated by the ‘hollowing out’ of the 
state (Nickson 1995; Schuurman 1996, p. 8; Helmsing 2000, p. 5). In reaction, a more 
participatory, bottom-up approach to development problems was called for, with a 
greater role for lower tiers of government. It was thought that public performance at the 
local level would be much more efficient and responsive to the needs of the urban and 
rural poor.  
Third, the collapse of the authoritarian, autocratic regimes and the trend towards 
democratisation, stimulated the drive for decentralisation, particularly the democratic 
variant (Schuurman 1996, p. 9; Manor 1999, p. 30).  
Fourth, some authors believe globalisation being a driving force behind 
decentralisation processes. Schuurman (1996, p. 8-9), following Naisbitt (1994) and 
Swyngedouw (1992), argues that globalisation results in a ‘radical downsizing’ of the 
economy, with smaller but more autonomous units united around a global network. 
Swyngedouw (1992, p. 40) refers to this relation between the local and the global as 
‘glocalisation’. Other authors take issue with this position. Manor (1999, p. 34) argues 
that it is more correct to view the occurrence of decentralisation policies as being 
unconnected with the emergence of globalisation, since most decentralisation processes 
were implemented before the respective governments became aware of the challenges of 
globalisation. Moreover, governments that fear losing control over matters they are used 
to dominate are not likely to be eager to devolve even more functions to lower levels. 
Fifth, financial arguments have supported the drive towards decentralisation. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, many Latin American countries were confronted with a 
financial crisis and were no longer able to meet the obligations flowing from their foreign 
debt. The decentralisation of functions was viewed as an opportunity to unburden the 
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central government, and was thus seen as an instrument to effect savings by cutting total 
sector expenditures.  
 
Decentralisation policies in Latin America are generally a mix of the four types (Manor 
1999). Most countries have transferred functions and funds to lower levels where 
officials have been elected by the population. The moment of decentralisation, the share 
of sub-national levels in total public spending and the functions transferred to lower 
government levels have varied between countries.  
The far majority of Latin American countries introduced decentralisation measures in 
the 1980s (Table 2.1). When analysing the level of decentralisation, distinction should 
first be made between the federal countries and the unitary countries. The first include 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, where decentralisation is mainly focused on 
strengthening the position of the intermediate levels – the provinces (Argentina) and the 
states (Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela). In unitary countries the main focus of 
decentralisation is on the local, municipal level. Peru, which strengthened the provinces, 
is an exception here. 
 The level of decentralisation can be measured by the share of public expenditures 
handled by sub-national governments. Here, we can distinguish three broad categories 
(Table 2.1): those countries with a high level of decentralisation (more than 20% of total 
public expenditure), those with a moderate level of decentralisation (between 10-20%) 
and those with a relatively low level of decentralisation (less than 10%) (IDB 2000, p. 3; 
Willis 1999; Burki et al. 1999). Although a considerable amount of public expenditures 
is managed by sub-national government levels, the central government often retains the 
decision-making power in the allocation of the funds transferred. This implies that this 
kind of decentralisation refers more to administrative decentralisation, in particular 
delegation, than to devolution (IDB 2000). Ideally, the functions transferred should be 
allocated according the subsidiarity concept, with decisions made at the lowest possible 
level of government. However, in most Latin American countries this is only partially the 
case, leading to the sharing of functions among the different government levels and the 
lack of a clearly demarcated division of functional responsibilities. In the least 
decentralised countries the responsibility of the local level is generally limited to classic 
functions such as the maintenance of public services and waste management. In 
moderately decentralised countries, primary health care and education, urban planning 
and social housing form also part of the responsibilities of the local level. In highly 
decentralised countries, regional highways, welfare systems and secondary health and 
education belong to the main functions that are executed at the intermediate level. 
Typical central functions are defence and national highways.  
 
In explaining the variation in the form and extent of decentralisation between different 
Latin American countries, Willis and colleagues (1999, p. 49) found that excessive 
decentralisation set countervailing pressures in motion, leading to centralism. This is the 
result of a lack of political autonomy, a failure to transfer adequate funds and power to 
levy taxes, fiscal imbalances and an unequal distribution of benefits of decentralisation 
across jurisdictions. 
 
The emergence of political motives that inspired decentralisation projects have led to 
renewed attention for the local level, the municipalities; also in federal countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil (Box 2.1).  
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2.3 Good governance  
Governance is a new concept on the research agenda and is often viewed as a desired 
outcome of democratic decentralisation. A World Bank publication on Africa introduced 
Box 2.1  Examples of decentralisation policies in some Latin American countries 
 
In Mexico, decentralisation in the 1980s was adjusted, in order to strengthen local governments in 
their need to deal with the effects of rapid urbanisation. Although Mexican decentralisation involved 
a transfer of functions and responsibilities in the fields of education, health and funds to sub-
national levels (Martínez 1996), some authors consider this policy as an instrument used by the 
central government to assert its control (Rodríguez 1993).  
 
Brazil is one of the most decentralised countries in the world in terms of the distribution of fiscal 
resources and political power. In 1988, the Brazilian government ‘municipalised’ the health system. 
States and municipalities may now formulate their own health policies, based on nation-wide 
guidelines. Municipalities have total responsibility for the management of the health system, 
including policy formulation and planning, resource allocation, and the monitoring and evaluation 
of public and private health providers. Within this decentralisation of the health sector, several 
stages are identified with different conditions. The responsibilities of the municipalities increase 
according to the stage they are in. The political strength and financial resources of sub-national 
governments have been improved. However, federal governments are experiencing financial 
constraints and face difficulties in building governing coalitions. One of the difficulties encountered 
and an unintended effect is the persistence of clientelism and the creation of manoeuvring room for 
traditional elites (Souza 1996, p. 553-554).  
 
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile have also undergone decentralisation processes. Peru started a 
decentralisation programme in 1984 in order to promote employment and give local governments 
more autonomy. In 1988 measures such as quarterly meetings with neighbourhood organisations 
were added, with the aim to increase the participation of the population in local decision-making. A 
general criticism of decentralisation policy in Peru is that, in reality, it was motivated by the desire 
to increase presidential influence in the regions outside Lima. In addition, the functioning of local 
governments has been seriously threatened by the guerrilla activities of Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path) and the centralist attitude of the Fujimori presidency in the 1990s.  
 
In Ecuador, health and education have been decentralised. This sectoral approach was further 
expanded in 1985 by involving regional and local government levels in planning and measures 
aimed at increasing the participation of the population.  
 
Colombia started decentralising in 1986 when it introduced a package of legislation aimed at the 
treasuries, duties and powers of municipal governments, creating new mechanisms for citizen 
participation. Here, as in Chile, decentralisation involved devolving decision-making power to 
lower levels. However, decentralisation in these countries remained limited to the decentralisation of 
education and health, since financial control is still in the hands of the central government. 
 
In Honduras, decentralisation was initiated in 1990 through the Municipalities Act. Although this 
act was intended to transfer political decision-making, the process functioned more as a de-
concentration project (Salomon and Avila 1998). The decentralisation process was hampered by the 
limited transfer of resources as compared to the responsibilities assigned, a lack of local capacity, 
and severe limitations on popular participation.  
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the concept in 1989 by stating that a ‘crisis of governance’ was underlying Africa’s 
development problems. The perspective caught on and ‘governance’ became a buzzword. 
Some publications emphasise the importance of democracy and human rights, but most 
of them required a rather technocratic view – at least until the mid-1990s – focusing on 
management and administration as the key themes of good governance.  
The popularity of the concept and the increasing attention for governance issues, can be 
attributed the following factors (Leftwich 1994, p. 366):  
a. the experiences with structural adjustment in the 1980s;  
b. the dominance of neo-liberalism,  
c. the collapse of the official communist regimes in the 1990s; and  
d. the emergence of pro-democracy movements in the developing world.  
 
The implementation of structural adjustment programmes led to increased awareness of 
the importance of politics as the only option towards change. Adjustment produced a 
redistribution of resources and power to be implemented by the government who saw its 
ability to organise and execute policy be put to the test. As Leftwich states: ‘The 
experience with adjustment confronted the international institutions and bilateral donors 
with the reality of incompetent and often corrupt government in many developing 
countries’ (1994, p. 368). The remedy for this ‘incompetent and corrupt state’ was, 
however, one-sidedly looked for in managerial and administrative strategies, ignoring the 
important political issues that had undermined the quality of government at the first 
place.  
Neo-liberalism – which inspired the adjustment strategies – supported the idea of 
democratic politics and the creation of an efficient and accountable public policy as part 
of a free market economy. The concentration of political and economic power in the 
hands of the central state was regarded as excessive and counterproductive. In response, 
many western governments (represented by several multilateral organisations, such as the 
World Bank and the IMF) promoted good governance as a condition for sustainable 
economic growth. The collapse of communist regimes in the early 1990s underlined the 
importance of governance. In addition, western countries could now explicitly mention 
political criteria and impose conditions of democratisation and economic liberalisation 
without having to fear of ‘losing’ third world countries to the other camp. Economic and 
political liberalisation, decentralisation and governance came to dominate the 
development debate. The movements towards democratisation that emerged in the course 
of the 1980s in the wake of authoritarian governments further supported the call for good 
governance.  
Harpham and Boateng (1997), in a study on urban governance and urban services, 
explain the current focus on governance as a reaction to a perspective on development 
that placed too much emphasis on economic factors, bypassing the role of socio-political 
variables. The latter were considered too difficult to handle for donor organisations, 
which were afraid of being accused of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. 
Introducing the concept of governance in development cooperation, however, created a 
new situation and a shift towards strategies emphasising the importance of institutions. 
Several definitions of governance have been formulated since the concept first appeared 
on the development agenda. Halfani and colleagues (1994, p. 35) state that ‘governance, 
as distinct from government, refers to the relationship between civil society and the state, 
between rulers and the ruled, the state and society, the government and the governed’.  
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Paproski (1993) emphasises the dynamic of the concept, by defining it as:  
 
‘… a system of socio-cultural, political, and economic interaction among the various 
actors of the public and private institutions of civil society. The character of the system 
varies and changes through processes involving the exercise of power and authority with 
the inherent aim of enforcing the legitimacy of the existing power and authority 
structures, particularly through selective delivery and distribution of goods and services 
to the individual and collective groups in civil society.’  
 
While conceptualising, the concept of good governance was developed. This term has 
now become widely accepted, although some international donor organisations prefer to 
use ‘decentralised governance’ (EU) or ‘democratic local governance’ (UNDP) instead. 
In this study, however, we will use the term good governance. Four criteria will 
determine good governance and distinguish it from just ‘governance’ (see UNDP, 1998): 
good governance should be participatory, accountable, transparent and contribute to 
equity. Each of these dimensions will be discussed below.  
2.3.1 Participation 
During recent decades, the concept of participation has undergone some significant 
changes of meaning. For a long time, the concept was used as social participation and 
referred to sharing in community affairs and the implementation of development projects 
(Gaventa and Valderrama 1999), and research concentrated on the dynamics of social 
movements and self-help groups. More recently, the concept has gained a wider 
significance and has come to include the sharing of the population in local decision-
making processes, the result of the implementation of democratic decentralisation. This 
type of participation is generally referred to as political participation and it can be direct 
or indirect. Indirect political participation refers to the ability to elect representatives and 
can also be defined as representative participation. Direct political participation means 
the actual sharing of the population in local decision-making processes and the process of 
planning, formulating and implementing public policy, through legally recognised 
mechanisms (Schönwalder 1997, p. 756). This assumes direct interaction with the state 
and its institutions as equal partners.   
The relationship between decentralisation and popular participation can take two 
forms. Popular participation can be supporting decentralisation by increasing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of development projects and public programmes at the local 
level. In this way, popular participation is often limited to consultation and aid in the 
implementation phase of development projects. Schönwalder (1997, p. 756) calls this 
form the pragmatic approach to decentralisation, as opposed to the political approach, 
which uses popular participation not merely as an instrument but defines it as an 
objective. Popular participation, according to the political approach, increases its reach, 
including the phases of project planning and evaluation, and aims at a direct involvement 
of civil society organisations in decision-making processes in areas that affect their 
interests.  
The incorporation of popular participation into local decision-making in the various 
countries – as various studies indicate – does not meet all expectations despite its 
promising perspectives, Schönwalder (1997) mentions three basic reasons: the way local 
power structures are composed, with limited access for the popular strata; resistance to 
political change among local or regional elites and lack of political will at the higher 
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government levels to hand over political power to the lower levels; and the co-option of 
popular movements into local elites and other local actors neutralising their influence.  
Traditionally, the participation of the population in government decisions is weak in 
most Latin American countries (Nickson 1995). Authoritarianism has remained a 
significant characteristic of Latin American political systems. Community participation 
in everyday life, however, is very common, particularly in countries with a large 
indigenous population, such as Guatemala and Peru, even though this participation has 
not been able to change their social exclusion from society. In the past decades, the 
presence of military governments – authoritarian and centralist – had a strong negative 
effect on popular participation in local decision-making. In present day Latin America, 
popular participation has many different faces, and varies from the participatory 
budgeting in large cities, such as in Buenos Aires (Argentina), Porto Alegre (Brazil) and 
Montevideo (Uruguay) – to the consultative boards that we find in Chile, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua.  
Table 2.1 summarises the main ingredients of decentralisation policies in several Latin 
American countries, including the main features of popular participation. Based on these 
features, we can distinguish between countries with a high degree of popular 
participation, those with a moderate degree of popular participation, and those in which 
popular participation has been weakly developed.4 The city of Porto Alegre (Brazil) has 
been generally regarded as an outstanding case of participatory budgeting. It is currently 
serving as a model in 140 Brazilian municipalities (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis 2001, p.  
99). Participatory budgeting was introduced in 1988 by the leftist Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT). The neighbourhood organisations discuss the priorities for local 
investments through an intensive system of assemblies, forums and intermediate 
consultations and close contact with the municipal government at the local level (Abers 
1998). A similar situation is presented by Canel (2001) in his research on the impact of 
decentralisation in Montevideo, Uruguay. He found that decentralisation contributed to a 
more democratic type of municipal governance, by facilitating local participation in 
municipal decision-making. In Colombia popular participation includes giving local 
communities electoral power, establishing local referenda, introducing public-private 
partnerships in service delivery, and setting up citizen advisory boards (Santana 
Rodríguez 1995). The municipal funds foster community involvement in identifying 
local needs, and help to define instruments to attend those needs. In Honduras popular 
participation has been rather moderate. The Municipal Reform Law of 1990 introduced 
open municipal meetings. It also granted citizens the right to participate in the planning 
of development and the use of resources at the municipal level. An evaluation of popular 
participation in Honduras (Lippman and Pranke 1998) revealed, however, that the open 
meetings were, more often than not, purely ceremonial and that popular participation 
only functioned well in those municipalities where intensive support programmes were 
being implemented. Mexico presents another example of moderate popular participation 
in local decision-making. In 1989 it implemented the National Solidarity Programme 
(PRONASOL), a World Bank-financed project that targeted the urban poor, small 
peasants and indigenous communities (Fox and Aranda 1996; Rodríguez 1997). One of 
the elements of this programme was the Municipal Funds programme, through which the 
government channelled significant resources to municipal governments. With these 
funds, local development projects, identified by the local communities, could be funded. 
However, the distribution of funds was very much conditioned by political preference 
and the political will to decentralise in a substantial way was not always present. In Peru 
and Guatemala popular participation has been seriously hindered by the political 
situation.  
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Table 2.1  Decentralisation and popular participation in Latin America: some characteristics 
Country Year of 
reform 
(a & b) 
Share of 
sub-
national 
public 
expendi-
tures (in 
%) (e) 
Share of 
local 
government 
in total 
expendi-
tures (in %) 
(a) 
Degree of 
popular 
participa-
tion 
Characteristics of popular participation 
(a & b)  
HIGHLY DECENTRALISED 
Argentina 1983 49.3   9 (1992) 
(d) 
Low No specific measures; some interesting 
initiatives; 
Brazil 1988 45.6 18 (1991) High Referenda, popular tribunal, 
participatory budgeting participation by 
representative bodies 
Mexico 1977 25.4   3 (1990) Moderate Solidarity programme 1989, 
participation of citizen groups in 
selection/implementation of projects 
Venezuela 1989 19.6   7 (1989) Moderate Parish councils, consultative role with 
additional measures 
Colombia 1983 39.0 24 (1992) High Since 1986: consultation 
MODERATELY DECENTRALISED 
Uruguay 1984 14.2   4 (1986) Low Departments instead of municipalities; 
local boards, but lack of demand; the 
case of Montevideo 
Chile 1986 13.6 11 (1991) High Community council: advisory role  
Peru 1984 10.5   8 (1987) Low Lima also PP, but Sendero / Fujimori 
activities limited PP  
Honduras 1990 12.3   8 (1984) Moderate Consultation through cabildos abiertos 
since 1990 
Guatemala 1987 10.3 10 (1987) Low Military regime, minimal citizen 
participation 
LOWLY DECENTRALISED 
Ecuador 1982   7.5   5 (1992) Moderate Cabildo ampliado, not directly elected  
Paraguay 1991   6.2   2 (1988) Low Development commissions, some 
particular initiatives  
El Salvador 1986   6.0   3 (1990) Moderate Cabildos abiertos, popular 
consultations, advisory community 
groups  
Nicaragua 1988   5.2   5 (1989) Moderate Two cabildos (budget/implementation), 
municipal councils 
Costa Rica 1967   2.3   4 (1989) Low Community groups, limited role local 
government  
Panama    3.2   2 (1991) Low Nation-wide, sub-municipal level, but 
more miniature governments than 
independent bodies  
Sources: (a) Nickson (1995); (b) Burki et al. (1999); (c) Faguet (2000); (d) Willis, 1999; (e) IDB, 2000  
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Rendon Labadan (1996) shows in her study of the relationship between decentralisation 
and citizen participation in Guatemala that decentralisation – by creating more political 
space at the local level – may benefit the traditional elites who dominate the local power 
structure and have easy access to local authorities through clientelistic networks.  
Only in case that local elites manage secure funds for local investment, are successful in 
establishing relationships with the central government and are thus capable of 
strengthening local political dynamics, this type of decentralisation may benefit the 
community at large. In Costa Rica and Ecuador, popular organisations tend to bypass 
local governments by directing their demands directly to the central government. 
Martínez (1996) describes popular participation in Ecuador as ‘institutionalised’, because 
of the government’s dominant role and the limited room for the people to really have an 
say in the planning on the local level in areas that affect their interests. 
2.3.2 Accountability and transparency 
Transparency can be described as sharing information and acting in an open manner. In 
the United States this is called ‘government in sunshine’. This openness allows 
stakeholders access to information and check procedures in order to see whether there 
has been a deviation from the rates in whether any abuse has taken place. In a decision-
making process that is transparent people can defend their interests. Whether a process is 
transparent or not depends on a number of factors, such as the presence of clear 
procedures for public decision-making, open channels of communication between 
stakeholders and officials, and access to a wide range of information. Generally, 
decentralisation enables greater transparency and hereby enhances the legitimacy of local 
political institutions. But it can also have unintended effects, as is illustrated by the case 
of Karnataka, India (Manor 1999, p. 75).  
In the late 1980s, Karnataka implemented decentralisation by holding elections for 
district and local councils, followed by a transfer of resources and responsibilities to 
these councils. Transparency of local decision-making led to a decline of corruption in 
the political system. However, the perception of the population was that corruption had 
increased dramatically because in the more transparent decentralised set-up, it was far 
more visible than before. As a result, the decentralised, more transparent system appeared 
less legitimate than the one which had preceded it.  
Accountability can be defined as the need to clearly demarcate ‘who is responsible for 
what’ (Burki et al. 1999, p. 5). This aspect, as Burki and colleagues emphasise, is 
strongly related to the aspect of authority, in the sense that those who are accountable 
should also have the authority to deliver results. The definition used by the UNDP is 
more detailed: ‘the requirement that officials answer to stakeholders on the disposal of 
their powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept some 
responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit’ (UNDP 1998). Accountability takes 
various forms. Polidano and Hulme (1997) distinguish administrative and political 
accountability. The former refers to control within government institutions and includes 
input-oriented control (human resources, financial) and output-oriented control (services 
delivery); both are not easy to realise. Political accountability refers to direct 
responsiveness to civil society: government employees must be responsive to directly 
elected representatives, who in turn must be open and straight with the voting public. 
However, as elections are held at fixed, widespread intervals, mechanisms for exercising 
accountability are institutionalised through political parties, interest information, civil 
society, media and formal grievance procedures and opinion surveys (Blair 1998, p. viii). 
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Transparency and accountability at the local level are often limited. Shamsul Haque 
(1997) mentions several bottlenecks in creating accountability at the local level in 
developing countries. The extreme inequality in local power structures leads to local 
elites controlling local institutions, excluding the poor. Local elites have the financial 
resources to run for office, get elected and once elected, tend to use these local 
institutions for their own benefit. The relations between central and local government are 
often based on dependency with respect to finance, responsibilities and power. Alliances 
between the local elite and central government serve to freeze their situation. The central 
government often exerts tight control over local institutions and tends to be very 
bureaucratic with respect to resource use and decision-making. Politics and 
administration at the local level are often confused. Government officials will act in 
favour of local elites, who in turn will reward them, closing a vicious circle. 
Accountability in such a situation is difficult to realise, certainly where civil society has 
been weakly organised and a democratic culture has been lacking that pushes for the 
control of local and national government. In many situations local government may be 
more responsive to the central government, the national political structure and local elites 
than to the local population.  
Accountability and transparency are strongly related, as greater transparency in the 
activities of government institutions contributes to enhanced accountability (Manor 1999, 
p. 73). Decentralisation – in particular political or democratic decentralisation – can 
contribute to transparency and accountability at the local level through the direct election 
of local authorities, the establishment of institutions representing the population, and 
popular participation in the planning of projects/local development. Multiparty systems 
will offer better opportunities to participate in this process, as opposition forces 
constantly will raise questions about the conduct of those in government and will expose 
abuse and misdeeds (Polidano and Hulme 1996). Also in this case, however, local social 
and political practice will determine its effectiveness. Fox and Aranda (1996, p. 50) 
conclude that: 
 
‘It is often assumed that decentralisation necessarily encourages more accountable 
governance. The impact of decentralisation on accountability depends on how 
representative local government was before receiving additional external resources. At 
least in Mexico, there is no evidence that increased external funding for municipalities, 
even with pro-rural targeting mechanisms attached, increases local-level accountability. 
...These conclusions suggest, therefore, that increased funding without institutional 
change is likely to reinforce the existing institutional structure.’  
2.3.3 Equity  
Equity is an important dimension of good governance, in the sense that good governance 
should offer similar opportunities to groups or individuals in similar positions.  
Equity can be applied to the other dimensions of good governance, that is, 
participation, transparency and accountability. Equity in participation means that all 
segments of the population should have equal access to participatory mechanisms, 
between and within groups. Equity in transparency means that all members of civil 
society should have the same access to information on how local decision-making is 
being structured. Equity in accountability means that all persons should have access to 
the same mechanisms to control local government, such as the right to elect authorities 
and to represent civil society in controlling bodies. Traditionally, decentralisation has 
been considered as favouring equity, both between and within regions. However, one can 
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only expect this to happen in case of the transfer of funds to the regional and/or local 
levels (Manor 1999). When local governments have to generate their own resources 
without receiving funds from the central government, decentralisation will not be able to 
reduce regional and/or local disparities, as resource-poor municipalities will have more 
difficulties in raising funds than the richer ones. Transfer of funds will create room for a 
decentralisation project to reduce regional disparities. Actual positive effects on equity 
will depend on a number of conditions, such as:  
- the incorporation of financial distribution codes that assign more than average 
resources to resource-poor municipalities; 
- differential assignment of functions, depending on resource presence; and  
- finally, the creation of ‘municipal commonwealths’ or union of several resource-
poor municipalities as a way to increase political ‘weight’ and create economies of 
scale.  
The potential of decentralisation to reduce disparities within localities and regions is 
being conditioned by regional and/or local power relations, the political will of elites to 
support projects of redistribution in favour of the poor, and the ability of the poor to 
organise and later on enter in a dialogue with the government and other interest 
organisations. Finally, decentralisation has also been suggested as an effective means of 
counteracting the ‘urban bias’, since the institutional context created by decentralisation 
would enable the representatives of rural populations to defend local and/or regional 
interests at a higher level. In political practice it does not always work that way. Urban 
populations tend to be more organised and politically skilled, and their proximity to the 
local and/or regional government gives them a better position to obtain support for their 
development projects. In case they outnumber the rural population, the election of an 
urban-biased local government may follow with possible negative effects in local and/or 
regional equity (Prud’homme 1995). Fox and Aranda (1996, p. 47) show in their study 
on the impact of the Municipal Funds Programme in Oaxaca that, although this 
programme stimulated investments in rural areas, the investments in the municipal 
centres were almost triple those in rural areas.  
2.4 Decentralisation and local development  
The crisis of the central state, in combination with the trend towards decentralisation, 
forced a revaluation of development policies on the sub-national (regional and local) 
level (Guimarães 1997, p. 281). This assessment was also inspired by the failure of 
regional planning methodologies in the 1970s and 1980s to define effective means to 
overcome regional inequalities and address the excessive spatial concentration of 
economic activities and population. Researchers and policy makers turned their attention 
to local development, following the revival of local government. In 1994 there were 
some 14,000 municipalities in Latin America (Nickson 1995, p. 1; IDB 2000, p. 10). All 
share functions and responsibilities and their governments can play a major role in local 
development. 
2.4.1 The concept of local development revisited 
The debate about local development in developing countries, its objectives, actors and 
policies to be implemented, is a relatively recent phenomenon. It has not resulted yet in 
the development of a certain paradigm. Lathrop (1997, p. 95) states: ‘… so far, and 
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probably for very good reasons, there seem to be no attempts at coming up with an 
integrated field of knowledge that can be called ‘the theory of local development’’.  
Some observations can be made with respect to the efforts to conceptualise local 
development. First, many authors approach local development from a predominantly 
economic perspective, using location theory, capital accumulation and technological 
change as the main theoretical framework (Bingham and Mier 1993; Blakely 1994; 
Rogerson 1995). Exponents of this view emphasise the need for local industrialisation, 
through the attraction of external investments or the development of small-scale 
enterprises. Although local industrialisation through the attraction of outside investments 
might be a viable strategy in larger cities which have a market and are well accessible 
and well organised, in large parts of rural Latin America this strategy is not a realistic 
option (Rogerson 1995, p. viii). Lathrop warns against focusing exclusively on economic 
conditions when considering local development (1997, p. 96). He defines local 
development as a strategy enlarging people’s access to opportunities, whether ‘income, 
employment, or the consumption of public goods and services’. People’s access to these 
opportunities is determined not only by their presence, but also – and especially – by the 
way they are distributed. The increase of opportunities will mainly be an economic affair, 
but access to these opportunities is an essentially political question.  
A second observation is that within this new approach to local economic development, 
the emphasis is not so much on external factors as on endogenous processes and actors. 
Blakely (1994, p. 50) points out that local economic development should emphasise 
‘endogenous development’ policies using the potential of local human, institutional and 
physical resources. A major role in this is assigned to civil society, since ‘obviously only 
local social forces will be able to identify objectives and instruments of intervention in 
relation to the actual situation in each area’ (Garofolli 1990, p. 95-96; see also Wilson 
1995, p. 645).  
 
The increasing attention paid to the local institutional context in explaining local 
development is also expressed by Shepherd in his classic work on sustainable rural 
development. According to Shepherd (1998, p. 1) rural development refers to ‘the set of 
activities and actions of diverse actors – individuals, organisations and groups – which 
taken together leads to progress in rural areas’. In the rural local context, and in that of 
decentralisation, this institutional context includes both local government and the private 
sector. This last category is represented by the local population, their organisations and 
NGOs.  
The role of NGOs in rural development has been extensively analysed during recent 
decades (Van Niekerk 1994; Wils 1997; Zoomers 1998; Van der Borgh 1999; Kusters 
2001). It is widely acknowledged that when the state withdrew from many areas in the 
economy and society during the implementation in structural adjustment policies, NGOs 
stepped in and created an important role for themselves in the planning and implementing 
of rural development projects. Within the context of decentralisation this role is prone to 
changes. Latin American NGOs emerged in the 1970s within a context of military 
regimes. In this period, the main focus of NGO activities was on increasing public 
awareness and strengthening of social organisations. The relation with the state in that 
period was one of distrust. In the 1980s, there was a shift towards economic development 
as a result of the withdrawal of the state in this field. NGOs acquired the status of experts 
on rural development, a status based on experience and a relatively healthy financial 
position, a result of extensive funding by western donors (Bebbington 1997).  
In the 1990s, many Latin American countries implemented decentralisation policies, 
often resulting in a revaluation of local governments. For NGOs, this implied a shift in 
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their position vis-à-vis the state. At the same time, international donors, who provide the 
financial input for NGOs, questioned their accountability. Also, the amount of money 
channelled through NGOs decreased. Both developments stimulated NGOs to reconsider 
both their position and their legitimacy. This has resulted in a change in the collaboration 
with the state. NGOs are increasingly required to work with government institutions. 
Also, as a reaction to the trend towards local democratisation and the new notion of local 
governments, NGOs now emphasise in their activities participatory methodologies and 
provide training to support the population in their new role in local decision-making.  
In line with the changing views on decentralisation, the role of local government in 
decentralisation changed. As Helmsing (2000, p. 6) observes, decentralisation ‘…has 
ceased to be a local affair, and has turned into a local governance issue’. In this respect, a 
revaluation of the role of local government in development can be noticed, with a focus 
on the role of government – and particularly that of local government – as an ‘enabler’ 
(Helmsing 2000, p. 6 and 1997; World Bank 1993). Instead of direct intervention and the 
delivery of services (in the production sphere), the role of the new local government is 
one of facilitating and regulating this service provision. The main functions of this 
enabling government are to formulate strategies of public private sector cooperation, and 
to create the main conditions for policy implementation, in particular in relation to the 
mobilisation of funds. With respect to this new role, some bottlenecks condition the 
performance of local governments in development. These conditioning factors are 
elaborated in the following section.  
2.4.2 Conditioning factors in the contribution of decentralisation to the role of 
local government and local development 
Sufficient financial and fundraising capacity  
A basic condition for adequate performance of functions transferred to the local level and 
meeting all popular demands is the availability of sufficient financial resources. Most 
local governments face a problem here. Raising additional funds locally is one way to 
tackle this problem. Manor (1999) mentions two types of the ‘mobilisation of local 
resources’: firstly the levying of taxes and secondly the investments made in cash or in 
kind, such as labour or materials, by target groups at the local level, when implementing 
projects.  
Some authors write glowingly about the untapped fiscal potential of local government, 
but in practice there are several problems in raising funds at the local level, particularly 
in rural areas where resources are limited (Manor 1999, p. 111). Moreover, many central 
governments are reluctant to transfer tax levying powers to sub-national authorities, but 
even if they would devolve these powers, it would not be easy to collect taxes at these 
levels, given the lack of administrative capacity, especially in rural areas, and the absence 
of cadastral surveys. Local governments themselves often are reluctant to levy taxes, as 
this might affect their popularity in the presence of a reluctant population that has seen 
few services in return for their tax payments. Schuurman (1996, p. 17) mentions with 
respect to local governments in Chile that: ‘many of the poor municipalities remained 
very dependent upon redistributed national funds. They did not succeed in developing an 
autonomous tax base to warrant greater financial independence from central budgets.’ A 
more practical way to mobilise local resources is to have the population involved in the 
implementation of communal projects. Manor (1999) and Rendon Labadan (1996) 
mention this as a potentially successful strategy, provided these contributions of the 
population are properly guided. Under Colombia’s co-participation system, the local 
community will provide labour and local materials, and the local government will carry a 
 38 
certain part of the costs (Santana Rodríguez 1995). Fiszbein (1995, p. 1036) mentions the 
system of minga which functions in Colombian municipalities, especially in the road and 
water sector. The system proved to be a good resource, contributed positively to the cost-
effectiveness of the projects that were undertaken and secured the responsibility of the 
population with respect to project maintenance. However, in most cases that one will 
encounter in Latin America, local investments will remain very fragmented due to 
insufficient access to resources. Mexico offers an example where, due to the lack of 
financial resources, the Municipal Funds Programme led to a multitude of small projects 
that had very little developmental significance (Fox and Aranda 1996).  
 
Adequate administrative capacity 
A major limiting factor concerns the administrative capacity of the new local 
governments. In a study on capacity development in Colombian municipalities, Fiszbein 
(1997, p. 1031-1032) discerns three dimensions of administrative capacity: qualified 
human resources (the human dimension), financial capital (the physical dimension) and 
technology (the internal organisation and the management style). He found that there is a 
close relationship between political reforms and capacity development, since competition 
for political office offered more opportunities for responsible and innovative leadership. 
He also found that capacity development in small municipalities is strongly related to the 
mayor, as these municipalities generally have only limited staff (ibid., p. 1034). He 
notices (ibid., p. 1034): 
 
‘Small and remote municipios experience particular difficulties in upgrading the quality 
of their workforce. In the first place, scale imposes a natural or structural limit on the 
number of professionals working for the municipal administration. A majority of the 
Colombian municipios simply cannot afford the expenses of a cadre of adequately 
remunerated professionals in the different areas of government responsibility. Second the 
cost of hiring even a few well-qualified professionals might be too high for many small 
municipios that would have to attract them from other – sometimes distant – places.’  
  
However, Fiszbein concludes that municipal administrative capacity is not necessarily a 
function of size. In Colombia, a successful effort was made to increase local capacity 
through competitive hiring, sharing professionals between municipalities and rotating 
personnel through the different departments within municipalities, increasing their 
experience and know-how (UNDP 1998).  
In Honduras, Lippman and Pranke (1998) noted the importance of prior development 
experience in achieving local development, which helps to develop professional and 
technical expertise. 
 
Creation of economies of scale 
Creating economies of scale seems to be an important condition for decentralisation to 
contribute to local governance and development. Often, municipalities are at a 
disadvantage in attracting qualified staff due to the lack of career opportunities. Lippman 
and Pranke (1998) show that in relatively small municipalities effective municipal 
governance is hindered by the poor education of the mayors and councils that govern 
them.  
 Fox and Aranda (1996, p. 2) add to this observation that rural local governments also 
encounter problems with respect to community participation, as they are usually the 
poorest and institutionally weakest with limited opportunity to implement activities 
involving economies of scale. They also have a political structure that is often dominated 
 39 
by traditional elites, with mistrust for popular mobilisation and democratisation. In 
connection with this, Smith (1985, p. 61) shows that ‘large units of decentralised 
government have no worse a record than small ones in some aspects of political 
participation’.  
The need to create economies of scale also becomes apparent in the implementation of 
development projects aimed at the provision of services. The problem is that financing 
institutions often prefer small and clearly delineated projects within a fixed timeframe, 
while the lasting impact of these projects on local development is generally small.  
Fiszbein (1995, p. 1039), in his study on capacity development in Colombia, notes the 
difference between small and larger municipalities with respect to the presence of 
development plans. He found that small municipalities generally do not have these plans, 
but work with listings of priorities. Larger municipalities, however, do have municipal 
development plans. In the case of Honduras, Lippman and Pranke (1998) found that the 
involvement of NGOs was crucial during the planning and implementation phases of 
projects.  
 
Willingness of the central government to step back 
Finally, it appears from the many studies on decentralisation, that its realisation is and 
remained an uphill struggle. Government functionaries on the higher level often fear a 
loss of power in case responsibilities and functions would be transferred to lower levels. 
This is what happened in Honduras (Lippman and Pranke 1998, p. 11-13), where higher 
government officials tried to retain control over municipal expenditure by hindering the 
transfer of the funds as established by law.  
 
In the following section, we attempt to link the concepts of decentralisation, local 
governance and local development, and present the conceptual framework.  
2.5 Approach of the study   
In this  review of the literature, several issues keep surfacing. Decentralisation is 
increasingly being considered as a political issue of power over resources at the central, 
regional and local level (Smith 1985; Manor 1999; Litvack et al. 1998; Burki 1999). 
Most literature on decentralisation offers a rather disappointing picture of the results: 
functions and responsibilities are transferred, but without the allocation of the appropriate 
resources in terms of financial and human capital. It is also observed that the local 
capacity to handle the new responsibilities is lacking, which complicates efficient 
management of local resources. Many municipalities face severe difficulties when 
mobilising own resources, levying taxes, or confronting political and technical 
constraints on the local level. In addition, local governments face restrictions in their 
authority through attempts of central governments to gain control.  
With regard to participation, the findings of other studies are more positive: 
populations are increasingly participating in local decision-making processes. Increased 
popular participation can lead to more responsiveness to local needs and to a more 
balanced use of local resources. It also involves an important learning effect, which 
serves the quality of the planning process, the projects and the sustainability of 
development. A major problem with participation remains the question of representation: 
whose priorities count? Empirical studies show that, especially in rural areas, traditional 
elites control the local level, restricting the opportunities of the poor.  
Decentralisation can enhance transparency and accountability by clearly defining 
responsibilities and functions, and by institutionalising controlling bodies. In this study, 
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equity is analysed from a spatial perspective. It refers to the reduction of disparities 
between and within municipalities brought about by decentralisation.  
The concept of local development in this study refers to improving people’s access to 
development opportunities by both increasing these, and ensuring that these are evenly 
distributed. Within the context of decentralisation, three conditioning factors can be 
identified on the basis of the literature review: the spatial context, the socio-economic 
context and the institutional context (comprising both public and private actors). Figure 
2.1 presents an overview of the concepts discussed in this chapter and the relations 
between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Concepts 
 
 
The aim of this study is to obtain a better understanding of the impact of decentralisation 
policy on local governance and local development in rural Bolivia and to define the 
factors explaining the success and failure of decentralisation. It is assumed that 
democratic decentralisation will lead to increased participation of the population in local 
decision-making, to enhanced transparency and accountability, and to more equity. The 
contribution of decentralisation to local development comprises four assumptions:  
1. Participatory planning offers opportunities to develop a more efficient and effective 
development strategy. 
2. Popular demands are reflected in local investments, leading to a more responsive state. 
3. The resource position of municipalities improves and a multiplier effect can be 
noticed. 
4. Elements within the spatial, socio-economic and institutional context determine the 
impact of decentralisation policy on local governance and local development.  
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Notes 
 
1. This study concentrates on decentralisation of government. Other forms of decentralisation, such as 
spatial decentralisation and industrial decentralisation, are left outside consideration. 
2. The main characteristics of the types of decentralisation that are being dealt with in this section are 
based on Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Rondinelli 1984; Litvack and colleagues 1998; Manor 1999; 
Smith 1985; Burki and colleagues 1999; Rodríguez 1997 and Canel 2001. 
3. Public choice theory is directed towards the study of politics based on economic principles. It gives 
insight in the formulation of public policy, and departs from the viewpoint that public policy is 
inspired, and influenced, by collective economic motives. It considers politics as an economic market, 
with individuals and groups attempting to maximise their benefits. The theory clarifies the influence 
of interest groups on politicians and the outcome of this on policy making (Gunning 2001).  
4. In this section, Bolivia is left outside consideration. 
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3 DECENTRALISATION AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION: THE 
BOLIVIAN MODEL 
Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America, implemented decentralisation 
policies in 1994, through the Law on Popular Participation (LPP).1 The aim of this 
chapter is to describe the characteristics of the Bolivian decentralisation model and to 
discuss the similarities with and differences from experiences in other Latin American 
countries. To provide an understanding of the character of Bolivia’s decentralisation 
process, we start by introducing the country’s political and economic background, 
concentrating on the main socio-economic developments in the period 1953-93 (i.e. since 
the 1952 revolution, which marks a turning point in Bolivian history, until the 
implementation of the LPP). Next, we focus on the political-administrative structure of 
Bolivia prior to 1994, including an overview of decentralisation experiments in that 
period and paying attention to the role of NGOs. Subsequently, we will describe the legal 
framework of decentralisation and its implementation in practice.  We will finalise this 
chapter by discussing the perspectives of decentralisation under the Banzer government 
(1997--).  
3.1 The political background  
The early 1950s were a turning point in Bolivia’s recent history. The 1952 revolution 
temporarily did away with dictatorial regimes. A year later, the reforma agraria (land 
reform) introduced a series of drastic changes into Bolivian society. Land formerly the 
property of the large landowners in the hacienda system was redistributed to the peasants 
who used to work as peones (peons or farm workers) at the haciendas. This was 
accompanied by a new social organisation in the country: the rural, mostly indigenous 
population, the former serfs, organised themselves into sindicatos (unions) that were 
structured on several levels, from the communal to the national.  
The Chaco War2 (1932-35) is considered to have laid the foundation for the 1952 
Revolution, since this war contributed to the increased dissatisfaction with the ruling 
classes and the uneven power structures (Havet 1985, p. 27; Thiesenhusen 1995, p. 55). 
After the war, the rural poor, factory workers, miners and the middle class became much 
more conscious of their own situation and that of the country, especially the unlimited 
power in the hands of the tin barons, the uneven distribution of land and the way labour 
was organised in the rural zones. Between 1935 and 1952, several attempts were made to 
correct some of these imbalances by carrying out reforms, but the traditional oligarchic 
parties, and especially the landowners and tin barons, refused to relinquish their power. 
This resulted in the miners and peasants intensifying their actions by means of land 
invasions and sit-down strikes as instruments to get what they wanted. To coordinate 
their actions, they organised themselves into what were later to become the unions. Thus, 
growing discontent, supported by high inflation and deterioration of the socio-economic 
situation, led to the revolution of 1952 and the land reform of 1953.  
The 1952 revolution was initiated by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(National Revolutionary Movement – MNR), under the leadership of Victor Paz 
Estensoro. According to McEwen the discontent was the result of: ‘… stagnation and 
imbalance of the national economy, inadequate tax revenue, an increasingly inept 
national administration, the growing organisation and militancy of labour groups, 
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especially miners, and the spreading dissatisfaction in the politically critical urban 
populations’ (McEwen 1975, p. 21). 
The main changes brought about by the revolution were the nationalisation of the tin 
mines and the extension of the franchise system. This was followed by the 1953 land 
reform, which brought about the end of the traditional hacienda system, in which 4% of 
the private land holdings occupied 82% of all agricultural properties The land was 
transferred to the Indian peons who had formerly worked on the haciendas (McEwen 
1975, p. 22). The reform also implied the emergence of the sindicatos, which abandoned 
their low profile and expressed a strong wish for independence. From this moment on, 
the peasant organisations form the most important civil organisation in rural Bolivia. The 
unions were territorially organised, forming peasant communities. The main function of 
the union was to negotiate with the government representatives who were implementing 
the land reform, and with the former patron (the owner of the hacienda). Through the 
union system, they could make collective decisions, elect their own representatives and 
manage their own affairs. For the first time in Bolivian history, peasants were enabled to 
participate in extra-local affairs and the national arena (McEwen 1975, p. 23). The union 
system also meant the start of the peasants’ involvement in the implementation of 
projects. According to Thiesenhusen (1995, p. 63) ‘…in the absence of viable local 
governments the sindicatos often organised campesinos to build schools and other public 
works’.  
Although the land reform had a redistributory effect on tenure systems in general, its 
impact was far more profound in the valleys and the Altiplano than in the eastern 
lowlands.  
A renewed electoral system meant a further incorporation of the rural population into 
the national political system. Universal suffrage was established and sex, literacy and 
income restrictions on the right to vote were abolished. Voting was also made obligatory. 
The result was an enormous increase in the number of Bolivians who voted: from around 
126,000 before 1952, to 931,888 in the first elections after the revolution, and then to 
1,294,000 votes in 1964 (McEwen 1975, p. 24). Another measure to improve the position 
of the population was the use of the term campesino rather than the discriminatory indio 
to refer to the indigenous rural population.  
These changes, which were intended to stimulate the integration of the rural 
population into national society, were accompanied by an educational reform, aimed at 
increasing the number of educational facilities in rural zones.  
In 1964, the MNR government was overthrown by a military coup. According to 
Malloy (1989), the main reason for the coup was the inability of the MNR to combine the 
transformation of society with economic development. During the period of authoritarian 
government (which continued until the early 1980s3), the relation between the state and 
society worsened. The successive military governments ruled with a firm hand and used 
violent methods to suppress popular protest. While these governments were in power, the 
country was relatively prosperous. In this respect, the government of General Hugo 
Banzer (1971-8) has frequently been mentioned as successfully promoting economic 
development. Malloy (1989, p. 71), however, argues that despite good economic 
performance, this period laid the foundation for the economic crisis of the first half of the 
1980s. The government apparatus, for example, grew explosively from 66,000 public-
sector employees in 1970 to more than 170,000 in 1977 (Van Lindert and Verkoren 
1994, p. 23). Moreover, the Banzer government emphasised development of the eastern 
lowlands of Santa Cruz through agricultural colonisation, neglecting the economic 
problems in the valleys and the Altiplano. In 1982, the country re-embraced democracy 
when Siles Suazo was elected president.  
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3.2 The economic context 
Economically, the country has a troubled history, in which the extraction of minerals – 
especially tin and silver – and subsistence farming play a key role. The tin and silver 
supplies have been exploited ever since the Spanish ruled the country and remained the 
most important export products until 1985. These minerals are found in the departments 
of Potosi and Oruro on the Altiplano. Since 1952, exploitation has been controlled by the 
state Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL). Although the exploitation of mines 
generated the most important export product, this sector did not manage to become a 
solid economic sector and even experienced negative growth figures.  
Besides mining, the production of coca provides an important informal export product. In 
1974, cotton production in the lowlands stagnated and many peasants in those areas 
decided to start – by making use of government subsidies – coca production. The 
importance of coca in Bolivia’s non-official export figures rose dramatically, from an 
estimated 25% in 1985 to 43% in 1990 (Van Lindert and Verkoren 1994). 
 
The Bolivian economy was seriously affected by the economic depression in the early 
1980s. The main causes of this depression were the monetary and debt crisis, and the 
economic depression in the West. As a result, interest rates increased sharply, due to 
which Bolivia was confronted with increased costs of loans that could be so easily 
acquired in the 1970s. The economic depression in the rest of the world resulted in higher 
prices of imports and lower prices for Bolivia’s export products. Due to diminishing tin 
prices, the exports of tin decreased from US$ 378 million in 1980 to US$ 248 million in 
1985. Besides these external factors, the economic depression can also be attributed to 
such internal factors as inflation, increasing governmental expenditure and diminishing 
tax income (Dunkerly, 1990; Mann et al., 1989). Inflation in Bolivia reached 25,000% in 
July 1985, leading to a dramatic loss (46%) of purchasing power. People called for 
presidential elections, resulting in Victor Paz Estensoro again taking up residence in the 
presidential palace.4  
To combat high inflation figures and the worst economic depression for years, the 
Bolivian government implemented in 1985 – under pressure of the IMF and the World 
Bank – a stringent package of structural adjustment measures under the name of the New 
Economic Policy (la Nueva Economica Política – NEP). Jeffrey Sachs – a famous 
American economist at the World Bank – played a key role in its design and the Minister 
of Planning and Coordination, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada – the president who later was 
to implement decentralisation policies – implemented the NEP.  
The most important elements of the NEP were the freeing of wages, the dismantling 
of the once so important mining sector (23,000 mine workers lost their jobs), trade 
liberalisation, the abolition of government subsidies on food and basic goods and the 
introduction of a new currency. The inflation rate dropped within a few weeks and, from 
an economic perspective, the policies had the desired long-term impact: the country’s 
inflation rate in 1993 was 9.3% (one of the lowest rates in Latin America) and economic 
growth increased by 3-4% each year.5  
The social implications of the SAP were, however, less successful, as many people 
lost their job and food prices increased substantially. Although the impact of the NEP 
was felt in all sectors of Bolivian society, rural areas were especially affected, as they 
also suffered from serious droughts. In order to relieve some of these effects, the 
government established the Social Emergency Fund (the Fondo de Emergencia Social – 
FES). This fund mainly financed projects in the social sector, such as education and 
health.  
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In explaining the success of the NEP in Bolivia, it is important to mention the ‘hidden’ 
sector in Bolivian economic statistics: the cultivation, processing and export of coca, and 
the product derived from it, cocaine. By temporarily migrating to the coca-producing 
region north of Cochabamba (Chapare), many people affected by the NEP managed to 
increase their income to outlive the crises. The rural population and miners also 
responded to the worsened economic situation by moving to the large cities (El Alto, La 
Paz and Santa Cruz), and to the eastern lowlands where the export-oriented production of 
soya, cotton and sugarcane was expanding. Bolivia rapidly changed from a 
predominantly rural country in 1976, when 42% of the population lived in cities, to an 
urban country with 57% living in urban areas in 1992 (INE 1992).  
 
Agriculture still is the main source of employment for most Bolivians, absorbing 44% of 
the economically active population (INE 1992). The agricultural sector is dominated by 
subsistence farming, although the export-oriented production of soya, cotton and 
sugarcane in the eastern lowlands is expanding.  
The second sector of importance is that of services (36%), in which the La Paz-
Cochabamba-Santa Cruz axis is the leading area. Industry employs 12% of the 
population, and mining 2%.  
Characteristic of Bolivian economy is the almost complete lack of processing 
industries for minerals or agricultural products. Although industrial complexes are 
emerging in the department of Santa Cruz, Bolivian industry is mainly directed at the 
domestic market. The import of industrial and semi-finished products, especially in the 
form of contraband, is far more important than the processing of goods.  
 
Within the country, large regional differences in living conditions can be found, at 
different levels of scale. First, large differences exist between the lowlands with 
economic potential and a more diversified economic structure, and the higher situated 
departments that largely depend on subsistence agriculture. This is also expressed in the 
Human Development Index (HDI). The lowland departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and 
Pando have, respectively, a moderate HDI of 0.620, 0.538 and 0.532. The departments of 
Potosi and Chuquisaca, on the other hand, have a very low HDI of respectively 0.373 and 
0.430 (UDAPSO-PNUD 1997, p. 22). Second, also within departments large differences 
between resource-rich and resource-poor regions can be observed, with the departmental 
capitals having a much higher standard of living than the surrounding rural areas.   
3.3 The political-administrative structure and experiments with decentralisation 
before 1994 
Bolivia’s political-administrative structure before 1994 consisted of nine departments, 
subdivided in 112 provinces. These provinces were subdivided in 297 provincial sections 
and 1,500 cantons. Despite the presence of sub-national levels, political and economic 
power and decision-making processes were concentrated at the central, national level 
since independence in 1825. This means that during most of the post-colonial period the 
country has been a very centralist nation. The formal head of the department level, the 
prefect, was appointed by the national president and only had a representative function 
and very limited political power. The functions of the prefect’s office before 1994 were 
mainly administrative. The same applies to the sub-prefect, head of the provincial level 
and also appointed by the national president. The provincial sections had no formal 
representation. The cantons were governed by the corregidor, a policeman-type official 
appointed by the prefect with no official functions. 
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Although the concept of municipality was absent in the formal structure of the country, 
urban settlements, varying from small villages to large cities, were called municipalities. 
These municipalities had a strictly urban radius, comprising only the urban population. 
This implied that the rural population, living in the peasant communities (and organised 
in the aforementioned sindicatos) was not part of the municipality, and consequently 
totally excluded from the formal political-administrative structure.  
 
Although being a centralist nation, the current decentralisation policies certainly did not 
appear out of the blue and should be placed in a context of years of debate on, and 
regional experiments with, decentralisation. The Comités Civicos (Civic Committees – 
CCs) were established already in the 1950s, aiming at more financial autonomy for the 
departmental level. The first CC was established in 1950 in the department of Santa 
Cruz. In that year, municipal elections were banned and the population of the city of 
Santa Cruz considered itself as being deprived of any instrument of political 
representation. They created the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz; which definitely developed into 
the most powerful CC. The CCs are considered as most effective instruments for regional 
fights and what is generally called the pensamiento regional (regional thinking).  
This resulted at the end of the 1960s in the legal establishment of the Regional 
Development Corporations (Corporaciones Regionales de Desarrollo – CORDES). The 
CORDES were created in all departments, and their activities were mainly in the field of 
public works, such as sewerage and the provision of electricity, the performance of 
studies and the implementation of integrated rural development projects. The funds to 
implement these activities consisted of two resources: those coming directly from the 
national government and own resources. The latter were based on regalias petroleras (oil 
royalties) in the case of Santa Cruz, Tarija and Chuquisaca, and on regalias mineras 
(mining royalties) in Potosi, Oruro, La Paz and Cochabamba. The two departments that 
lacked any natural resources received some compensatory funds from the national 
treasury. This led to a highly uneven distribution of funds, as some departments produce 
more than others, and oil produces more income than the production of minerals. The 
board of the CORDES was composed of several members, such as the prefectura, the 
local government of the departmental capital city, the university, the army, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, professionals, entrepreneurs and the peasant unions, all with voz y voto 
(‘voice and vote’). 
Studies on the performance of the CORDES often emphasise their highly bureaucratic 
structure. During the period 1974-8, overhead and functional costs increased dramatically 
(from 5.6% to 22.7%) in all departments except Cochabamba, while investments 
decreased accordingly (Roca 1999, p. 129). The increasing bureaucratisation of the 
CORDES led to growing awareness that these entities were not the most appropriate 
instruments to enhance development.  
Despite this criticism of the CORDES, they did in their way try to improve the 
prevalent planning system. Systematic planning appeared on the national agenda only in 
the 1970s. From then on, national medium-term planning documents were presented. 
Often, these plans were to be implemented with financial support of international donors 
or were, in practice, not implemented at all. Moreover, these plans had mainly a national 
focus (Toranzo Roca 1988). Since the mid-1970s, most Regional Development 
Corporations had formulated departmental development policies, although in most cases 
only short-term ones.  
An important contribution to decentralised planning was the introduction of the 
concept of regional planning by the CORDES in the 1980s. In these plans, river basins 
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(cuencas) were seen as the most appropriate territorial unit to plan and implement 
projects.  
In the 1980s, some other proposals were elaborated to assign more responsibilities to 
sub-national levels, such as the Tax Reform of 1986, the Financial Law of 1988 and a 
proposal in the elections campaign of 1989.6 The debate in this period was consequently 
called the ‘impossible decentralisation’, as it appeared impossible to develop a proposal 
that was acceptable for all actors nation wide.  
However, at the sub-national level, some interesting experiences with decentralisation 
can be observed. One of most advanced is that of the Departmental Council for Social 
Development in Chuquisaca in 1989 (Box 3.1).  
 
In the meantime, the local, municipal level remained weak. A major turning point in this 
was the 1985 Organic Municipal Law (Ley Orgánica Municipal – LOM), which 
recognised the municipality as an autonomous entity. The most innovative aspect of this 
law was the direct election of mayors and municipal councils for the first time since 1950 
(Vargas, 1989). In the period 1950-85, mayors were directly appointed by the president, 
and there were no municipal councils. In the period 1985-1994, municipal elections were 
held every two years. However, only people with an identity card could vote for one of 
the candidates appointed by the national parties. Since the majority of the people living in 
the rural areas did not possess such a card, the elections continued to be an urban affair 
until 1994. Under the new law, municipalities were given the autonomy to programme 
and implement technical, administrative, juridical and economic policy (Vargas 1989). 
Municipalities were also enabled to generate their own resources and to invest them. 
Notwithstanding, municipalities were not given the opportunity to impose municipal 
taxes, which remained the exclusive domain of Congress. 
 
Although the LOM defines the functions and responsibilities of local governments, the 
jurisdiction of the local governments concerned only the urban part of the municipality. 
This contradicted a 1932 Supreme Resolution, according to which ‘the municipal 
territory is valid in the whole territory of the Community, not only in the urban part’. 
Vargas points also at the tensions between the municipalities in the rural provinces and 
that of the departmental capital, as most policies were directed to the latter. This situation 
resulted in lack of financial resources in the rural municipalities, as a result of which they 
were inadequately equipped to perform the functions as defined by the LOM of 1985. 
 
This short overview of the political-administrative situation prior to 1994 shows that 
some initiatives were taken to transfer responsibilities and funds from the central level to 
sub-national level. These initiatives were primarily aimed at increasing control at the 
departmental level. These initiatives had mainly a de-concentrating character and as such 
were not directed at political decentralisation or increased involvement of the population 
in decision-making on public affairs. At the end of the 1980s, the character of these 
initiatives changed, as is shown by the establishment of the Departmental Development 
Council in Chuquisaca. As in other Latin-American countries, this process was driven by 
the inability of the central state to respond adequately to the social implications of the 
structural adjustment programmes and the pressure of more leftist groups to incorporate 
the population. Non-governmental organisations played an important role in this, as will 
be shown in the next section.   
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3.4 The role of non-governmental organisations 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have long been considered as the most 
important actor in Bolivia’s rural areas. The presence of NGOs in Bolivia can be 
explained by a number of factors (Van Niekerk 19977) from which the extreme poverty, 
aggravated by the application of a Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1980s, is one 
of the most important. Another factor is the presence of international development 
organisations providing funds. It is estimated that there are some 550 NGOs nation-wide 
(Arellano-Lopez and Petras 1994, p. 562; Ministerio de Hacienda 1996).  
Box 3.1  Experiments with decentralisation in Chuquisaca 
Already in the 1980s, a debate was initiated on the role of the government in Chuquisaca, in which the 
future role of the CORDECH – the regional development corporation in the department – was at stake. 
The initiators of this debate were, as in other parts of Bolivia, the Civic Committees. At a conference of 
Civic Committees of Chuquisaca in 1989, it was observed that the CORDECH was a highly politicised 
entity, the management of which was concentrated at the departmental level, without sufficient 
knowledge of departmental reality due to the limited participation of the population. The Civic 
Committees recommended the establishment of a provincial representation of the CORDECH, so that 
planning and implementation of projects would be able to better respond to the needs within the 
department (Comités Civicos de Chuquisaca, 1989). As a result of increased pressure to incorporate 
NGOs into regional development, the Departmental Council for Social Development ( Consejo 
Departemental de Desarrollo Social – CDDS) was created by the end of 1989. The CDDS consisted of 
13 governmental organisations and NGOs and its task was to coordinate and lead the discussion of 
plans and developmental activities in the social sector of the department of Chuquisaca. To achieve this, 
several divisions within the CDDS were created, such as a technical team, composed of technicians 
from the participating organisations. Although social development was the main focus, activities were 
also directed at environmental problems, integrated rural development, planning methodologies, project 
formulation and monitoring, and evaluation. Over a period of four years, US$ 112 million were 
invested in the overall project (Bonifaz et.al., 1994).  
 
An evaluation of the performance of the CDDS carried out in 1992 revealed the organisation’s limited 
efficiency, which was due to its bureaucratic structure and the fact that the target groups were not 
integrated.2 To ensure a good understanding of the rural situation and context, it was decided in 1992 to 
establish a second, de-concentrated level of discussion by creating the Provincial Councils for Social 
Development (CODES). In addition to the role of the CDDS, the main task of these councils was to 
involve the population in identifying the main problems of the socio-economic situation of the 
department, with an emphasis on the rural population. The Provincial Councils can be defined as 
representative instruments of the local, provincial population, a joint effort to strengthen political 
participation in all aspects of development.  
The Provincial Councils involved the sub-prefect (the highest authority at the provincial level) and 
representatives of state institutes, NGOs, municipal governments, syndicates and labour organisations, 
and civic organisations. The lack of legal recognition made it difficult for the Councils to formalise 
agreements. Although the councils could make recommendations, they had no formal decision-making 
power. The participation of the population was also limited, resulting in the co-option of the councils by 
local elites to satisfy their demands. Other limitations encountered by the Councils were the lack of own 
financial resources and the lack of technical support, for which they depended on the CORDECH and 
the future municipalities. In 1994, with the implementation of the LPP, the establishment of Provincial 
Councils for Popular Participation was announced and the Provincial Councils were dismantled. 
 
 50 
The first NGOs emerged in the 1960s, having a predominantly charitable character. From 
a historical viewpoint, several breakpoints in NGO-activities can be discerned. The first 
occurred in 1970, when NGOs shifted their focus from charity to political mobilisation of 
the population, aimed at political change. This change was inspired by the dominance of 
military regimes in Bolivia.  
A second breakpoint can be noted in the mid-1980s, when the consequences of the 
1983 draught and the impact of structural adjustment demanded a different approach. 
Political mobilisation makes way for programmes directed at a direct improvement of 
living conditions. Within these programmes, an increase of economic production plays an 
important role. By doing so, NGOs increasingly replaced the role of the state, which was 
not able to respond adequately to the demands of the population and whose only presence 
in rural areas entailed the Regional Development Corporations.  
With respect to their functioning in relation to the Bolivian state, NGOs can be 
considered as extremely autonomous in the period before 1994. The funds to finance 
their activities mainly came from foreign donors, while additional funding was provided 
by national investment funds such as the FIS (Social Investment Fund, the former FES), 
the FNDR (National Fund for Regional Development) and the FDC (Fund for Rural 
Development). These funds, established in the 1980s to reduce the most severe 
consequences of the structural adjustment programmes, were the first in Latin America, 
an initiative that was followed by several other countries (Van der Borgh 1999, p. 138).8 
In practice, NGOs were, along with public sector agencies, the only other organisations 
that benefited of these funds. The relation with the state was mainly limited to 
communication over these funds, and registration in a national database of NGOs. 
Although the character of the NGO-activities changed considerably during the past 
decades, the importance of their presence remained. Bolivian NGOs receive enormous 
amounts of funds mainly from international development organisations, and are quite 
experienced in rural development, the delivery of social services at the local level and in 
micro-regional planning, introduced by them at the end of the 1980s. By dividing the 
territory, they worked in smaller micro-regions (often based on river basins) and were 
thus able to operate more efficiently. They also initiated discussion on political 
decentralisation. The NGO CIPCA (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del 
Campesinado) performed an important role in this. From 1988 onwards, CIPCA 
organised seminars and workshops on the theme of decentralisation, resulting in a 
publication entitled ‘For a different Bolivia: contributions to a historical popular project’ 
(CIPCA 1991). This publication proposes a radical decentralisation in which the role of 
political parties is limited to the election of the president. Local community government 
and functional organisations were destined to play a far more elemental role in policy 
making.  
In the meantime, various projects were implemented to extend decentralisation to the 
rural areas (see also Urioste 1992). In the province of Mizque in the department of 
Cochabamba, efforts were made already in 1988. CIPCA started in Santa Cruz with a 
new technique of participatory planning. The decentralisation model introduced in 1994 
by the government encompasses several of the ideas previously developed by NGOs such 
as CIPCA.  
3.5 Todo el poder al pueblo: the Bolivian decentralisation model  
During the Zamora government (1989-1993), the MNR – through its think-tank 
Fundación Milenio led by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada – further elaborated the quite 
vague ideas on the role of municipalities already developed by the Estensorro 
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government. This resulted in 1993 in the Plan de Todos, the MNR’s main election 
programme.  
 
Seven objectives were laid down in this programme (República de Bolivia 1993), 
namely:  
- to increase investment funds;  
- to increase the number and quality of jobs;  
- to achieve economic stability;  
- to invest more in education and health;  
- to bring about popular participation;  
- to reorganise central government; and  
- to reduce corruption.  
In addition to the Law on Popular Participation (LPP) and the Law on Administrative 
Decentralisation (LDA), this plan contained various other reforms, such as the Ley de 
Capitalisación that aimed at the privatisation of state enterprises, and the Educational 
Reform, through which bilingual education was introduced. 
 
With the ambitious Plan de Todos, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada won the general 
elections in 1993. He went into the campaign with Victor Hugo Cardenas from the 
MRTKL, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación, one of the small 
indigenous parties that promote the emancipation of the Indian population. This made 
them a strong couple, since Cardenas was of Aymara origin, and as such an attractive 
candidate for many indigenous people. Sánchez de Lozada (‘Goni’ in popular speech) 
was already a well-known politician. Charismatic and educated in the US, he stood for 
neo-liberalism and the development of business. As Minister of Planning, he participated 
in the implementation the New Economic Policy in 1985.  
Although the concept of popular participation had played a major role in the election 
campaign, the idea had not been very well elaborated. On 6 August 1993, Sánchez de 
Lozada was appointed president and the next day he instructed a Bolivian expert in 
decentralisation – Carlos Hugo Molina – to form a group of twelve Bolivian and foreign 
experts in decentralisation, state reform, tax reform and participatory planning. This 
group – which was said to be free from any political limitations – was asked to develop a 
proposal for state reform in which local governments and popular participation would 
play a central role.  
A number of fundamental decisions need to be made when a decentralisation policy is 
elaborated. These decisions include the selection of a destination area (the territorial unit 
to which power will be decentralised), the subjects of decentralisation (who will 
participate in it), the functions to be decentralised and to remain under central control, 
and – very important – the amount of funds to be transferred. All these issues were 
discussed during the elaboration of the LPP. The selection of the territorial unit proved to 
be difficult. Bolivia’s political-administrative organisation recognised nine departments, 
112 provinces, 311 provincial sections and 1,500 cantons. None of these territorial units 
seemed convenient for the purpose of decentralisation: the departments and provinces 
were considered too large, while sections of provinces had never been used as territorial 
units. In addition, there was much discussion about the exact boundaries of many 
sections. The number of cantons was considered to be too high and there were huge 
differences in population size between them (some had only 19 inhabitants whilst others 
comprised parts of large cities). In the end, it was decided to use the municipality as the 
unit, and that its jurisdiction would be the limits of the section of the province. Sánchez 
de Lozada was still uncertain which organisations would become the targets of 
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participation. At first, it was decided to create new organisations, but this idea was soon 
abandoned as it seemed illogical not to consider the existing social organisations, that is, 
the peasant sindicatos and the urban juntas vecinales. Another aspect – the transfer of 
functions and resources – was also subject to discussion. It was decided from the start 
that participation alone would not be sufficient: a governmental level with power and 
money was needed. With respect to this, several experts suggested a redistribution of 
resources as established by the 1986 tax reform. The president initially resisted any 
modifications to the reform that he himself had elaborated. In addition, the Ministry of 
Finance rejected the changes with the argument that such a successful law should not be 
touched.9 Changes would imply new, expensive, administrative procedures, such as 
software, forms and bank accounts. Finally, a compromise was reached: the system of 
levying taxes would remain as it was, but the distribution of taxes would change. The 
decision on the destination of the funds was less difficult, as it was generally admitted 
that the CORDES’ funds should be transferred to the municipalities. The main argument 
for this was that the CORDES did not function very well, and that these resources should 
be better administrated. This is not to say that everyone agreed with the complete 
dismantling of the CORDES, since most people believed that the CORDES should 
perform a training function, in order to inform and strengthen the municipalities. This 
should not be done by the prefectura, the departmental government, many maintained, as 
these were mainly political entities. The first proposal elaborated was quite modest, in the 
sense that the central government would still play an important role. Sánchez de Lozada 
was not content with this proposal and stressed the importance of ‘more power to the 
people’.10 Various concepts were developed in the last months of 1993, all with 
considerable input from the president himself, who in this period was assigned almost 
heroic features:   
 
‘The president considered the elaboration of this law as a hobby. During the day he 
performed his usual tasks as a president, but after seven in the evening he spent all his 
time meeting with the group to work out the law, discuss the various bottlenecks and 
invent creative solutions.’11 
 
The first draft of the LPP was presented to the public in January 1994. Three months of 
intensive discussions followed, making the LPP undoubtedly one of the most discussed 
laws in Bolivian history. Columns appeared in the newspapers every day, representing 
the opinion on the LPP of individuals and organisations. Not everyone shared the 
president and experts’ enthusiasm on this law. Before we turn to these critics, we will 
first give an overview of the main characteristics of this law. 
3.5.1 The Law on Popular Participation in detail 
The main objective of the LPP, as stated in its first article, is to improve the living 
conditions of the Bolivian population.12 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the Bolivian political-administrative structure was highly 
centralised until 1993. The central government was responsible for planning and 
investment, whilst at the lower departmental level CORDES functioned as highly 
bureaucratic entities that implemented some large projects in the provinces. Municipal 
structures were found only in the urban parts of the country – the cities and towns.  
According to the law, increased participation of the population in local decision-making 
is vital for improved living conditions and the LPP therefore concentrates on creating the 
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mechanisms to facilitate this participation. It does so in three ways: the creation of new 
municipalities, the transfer of funds and the institutionalisation of the relation between 
the state and civil society.  
First, the local level was institutionalised by creating 311 new municipalities. These 
new municipalities are based on the existing territorial division of secciónes provinciales 
(provincial sections), giving these sections a place in the political-administrative structure 
and enabling the performance of functions therein. In contrast to the former 
municipalities, which comprised only the urban parts of the territory, the new 
municipalities specifically encompass towns and the surrounding rural areas. The new 
municipalities became responsible for a number of tasks, such as providing vital 
infrastructure (e.g. health, education and roads). A detailed overview of the functions and 
responsibilities of the municipal government is presented in Box 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The second mechanism to enhance popular participation is the transfer of funds from the 
central to the municipal level. Through the LPP, 20% of national taxes are transferred to 
the municipalities, proportional to the population size of each municipality.  
Box 3-2 Functions and responsibilities of municipal governments since the 1994/5 reforms      
(Source: República de Bolivia, 1994) 
According to Art. 14 Part II of the Law on Popular Participation, municipalities have the following 
competencies: 
a. to control, maintain and improve the equipment and properties of the municipal government, 
including those that have been transferred by the present law; 
b. to provide equipment, furniture, didactic materials, medicines and alimentation to health services 
and to administer and supervise its use, in order to facilitate the adequate functioning of 
infrastructure and services related to health, basic sanitation, education, culture and sports; 
c. to supervise the functioning of educational authorities, directors and teachers, and to advise the 
departmental authority about the provision of educational services;  
d. to control, supervise , and advise about changes in public health sector authorities, in order to 
guarantee the efficient provision of health services;  
e. to administer the register of urban and rural properties;  
f. to administer the registers and list of contributions necessary for the imposition of taxes; 
g. to conserve and/or renovate cultural and historical patrimony and to stimulate culture in all its 
expressions; 
h. to stimulate sports; 
i. to stimulate rural development by means of appropriate technologies, irrigation works and roads; 
j. to construct new infrastructure in the field of education, culture, health, sports, secondary roads and 
basic sanitation; 
k. to contribute to the maintenance of secondary and local roads; 
l. to respond to petitions, representatives and acts of social control by the territorial base 
organisations and the Comité de Vigilancia; 
m. to take care of the programmes of complementary alimentation, including school breakfast; 
n. to promote policies that incorporate the necessities of women in the field of the above-mentioned 
municipal competencies. 
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The third way is the institutionalisation of the relationship between civil society and the 
state. The LPP recognises traditional and existing social organisations that have a 
territorial character. These are the peasant communities (sindicatos), the neighbourhood 
organisations and indigenous communities. The LPP assigns to all these organisations the 
term Organización Territorial de Base (OTB), which emphasises their territorial 
character. OTBs are legally recognised and are assigned an active role on the local level. 
According to the LPP, each OTB is supposed to present its demands to the municipal 
government through participatory planning. The law foresees the creation of a Comité de 
Vigilancia composed of OTB representatives, to supervise and control the correct 
implementation of the LPP on the municipal level. 
 
The Sánchez de Lozada government did much to promulgate the law, and the LPP is 
without doubt the most debated law in Bolivian history. Every year much attention was 
given to the anniversary of the LPP on 20 April. The president himself visited a 
municipality and special propaganda was presented about the results of the process. 
Other expressions of the important position given to the LPP were the numerous 
magazines and brochures on the national as well as the departmental level (e.g. El 
Chuquisaceño, and Participar!). The Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular 
(SNPP: National Secretary of Popular Participation) set up a website with information 
about the law and its implementation, and characteristics of OTBs and municipalities. 
Promulgation of the contents of the law over the course of time was followed by the 
publication of research results. Within the SNPP, a special unit was created for 
monitoring and evaluation, and most of these results were published, often with financial 
support from international donor organisations. The publication of new books was 
announced in the national press. In addition to this official, though not very critical, 
governmental research, national research institutes and international organisations carried 
out more independent research. 
3.5.2 The implementation of the Law on Administrative Decentralisation  
The LPP is completely directed towards the local level and focuses on the issue of 
participation. As such, the law disregards the country’s strong regionalism, which is 
aimed at a more autonomous position of the departments. The departmental level, 
however, remained as it was: a weak and bureaucratic entity, deprived of its funds, which 
are transferred directly to the local, municipal level. The weak position of the 
departmental level meant that there was no virtual layer between the central and local 
level. This situation posed some problems, such as the impossibility of coordinating the 
actions of over 311 municipalities at the central level. Generally, the LPP has been 
considered an incomplete decentralisation reform. A new Law on Administrative 
Decentralisation (Ley de Descentralización Administrativa – LDA) was therefore 
designed, which came into force on 1 January 1996.  
The LDA aims at restructuring the departmental level in accordance with the new 
political-administrative municipal structure. Under the LDA, the prefect is appointed by 
the president and is his formal direct representative. The LDA also establishes the 
departmental administration, which is characterised by a sectoral division. This 
departmental administration is responsible for several functions concerning roads, rural 
electricity, the production infrastructure and technical assistance. In each department, 
members of the municipal council elect departmental councils. These councils have to 
approve the departmental budget, plans, programmes and projects, request additional 
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credits and funds and make arrangements and contracts with credit institutes. They are 
also entitled to dismiss the prefect or pass a vote of no confidence. 
The LDA means a significant increase of power for the prefect and meant in practice that 
the CORDES (Regional Development Corporations) were dismantled. On 1 January 
1996 all property and projects of the CORDES were transferred to the municipalities. 
Since June 1994, the functioning of the CORDES had been adjusted to the new 
administrative structure, and their functionaries were integrated in the municipal UFIs 
(Unidades de Fortalecimiento Institucional). These entities offered support to the 
municipalisation process by disseminating the LPP and training of municipal employees, 
especially in the field of participatory planning.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  The political-administrative structure of Bolivia before and after 1994 
 
 
With the introduction of the LPP and the LAD, the political-administrative structure of 
Bolivia underwent profound changes. Figure 3.1 shows the situation after the 1994/5 
reforms. Although the representatives on the provincial and cantonal level are mentioned 
in the LPP and LDA (Art. 22, Decree 23858 and Art. 7-9 LDA), in practice the functions 
of their authorities remain untouched by the reforms. This can be explained by these 
entities’ lack of financial resources, hence power.  
Without doubt, the reforms had the most impact at the local, municipal level with regard 
to such functions as planning, financial resources and the implementation of projects.  
3.5.3 Financial implications of the LPP 
Before 1994, there were enormous inequalities in the distribution of income at the local 
level. The ten largest municipalities (the departmental capitals, including El Alto) 
received the bulk of funds while the smaller, rural municipalities received hardly 
anything. As shown in Table 3.1, this situation changed in 1994 with the implementation 
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of the LPP. Today, the resources are more evenly distributed, and correspond with the 
population number in the municipalities.  
 
 
Table 3.1  Distribution of national tax income, in % 
 1993  1994  1995-6  
Departmental capitals 92.1  54.4  38.9  
Rest of the country    7.9  45.6  61.1  
Source: SNPP 1996 
 
 
The LPP thus brought about significant changes, not only in the distribution of funds but 
also in the composition of these funds. Since 1994, the municipalities receive 20% of the 
national tax income, compared to 10% before the LPP. The amount of national tax 
income to be invested increased from US$ 4.6 per capita in 1990 to US$ 24 in 1997.  
 
In addition to funds from the national tax income, municipalities have other funds at their 
disposal. First, all municipalities can generate own resources by imposing taxes. Second, 
they can propose a contribution from one of the national investment funds – the FIS, 
FNDR and FDC. Before 1994, the resources from these funds were channelled mainly 
through non-governmental organisations, which constitutes a specific form of 
decentralised finance. With the implementation of the LPP, it was decided that only the 
new municipalities would have direct access to these funds, and that only joint requests 
of NGOs and municipalities could be taken into consideration. This implied a dramatic 
change for the financial position of NGOs, since these were now obliged to cooperate 
with municipalities in order to secure the access to the national investment funds.  A third 
source of income for municipalities is co-financing by NGOs. By cooperating with 
NGOs, municipalities are able to finance projects or to submit a joint request for co-
financing of funds as described above. A fourth source of income in the first years after 
the implementation of the LPP consisted of the transfer of funds from the CORDES to 
the municipalities, in case of projects that no longer concerned the CORDES, but only 
the municipality. Fifth, the OTBs can contribute to projects, in kind (by work) or with 
money.  
 
There are some conditions attached to the investments of the funds. Of those stemming 
from national tax income, municipalities have to invest 85% in projects, while the 
remaining 15% can be used for overheads and salaries. With respect to own resources, 
50% has to be invested in projects.13 A second condition is that at least 25% of the 
investments should be directed at the productive sector, and 40% to the social sector, 
such as health and education. 
 
Through the considerable amount of funds transferred to the local level, Bolivia 
transformed into a highly decentralised country, with 27% of total public expenditures 
operated by the local level (República de Bolivia 2001, p. 31).   
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3.5.4 Criticism of the LPP 
As soon as the LPP was presented to Congress in February 1994, critics emerged from 
several layers of Bolivian society. Most fundamental was the observation that the LPP – 
being a law intended to increase the population’s participation – had been formulated top 
down by a group of ‘experts’ behind closed doors, almost in secrecy and without the 
involvement of any representatives of Bolivian society. It was argued that a law could not 
enforce participation, as participation is a society-driven process. Although most 
intellectuals, interest groups and political parties supported the law, the main opposition 
came from groups that had been excluded from the discussion and/or saw their own ideas 
being wrecked. The reaction of the Comités Civicos fits into this last category, as their 
aspirations for political decentralisation, with more power for the departmental 
governments, was being ignored (Van Cott 1998, p. 166; Molina Monasterios 1997, p. 
204). The LPP proposed incorporating representatives of ministerial units in the 
prefecturas, without mentioning the selection of the prefects or the direct election of the 
Departmental Council of Popular Participation. The CCs also strongly opposed the 
transformation of the CORDES, because they were afraid the departmental resources 
(regalias) would be given to entities in which the CCs did not participate and, 
consequently, over which they had no power. 
Strong protest also came from the sindicatos, which received support from leftist 
parties. In their opinion, the OTB was a new organisation established by the central 
government as an instrument to control and co-opt popular organisations. The sindicatos 
considered the OTB a competitor, one dependent on and manipulated by the central 
government, and created to undermine them (Opinión 20-03-1995). NGOs supported this 
opinion. For a long time they had been the most important actors in the rural areas, but in 
the LPP they were only partially mentioned. This reaction was also based on the relation 
between the NGOs and the state: it had always been a tense one, and NGOs had had to 
maintain a low profile, especially during the dictatorial regimes.14Another important 
point of criticism was that social organisations not territorially organised were excluded 
from formal participation in local decision-making. Examples of such organisations were 
women’s organisations (e.g. clubes de madres), the Comités Civicos, and labour and 
producers’ organisations (e.g. the COB and CSCUTB).  
3.6 The implementation of popular participation and decentralisation 
The LPP brought about the creation of 311 new municipalities, almost one-third of which 
had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2 Municipalities by population 
Population  Number of 
municipalities 
 Population  % of 
municipalities 
< 5000 inhabitants    95     235,388  31 
5000 – 14,999 inhab.  128  1,185,851  41 
15,000 – 49,999 inhab.    72  1,695,094  23 
50,000 – 199,999 inhab.    12  1,052,776    5 
> 200,000 inhab.      4  2,245,283    1 
Source: SNPP 1996 
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The creation of municipalities was accompanied by the opening of bank accounts, so that 
money could be transferred to the local level. A second phase of implementation 
involved the registration as OTBs of an estimated 20,000 juntas vecinales, comunidades 
campesinas and pueblos indígenas. This was not a simple, formal act, as these civil 
organisations first had to be informed of the LPP, the requirements they had to meet in 
order to be registered, and the duties and functions they had to perform. Special units of 
the CORDES – the UFIs (Unidades de Fortalecimiento Institucional; Units for 
Institutional Strengthening) – were created with the task of informing the population of 
the changes. In every department, these teams travelled to the municipalities to organise 
workshops and visit communities. The general impression of these units is that of a 
number of very enthusiastic young professionals devoted to the implementation of the 
LPP in the new municipalities. Besides the UFIs, NGOs invested much in the registration 
of the OTBs. Already in May 1995, an impressive number of OTBs had been registered: 
49% of all rural communities had obtained juridical personality.  
The registration of neighbourhood committees was a slower process: only 20% of 
these organisations had been organised, and of the indigenous communities, not one had 
the status of OTB (SNPP 1995a). The relatively low number of neighbourhood 
committees registered can be explained by the low acceptance of the LPP by the urban 
population. The general opinion in the cities was that the LPP mainly benefited the rural 
population, as urban demand for improved access to basic services was more 
institutionalised. Moreover, urban political culture was more bureaucratic and strongly 
influenced by political parties and, as such, often hampered the registration of 
organisations. Many of these organisations also had quite a weak organisational structure, 
since they were governed by a board that was highly political and had little relation with 
the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods.  
Related to the registration of OTBs was the establishment of a Comité de Vigilancia in 
each of the 311 municipalities. This was more complicated, since these committees had 
to be elected by the OTBs, and the registration of these had priority in most 
municipalities. In May 1995, a Comité de Vigilancia had been established in only 10% of 
the municipalities (SNPP 1995a). However, the registration of OTBs and Comités de 
Vigilancia progressed quickly, and at the end of 1996, almost all OTBs had obtained 
juridical personality. Overall, most civil organisations adopted the LPP quite quickly 
because – as Sánchez de Lozada put it – ‘When money speaks, people listen’.15 Another 
phase in the implementation of the LPP consisted of the elaboration of municipal 
investment plans. Since June 1994, municipalities have to present an annual overview of 
projects that will be implemented with funds from the central government. In the second 
half of 1994, 3,700 projects were presented, and this number increased to 10,000 in 1995. 
Especially during the first years of implementation (i.e. in 1994-5), this process 
progressed only slowly. In 1994, only a few municipalities managed to produce such a 
plan, and most of these annual planning documents were rather simple, often merely 
containing an enumeration of small projects, cynically called ‘shopping lists’. Most of 
the difficulties encountered can be attributed to the fact that the majority of 
municipalities (especially the rural ones) had limited capacities with respect to human 
and financial resources. The LPP meant that an administrative structure had to be 
developed, generally from scratch. Most rural municipalities did not have any personnel, 
and even with LPP funds, only a limited number of employees could be contracted. 
Another problem was the lack of knowledge about the administrative and planning 
aspects of the LPP: municipal employees simply did not know how to formulate these 
plans. This situation improved in 1995, thanks to the numerous workshops in which the 
municipal authorities were informed and trained.  
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Another problem related to the formulation of municipal plans was the lack of 
infrastructure in rural municipalities. Most municipalities started in small adobe 
buildings, without electricity or means of communication, such as telephones and faxes. 
Nor did they have computers. All these factors contributed to the modest performance in 
the design of planning documents. To overcome the problem of the ‘shopping lists’ and 
limited participation of the population in planning, procedures to stimulate mid-term 
planning were developed in 1996. Since 1997, municipalities have to present a Municipal 
Development Plan (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal – PDM). A positive effect of the 
municipal elections of 1995 was that the newly elected councils and mayors were far 
more prepared than their predecessors to perform the functions and responsibilities 
assigned to them through the LPP. However, it also meant that previously acquired 
experiences and knowledge disappeared, as most municipalities changed not only the 
mayor and councils, but also its staff, which had been trained exhaustively in the period 
July 1994-December 1995.  
  
Over the course of time, the government has made some changes to the decentralisation 
process. In 1997, for example, the central government took back the responsibility for 
road infrastructure from the departmental authorities. Before the implementation of the 
LDA in 1996, the road sector had been organised into nine decentralised districts, 
operating under the Servicio Nacional de Caminos (National Road Service). After 
decentralisation, these districts were placed under control of the prefectures. In addition, 
the CORDES that previously had been responsible for the tertiary roads in the provinces 
were dismantled. No other sources than tolls were provided and many officials resigned. 
As a result, the condition of the roads soon deteriorated and in 1998 the government 
decided to take back responsibility (Burki et al. 1999, p. 94). Another adjustment, made 
shortly before the Banzer government took office, was the proposal to allocate funds to 
the Comité de Vigilancia.  
3.7 The Banzer government: 1997-2001 
The Bolivian decentralisation model has been embraced as a very innovative model for 
decentralisation. Although Bolivia implemented decentralisation very recently, compared 
to other Latin American countries, other Latin American countries followed this process, 
and the main initiators – Carlos Hugo Molina and the president – were invited to explain 
the model at various congresses. Representatives of other countries visited Bolivia to see 
the details of the law in practice. Also in the literature the model is viewed as a 
breakthrough in traditional decentralisation efforts, and is sometimes referred to as 
‘Bolivia’s second export-product’ (Archondo 1997, p. 301).  
The international donor society shared this opinion and very quickly decided to support 
the process.16 This cooperation can also be attributed to the fact that women and 
indigenous people, traditionally the focus groups of international donor society in 
Bolivia, are explicitly mentioned as target groups in this law. Already in August 1994, 
multilateral donors such as UNDP and the World Bank formulated programmes aimed at 
municipal strengthening. An example is the World Bank-financed Programme of 
Development of Rural Communities, which supports local governments in the 
elaboration of municipal development plans. Bilateral donors also supported the process, 
albeit with smaller funds.  
In 1997, general elections were again on the agenda. Based on the success of the LPP, 
the MNR hoped to win the elections, but as the implementation of the LPP was closely 
associated with the person of Sánchez de Lozada, who by law could not be re-elected, the  
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Figure 3.2  Billboard on the route Sucre-Monteagudo. This billboard reflects the four pillars of the Banzer 
government (1997-2001):  dignity, institutionalisation, opportunities and equity.  
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MNR lost the elections and Hugo Banzer returned to the presidential palace. General 
Banzer, as he is generally called, had been in office before in the period 1971-8 during 
the military regime. Like most new governments, the Banzer government wanted to put 
its stamp on national policy-making, which resulted in a diminishing role for popular 
participation. This was expressed in two measures. First, the government decided to 
restructure the governmental organisation. The National Secretary for Popular 
Participation – the ‘heart’ of the LPP – was dismantled and the functions were divided 
among three other ministries. Second, there has been a concentration of power within the 
departmental government (the prefectura) from 1997 onwards. All nine departments now 
have a prefect of the Acción Democratico y Nacionalista (ADN)-party, who gained more 
responsibilities and more resources. In addition, almost all employees of the MNR and 
the MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre) have been replaced by ADN/MIR people. Although 
this is the usual course of affairs in Bolivian governmental organisations, it has had 
severe consequences, particularly for the implementation of the LPP. The new employees 
were selected on the basis of their political affiliation, rather than on the basis of their 
knowledge and experience with such issues as planning and training within the context of 
popular participation. This meant that, due to the outflow of knowledge, the process had 
to be started all over again.  
 
The lack of interest in popular participation was also reflected in the Banzer 
government’s National Plan, ‘To live better’ (Para vivir mejor). This plan consists of 
four major themes: (1) ‘opportunities’, aiming at economic growth; (2) ‘dignity’, 
referring to the struggle against the production and trafficking of coca; (3) 
‘institutionality’, with as main objective the upgrading of institutional capacity; and (4) 
equity, directed at improving living conditions (República de Bolivia 1997a). The role of 
popular participation and the strengthening of the local level in national policy decreased, 
in favour of a stronger for the departmental level. Although Banzer announced he would 
improve the LPP, there have hardly been any changes. The proposed adjustment of the 
division of funds, by using the level of poverty in the municipalities as additional 
criterion, has not been further elaborated.   
Other evidence of the Banzer government’s lack of interest in popular participation is 
its diminished communication about the law. The frequent flow of information about the 
LPP, which marked the Sánchez de Lozada government, came to an abrupt end when the 
Banzer government came into office. Although the responsible Minster for Popular 
Participation still publicises a letter in the national newspaper on 20 April each year, the 
supply of other information diminished dramatically. Although the research unit of the 
SNPP still functions, it employs only a few researchers and the number of publications 
about the LPP is only a fraction of what it used to be. With regard to this theme, Luis 
Ramirez – one of the experts in the group of 12 – states that:  
 
 ‘Of course Banzer wants to mitigate the Popular Participation, but I do not think he is able to 
do that. The municipalities will not surrender their recently obtained autonomy. But – and 
Banzer knows this quite well – he can obstruct the process by not supporting it, for example 
by limiting communication on the LPP.’ (Interview, 11-09-2000) 
   
In August 2001, Banzer was obliged to resign for health reasons. Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga, 
the former vice-president who is known for his technocratic style of governing, 
succeeded him.     
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3.8 Summary and conclusions 
The implementation of decentralisation completely changed the Bolivian institutional and 
administrative-political landscape. Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America, 
mutated from a centralist nation – which did not recognise rural areas nor rural 
population in local decision-making processes until 1994 – into a decentralised nation by 
using a model that has been admired throughout the world. The implementation of 
decentralisation policies did not take place overnight: the issue of decentralisation has 
been debated since the 1950s. However, political decentralisation was not achieved; that 
is, the prefect was not directly elected nor were representatives of civil society involved 
in departmental decision-making. In fact, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
democratic thinking was virtually absent due to the various military regimes. In this 
period, the government structure was changed in only one way: the creation of the 
CORDES. These rather technical and, in the end, very bureaucratic and ponderous 
organisations were the only link between the central, national level and the rural areas in 
the provinces. 
The continuous pressure applied by several groups led to the launching of 
decentralisation policies in 1994. Decentralisation in Bolivia is formulated in two laws: 
the LPP of April 1994 and the LAD of July 1995. The LPP provides for the creation of 
311 new, urban-rural municipalities, the transfer of funds to these municipalities and the 
concept of participatory planning. This means that the rural areas are now recognised as 
partners in governance for the first time in Bolivian history. Although the departmental 
level acquired more power with the LDA, the prefect continues to be appointed by the 
president, and as such, there is no political decentralisation at this level.  
Theoretically, the Bolivian model of decentralisation meets the conditions of good 
governance and local development discussed in Chapter 2. Firstly, the condition that 
good governance should be participatory is met by the active participation of the 
population in local decision-making through the OTBs. The increased participation of the 
population makes policy making more responsive, and thus more effective, resulting in 
increased potential for local development. Transparency of policy making is expressed in 
various manuals, which include guidelines. The fact that local governments have to 
inform the population of the implementation of policy is also a factor contributing 
positively to transparency. To meet the condition of accountability, Comités de 
Vigilancia were created. Finally, the fact that decentralisation was accompanied by the 
transfer of funds to the local level meets both the condition of equity and local 
development. Basing the distribution of funds on the number of inhabitants led to a more 
equal distribution, which in turn might lead to a reduction of regional differences. The 
transfer of responsibilities and funds enables the implementation of locally defined 
project and offers the required resources for local governments to stimulate local, rural 
development.  
Unfortunately, the promising decentralisation model was jeopardised by the change in 
government in 1997. Obviously, the present government attaches less value and is less 
enthusiastic about popular participation than the previous government. In the following 
chapters, we will analyse the implementation of the model at the local level, by analysing 
whether the Bolivian model of decentralisation in practice also leads to good governance 
and local development.   
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Notes 
 
1. The Bolivian model serves as an example for other countries because of the mechanisms included for 
popular participation, accountability and the considerable amount of funds and responsibilities 
transferred to the local, municipal level. 
2. Between 1932 and 1935, Paraguay and Bolivia fought the Chaco War. The conflict was about the 
Chaco region, which was supposed to house oil reserves. Bolivia lost the war and almost 100,000 of 
its people, including many indigenous people. 
3. See for an extensive analysis of Bolivia’s political economy in the period 1964-1985 the publication 
of James Malloy and Eduardo Gamara (1988) Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964-1985. 
4. Hugo Banzer won these elections, but as Paz Estensorro was able to form a coalition with the MIR of 
Paz Zamora, he became the president.  
5. An important side effect from the perspective of the state was that the dramatic job losses implied the 
fragmentation of the once very powerful labour movement in the mining sector. 
6. The Tax Reform (Law 843) dealt with the redistribution of the national tax income: 75% went directly 
to the national treasury, 10% to the CORDES, 10% to the municipalities and 5% to the universities. 
According to this law, companies paid taxes to the departments in which they were registered, and as 
the axis La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz is the most important economic region in the country, these 
departments benefited most from the reform. This increased the country’s regional disparities (Molina 
Monasterios 1997).  
The Law Financial dealt with the decentralisation of rural services in the health and education sector 
to the CORDES, and those of urban services to the – still purely urban - municipalities. The CORDES 
would receive 20% of the departmental tax income. To compensate less prosperous departments – a 
result of Law 843 – a US$ 200 million Regional Development Fund would be created. The plan was 
highly criticized, however: members of the coalition were surprised, as it was obvious that feasibility 
studies of the main financial consequences of this law had not been carried out. Municipal authorities 
in turn made it clear that the budget to perform these responsibilities was insufficient. Finally, the Ley 
Financial was approved, although without the decentralisation of health and education and thus 
leaving the municipalities without funds (Molina Monasterios 1997, p. 117-118). The debate on 
decentralisation was also an issue in the electoral campaign of 1989, as candidate Paz Zamora 
declared he was in favour of the direct election of the departmental prefect. His government (1989-93) 
organized several extraordinary congresses to discuss the decentralisation theme. Notwithstanding, 
once elected he backed off, saying that he had made a mistake and that it was still too early, as he 
considered the country’s integration too weak. A unitary country was still the only option (Molina 
Monasterios 1997, p. 119). In the meantime, the government stated that before decentralisation could 
take place, all actors involved must reach a consensus. To achieve such a consensus, decentralisation 
would be gradually implemented. 
7. See for an extensive overview on the role of NGOs in Bolivia also Van Niekerk, 1994. 
8. In the 1980s, the main objectives of these funds were the creation of jobs and the provision of basic 
services, in particular in health and education. The financial input for this was provided by actors in 
international development cooperation, such as the World Bank, and bilateral donors. 
9. By the application of Law 843, the share of taxes GDP increased from less than 1% in 1982 to 16% in 
1993.  
10. Interview with Luis Ramirez, September 2000, ‘ todo el poder al pueblo’.  
11. Interview with Luis Ramirez, September 2000. 
12. ‘La presente Ley reconoce, promueve y consolida el proceso de Participación Popular articulando a 
las comunidades indigenas, campesinas y urbanas, en la vida juridica, politica y economica del pais. 
Procura mejorar la calidad de vida de la mujer y el hombre boliviano, con una mas justa distribución y 
mejor administración de los recursos publicos. Fortalece los instrumentos políticos y económicos 
necesarios para perfeccionar la democracia representativa, facilitando la participación ciudadana y 
garantizando la igualdad de oportunidades en los niveles de representación a mujeres y hombres.’ 
(Titulo 1, Capitulo 1, Art. 1, Ley 1551/República de Bolivia 1994). 
13. A temporary measure has been formulated according to which the amount of own resources to be 
invested had to increase to 85% in 2001. 
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14. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed analysis of NGO-state relationship. 
15. ‘Cuando habla el dinero, la gente escucha’. 
16. According to Van Cott (1998), the international donor society supported the implementation of the 
LPP with approx. US$ 125 million. 
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4 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AREA: SIX 
MUNICIPALITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CHUQUISACA 
This chapter provides an overview of the socio-economic characteristics and the 
institutional context of the study area, which comprises six rural municipalities in the 
department of Chuquisaca. As such, it serves as an introduction to the research results 
presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
In the first section, we focus on the selection of the research municipalities. Next, we 
deal with the spatial context of the study area by presenting some features related to the 
location and accessibility of the municipalities. We then present the main characteristics 
of the municipalities’ population, with special attention to their access to such services as 
health and education. After that, we focus on the economic structure of the 
municipalities, describing the main economic sectors and employment opportunities. 
Subsequently, we discuss the institutional context by presenting the main actors, 
successively the local government, OTBs, other social organisations, the Comité de 
Vigilancia, the private sector and NGOs. The variables used to describe these actors 
indicate the potential for good governance, such as the stability of local government, the 
way local government is organised, the number of NGOs working in the municipalities 
and the character of their presence.  
4.1 The selection of the research municipalities 
The department of Chuquisaca is situated in South-east Bolivia (see Figure 4.1). This 
department developed in the nineteenth century as a food supplier to the mining sector in 
the department of Potosí. Because the climate of the capital Sucre is somewhat milder 
than that of the rest of Potosí, many tin barons decided to settle in Sucre or its 
surroundings and to build a huge country house there. Sucre was the administrative and 
judicial centre of Potosí and was one the most important cities in Latin America in the 
nineteenth century (Langer 1989, p. 12-35). The transfer of the Congress to La Paz, 
followed by the mining sector’s move towards the northern part of the departments of 
Oruro and Potosí, reduced the role of Sucre at the national level. Although Sucre is still 
the national capital and houses the High Court, today it has the feel of a calm, provincial 
town.  
The department is located outside the La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz axis, and as 
such is not part of the country’s economic core region. In 1995, the share of Chuquisaca 
in the national GDP was only 5.7%. In contrast to other departments, Chuquisaca has 
experienced only a slight increase in GDP: 0.7% since 1988 (Jetté and Rojas 1998). 
Agriculture is the main source of employment in the department. In 1992, 60% of the 
economically active population aged seven years or older was involved in this sector. 
The majority of the farming population are minifundistas producing for auto-
consumption. 
 
The three main reasons for selecting Chuquisaca for this study were the spatial and socio-
economic diversity within the department, the fact that it is one of the poorest 
departments in Bolivia and therefore very much in need of new development options, and 
the experiments with decentralisation carried out there prior to 1994. Each of these 
matters will be addressed below. 
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Figure 4.1 Bolivia and the department of Chuquisaca 
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Figure 4.2 The six research municipalities 
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The department encompasses various agro-ecological zones ranging from the puna 
(altitude 3,500-4,000 m) and the valleys (1,000-3,000 m) to the subtropical lowlands in 
the eastern parts of the department (300-900 m). The department represents a large socio-
cultural diversity: the urban settlements are mainly occupied by mestizos, who are of 
mixed descent. In the higher, rural zones of the department a large part of the population 
consists of small farmers with a Quechua background, and with several subcultures. In 
the lower parts in the east of the department live the Guaraní, an indigenous group. The 
different position of these groups in the power structure makes this department 
interesting for the purpose of this study.  
Chuquisaca is one of the country’s poorest departments, as illustrated by its relatively 
low score on the Human Development Index (HDI) and its limited potential for economic 
development. The HDI of Bolivia is 0.531, while that of Chuquisaca is 0.389 (UDAPSO-
PNUD 1997, p. 24) – the lowest in the country with exception of the department of 
Potosí. There are large differences in HDI scores between the city of Sucre and the rest of 
the department: the city has a medium score of 0.558, whilst the other municipalities all 
have a very low HDI  score of less than 0.399.  
Although the department is a backward area from an economic perspective, in the 
implementation of decentralisation it has been quite progressive. Even before the 
implementation of the Law on Popular Participation (LPP) in 1994, it had experiments 
with decentralisation through the establishment of the Departmental Council for Social 
Development (see also Box 3.1 in Chapter 3).  
The expectations concerning the implementation of the LPP in the department of 
Chuquisaca were high (Nicod 1996, p. 61; Archondo 1998; Arias 1996). This expectation 
was based on the promising experiences with the dialogue between the state and civil 
organisations, structured in the model of the Consejo Departemental de Desarrollo 
Social.  
 
Through the introduction of the LPP, 28 municipalities were created in the department of 
Chuquisaca (see Figure 4.1), the majority being relatively small, rural municipalities. Six 
of these municipalities were selected for the realisation of this study. In selecting them, 
several criteria that influence the potential for good governance and local development 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) were taken into consideration, leading to a diverse sample of 
research municipalities rather than a representative one.  
First of all, the three different agro-ecological zones in the department were taken into 
consideration. In each of these zones, two municipalities were selected, based on criteria 
such as physical accessibility, population size, type of mayor, number and type of OTBs 
(Organizaciones Territoriales de Base – Territorial Base Organisations), and the 
presence of NGOs and character of this presence. This resulted in the selection of Yotala, 
Poroma, Sopachuy, Presto, Monteagudo and Huacareta.  
4.2 The spatial context: location and accessibility  
The six research municipalities are situated in four different provinces. Yotala and 
Poroma are located in Oropeza (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2), Presto is in Zudañez, and 
Sopachuy is in Tomina. Together, the municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta form 
the province of Hernando Siles.  
 
These four provinces represent a wide range of agro-ecological zones. Roughly, three 
zones can be distinguished: the higher valleys (represented by the municipalities of 
Yotala and Poroma), the lower valleys (represented by Sopachuy and Presto) and the 
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subtropical lowlands (represented by Monteagudo and Huacareta). The main 
geographical characteristics of the six municipalities are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Table 4.1   Main geographical characteristics of the research municipalities by zone 
  Municipality  Altitude in m.  Accessibility  Hours 
from 
Sucreª 
High valley  Yotala  2,200 – 3,600  Good    0.5 
  Poroma  1,500 – 3,800  Bad    8 
Low valley  Sopachuy  1,600 – 2,500  Moderate     6 
  Presto  1,000 – 3,000  Bad    3 
Subtropical  Monteagudo     900 – 2,200  Moderate    9 
  Huacareta     620 – 1,900   Bad  12 
Source:  PDMs municipalities 1996-9. 
 ªHours from Sucre to municipal capital by motorised transport in dry season 
 
 
The municipalities of Yotala – the smallest in area of the six municipalities – and Poroma 
represent the higher valley-zone, situated in the north-western part of the department at 
an elevation of 1,500-3,800 metres. The average daily temperature is 16º C, but in winter 
the temperature at night drops to -6º C, causing damage to crops. There is a sharp 
distinction between the seasons, with a dry and cold winter season and a humid summer 
season. Of the average yearly precipitation of 650 mm, 90% falls in the rainy season 
(November-March). In winter, hailstorms are common and the higher parts of these 
municipalities experience frost. Natural vegetation consists of forest. Soil degradation is 
very common, particularly in the areas used for agriculture (Molina Barron 1995). When 
the fertility of the soil is exhausted, the farmers move on to new ground, leaving the 
former agricultural land without vegetation, hence more susceptible to erosion by wind 
and water. Soil degradation is further aggravated by excessive grazing. An increasing 
share of agricultural land is being contaminated by the rivers crossing the municipalities. 
The Pilcomayo river is highly contaminated with minerals washed down from the mining 
areas in Potosí, while the Rio Yotala is heavily contaminated by sewage from the city of 
Sucre. 
                
Sopachuy and Presto represent the lower valley-zone, at an altitude of between 1,000 and 
3,000 m. The average daily temperature is 17° C, and average annual precipitation is 850 
mm. There is a clear distinction between the dry season (November and December) and 
the rainy season. The main climatological hazards experienced in both areas are the  
occurrence of frost in the period June-August, hail storms in October and November, 
droughts from November to February and excessive rainfall from November to April. 
These climatological factors are a serious threat to agricultural production in these 
municipalities.    
 
The subtropical lowlands are represented by the municipalities of Monteagudo and 
Huacareta, which together form the province of Hernando Siles. These municipalities are 
also the largest (in area) in the study area (Figure 4.1). The municipality of Monteagudo 
is situated at an altitude ranging from 900 to 2,200 metres, whilst Huacareta is somewhat 
lower (620-1,900 metres). Both municipalities enjoy a relatively mild climate with an 
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average temperature of around 20° C. Rainfall is abundant, with an average annual 
precipitation of 1,000 mm. The rainy season in both municipalities extends from 
November to April (Molina Barron 1995).   
 
Access to the research municipalities, and the inhabitants’ access to markets, is limited 
by the mountainous character of the department, coupled with the number of rivers in the 
vicinity. The research municipalities differ, however, with respect to accessibility. 
Yotala, by far the best accessible municipality in the study area, is situated near the paved 
interdepartmental road from Sucre to the city of Potosí and is connected to Sucre by a 
micro-bus service, which runs four times an hour. The village of Poroma is accessible by 
road only in the dry (winter) season. During the rainy season the dirt road, surrounded by 
canyons, is unstable and too dangerous to travel. Due to the bad situation of roads, this 
town is not served by bus. However, trucks commute between Poroma and Sucre, and 
mainly have a commercial function. The villages of Presto and Sopachuy are connected 
to Sucre by an all-weather dirt road, and have a passenger bus service three times a week. 
In addition to the passenger bus, trucks commute daily between Presto and Sucre. 
Although the municipal capital of Sucre is well accessible, the large majority of the 
communities can only be reached on foot. 
The town of Monteagudo is situated along the Sucre-Camiri road, near the department 
of Santa Cruz. Despite being an important transit route, the road is often closed for a few 
weeks during the rainy season, leaving Monteagudo isolated from the rest of the 
department. Several bus companies serve the line Sucre-Monteagudo and Santa Cruz-
Monteagudo, both a nightly trip taking eight to ten hours. Huacareta is more isolated and 
can only be reached by bus through the town of Monteagudo. This road is stable almost 
the whole year, but in periods of excessive rain it is closed for a few days. A part of the 
municipality of Huacareta (the canton of Ingre) is isolated from the rest of the 
municipality. The canton is located in the east of the municipality and is separated from 
the rest by a mountain ridge. From Huacareta, one first has to travel to the town of 
Monteagudo, which is a long detour. The accessibility of the communities located in the 
research municipalities varies greatly. Only a few communities can be reached by motor 
vehicle, and then often only during the dry season. The majority of the communities can 
be reached only on foot.  
4.3 The population: main social characteristics  
The city of Sucre dominates the urban hierarchy of the department of Chuquisaca. 
According to the 1992 census, 34% of the 453,756 Chuquisaceños live in this city.1 The 
population of the six research municipalities ranges from 6,121 to 25,240 (Table 4.2). 
Together, they account for 16% of the departmental population (1992 census). During the 
last decade, most municipalities experienced a population increase, mainly due to natural 
growth.2 
 
All the research municipalities are predominantly rural, as is shown by the share of total 
population living in peasant communities (Table 4.2). Most research municipalities 
consist mainly of a village surrounded by peasant communities. The typical centre of the 
rural municipalities – the municipal capital – is a village centred on a main plaza. Private 
homes, a catholic church, some small shops, NGO offices, a health post and primary 
school and the municipal building (alcaldia) surround this plaza. 
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Table 4.2  Population, communities and ethnicity in the research municipalities 
Population 
size  
Pop. municipal 
capital 
Rural 
population¹ 
 Municipality 
abs. abs. % of total 
Nº of 
commu-
nities 
Ethnicity² 
High Yotala   9,486  1,325 86 52 Q 
 Poroma 13,659    387 97 79 Q 
Valley Sopachuy   6,121 1,276 79 23 Q 
 Presto   7,874    463 94 27 Q 
Low Monteagudo 25,240 6,544 74 80 G/M 
 Huacareta 10,015 1,245 88 29 G/M 
Source: INE 1992; PDMs municipalities 
¹ Rural population refers to the share of the population living in peasant communities. 
² Q = Quechua, G = Guaraní, M = Mestizo 
 
 
Most streets are unpaved, except those around the plaza. Adobe is the dominant material 
used for buildings, topped with a roof of tiles. Generally, this village is the highest in 
urban hierarchy in the municipality.3 
By far the largest part of the municipal population lives in peasant communities, with 
a population ranging from 70 to 450 people. Generally, the houses are one-room adobe 
structures with a palm-frond roof. The number of rural communities per municipality 
differs largely, ranging from 23 in Sopachuy to 80 in Monteagudo. Some of these 
communities are concentrated, with the households grouped around a primary school, a 
church and a soccer field. Others lack such a centre, and the households are dispersed. 
The majority of the population in the municipalities of Yotala, Poroma, Sopachuy and 
Presto are quechua small farmers who farm intensively on small parcels of land. One also 
finds quechuas in the lowlands of Monteagudo and Huacareta as a result of migration 
from the adjacent provinces of Azurduy and Zudañez in the 1970s (Buckman 1976). 
Guaranies and mestizos (of mixed Indian and European descent) also live in these 
municipalities. Mestizos mainly live in the municipal capital and work in the non-
agricultural sector, although some still own a piece of land. The languages spoken in the 
municipalities reflect the ethnicity of the population. In the higher zone and the valleys, 
Quechua is the first language, while in the subtropical lowlands Spanish, and to lesser 
extent Guaraní, is the dominant language.      
4.4 The socio-economic structure 
In the introduction of this chapter it was noted that Chuquisaca is one of the poorest 
departments in Bolivia. This is supported by an analysis of several poverty indicators in 
the six research municipalities: illiteracy, access to electricity and mains water, and the 
Human Development Index (HDI).4 When comparing the six municipalities (Table 4.3), 
Monteagudo has the highest HDI score and the lowest illiteracy score. Yotala is in 
second position, followed by Huacareta. The relatively favourable position of Yotala in 
terms of employment and educational services can be explained by fact that it is located 
in the vicinity of the city of Sucre. On the other hand, Sopachuy and especially Poroma 
and Presto are among the poorest municipalities in Bolivia, due to a high level of 
illiteracy and a short life expectancy.   
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Figure 4.3  The peasant community of Rodeo, municipality of Presto. This is an example of a clustered 
community with the school and houses centred around a small playing ground. The clustering 
was the initiative of the NGO ACLO, for the provision of mains water to the households.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 A typical example of the main street of a village in the valleys of Chuquisaca, here in Sopachuy 
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Table 4.3  Indicators of poverty: Bolivia, Chuquisaca and the six research municipalities 
Illiteracy 
among 
population>15 
years  
Electricityª Water mainª  
% of total 
population 
% of total 
population  
% of total 
population 
HDI Ranking 
national level 
Bolivia 20 70 71 0.531 - 
Chuquisaca 40 40 41 0.389 - 
Research 
municipalities 
     
Yotala 50 27 62 0.328 258 
Poroma 67   0 17 0.276 296 
Sopachuy 67 17 20 0.317 265 
Presto 77   6 12 0.270 299 
Monteagudo 35 24 36 0.387 180 
Huacareta 43   7 17 0.337 251 
Source: UDAPSO-PNUD 1997. 
 ª Share of the population that has access to electricity and the water main, respectively. 
 
 
Access to education and to health services is decisive for the level of human 
development. Rural households in Bolivia often have limited access to such public 
services as schools and health posts. These services are often absent or relatively far 
away and poorly equipped. This is confirmed by an inventory of the health and 
educational services available in the research municipalities (Table 4.4). 
 
  
Table 4.4  Availability of education and health services in the municipalities 
 Communities 
with a primary 
school as % of 
total number of 
communities 
No. of secondary 
Schools in the 
municipality 
Communities with 
a health post as % 
of total number of 
communities 
No. of medical 
centres in the 
municipality 
Yotala 61   7 21 1 
Poroma 59   1 14 - 
Sopachuy 77   6 14 1 
Presto 62   3   6 1 
Monteagudo 99 11 15 1 
Huacareta 85   6 24 1 
Source:  PDMs municipalities; UDAPSO-PNUD 1996. 
 
 
Although most communities have a primary school, these schools do not always offer the 
full school cycle (often only up to fourth grade). Many rural primary schools are one-
room buildings, without chairs, tables or adequate teaching materials. Primary school 
teachers are not qualified and difficult to find. Although an educational reform was 
introduced in 1994 to correct some of these imbalances, the results have so far been 
disappointing. 
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In addition to poorly equipped schools, a high absenteeism rate affects the level of 
illiteracy in rural areas. This absenteeism is due to three factors: the schools’ 
considerable distance from the households; the fact that the school calendar does not 
coincide with the agricultural calendar, which necessitates parents to keep their children 
at home during the harvest period; and the children’s deficient nutrition due to scarce 
economic resources. The situation in the health sector is comparable with that in 
education. All municipalities except Poroma have a medical centre, often with limited 
capacity. Besides these hospitals, each municipality has a number of health posts. The 
services offered by these posts are limited to simple treatments, such as vaccinations and 
first aid health care. For more advanced health care, such as operations, the households 
depend on the medical centres in the municipal capital.  
 
The rural character of the research municipalities is reflected by the employment 
structure. Agriculture is by far the most important source of employment for the 
population, as is shown in Table 4.5.  
 
 
Table 4.5  Economically active population by sector, as % of total economically active population, 1992 
Sector Yotala Poroma Sopachuy Presto Monteagudo Huacareta 
Agriculture   64  97   90  94   74   80 
Mining/industry   23    2     4    4     8     6 
Commerce     3    0     1    0     6     2 
Services   10    1     5    2   12   12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N = 1,826 8,828 2,282 3,874 7,880 3,511 
Source: INE 1992. 
  
4.4.1 Agriculture  
With respect to land tenure, two main patterns prevail in the study area. The first one 
concerns areas subject to the 1953 land reform. This pattern is found in the higher and 
lower valleys of the department (including the municipalities of Yotala, Poroma, 
Sopachuy and Presto). A study of the municipality of Presto (ACLO 1997, p. 53) 
describes that four families owned the land in this municipality prior to the land reform. 
Just before the land reform, these families handed their land down to their children in 
order to prevent expropriation. Nowadays, the influence of these families has almost 
disappeared, as most of the land in Presto has been redistributed. Only 1% of the land 
remains in the hands of the previous large landowners, the former servants owning 82% 
of the land, the former tenants 2% and immigrants possessing 15%. In the higher zones 
(Yotala, Poroma, Sopachuy and Presto), the average amount of cultivable land per 
household ranges from 1 to 3 ha, often divided into several parcels.  
The second pattern is found in areas in which the land reform was never fully 
implemented, as a consequence of which a considerable amount of land is concentrated 
in the hands of a few large landowners. This is particularly the case in the subtropical 
lowlands, the municipality of Huacareta and to a lesser extent in that of Monteagudo. 
Recently, however, these land owners have begun to sell parts of their property under the 
influence of increasing population pressure and the promulgation of a new law on 
Agrarian Reform (the INRA law). Nevertheless, the average area of cultivable land per 
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household in both municipalities still is much higher than in the other four municipalities, 
ranging from 7 ha in Monteagudo to 16 ha in Huacareta (PDMs 1996-9). However, there 
are sharp differences between the individual households.    
 
The dominant mode of production in all municipalities is rain-fed agriculture 
(agricultura a secano). Although irrigation is an important technology in increasing 
agricultural production, it is applied on a small scale only. Factors that condition the use 
of irrigation are the need for a water source, the high costs involved with building such a 
complex system and the specialised knowledge required.  
Maize is by far the most important crop produced in the research municipalities in 
terms of area, followed by wheat and potatoes in the higher valley municipalities, and red 
pepper, peanuts and citrus fruits in the lowland municipalities of Monteagudo and 
Huacareta (Table 4.6).  
 
 
Table 4.6  Main crops produced in the research municipalities by area 
 
 
Maize Wheat Potatoes Red pepper Citrus Peanuts 
Yotala x x x    
Poroma x x x    
Sopachuy x x  x  x 
Presto x x x    
Monteagudo x   x x x 
Huacareta x   x x x 
Source: PDMs, 1996-9. 
 
 
The agricultural production in the research municipalities is mainly for subsistence, 
particularly in the higher zones. The main use is for own consumption, followed by sale, 
the provision of seed for the next harvest and trueque, a traditional and still widely 
practised means of exchange.   
 
The breeding of cows, pigs and chickens is an important activity in all municipalities, for 
both own consumption and commercial purposes. With regard to own consumption, 
livestock serves various purposes, such as traction, nutrition (milk, eggs, meat) and 
derived products, such as wool and leather. In the municipalities of Yotala, Poroma, 
Sopachuy and Presto this purpose dominates. In Monteagudo and Huacareta, however, 
there is also extensive commercialised livestock-breeding on large haciendas. 
Notwithstanding, as a study of the NUR (1999) points out, a considerable part of the 
livestock in these municipalities is also for own consumption.   
4.4.2 Non-agricultural employment  
Although agriculture is the most important source of employment, the share of this sector 
in total employment differs between the six municipalities. In Yotala, Monteagudo and, 
to a lesser extent, Huacareta, the economic structure is relatively more diversified.  
The differentiated character of the employment structure of the population in Yotala can 
be explained by the proximity of the labour market of Sucre.  The importance of mining 
and transportation in Yotala can be attributed to the exploitation of sand and gravel 
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(arena and ripio) found on the bed of the Rio Cachimayu. These materials are collected 
by hand and transported by truck to the FANCESA concrete plant in Sucre. Employment 
in the transportation sector is also linked to the various transport services operating 
between Yotala and Sucre, and the fact that Sucre is the department’s most important 
commercial centre. As a consequence, there are many transportistas serving as 
intermediaries between the farmers and the market in Sucre. The relatively high share of 
the construction sector can be attributed to the proximity of the city of Sucre, which 
offers opportunities for work as a construction worker, as well as for contractors and 
private entrepreneurs.  
Compared to the other five municipalities, Monteagudo is where industry is the most 
developed. However, a study on Monteagudo (NUR 1997) points out that, compared to 
other regions, industry is weakly developed in the municipality as most products are 
commercialised pretty much as raw products. In 1966, the now privatised national oil 
company (YPFB) discovered an oil field in the municipality of Monteagudo. Although 
the site still produces oil, the number of barrels extracted each year declined from 10,000 
in 1972-3 to 700 in 1997. Initiatives to promote industrialisation and the processing of 
raw materials (e.g. the CONALDE, the ‘scouring’ plant, and CORDECH’s red pepper 
processing plant) did not survive. Nor did the pig-breeding project (FGP), as the 1996 
Law on Administrative Decentralisation transferred this project to the municipality. In 
sum, the industries can be characterised as small scale, producing for the local market 
and operating with family labour.  
In all municipalities there is some production of handicrafts, e.g. leather in 
Monteagudo and Huacareta, and textile, wood products, pottery and tools, produced 
mainly in the peasant communities. Although the importance of the last three products is 
gradually diminishing due to the emergence of industrially produced substitutes, the 
production of textile products offers some opportunities to earn an additional income. 
Another product worth mentioning is tiles, which are produced in Poroma and Presto for 
the local market.    
Trade is weakly developed in all municipalities except Monteagudo. Retail trade 
dominates the trade sector. In Poroma and Presto this takes the form of a few tiendas – 
small shops fronting the street. They have an informal character and sell a limited 
number of products, such as canned vegetables and soft drinks. In Yotala, Sopachuy and 
Huacareta, this sector is more developed and offers a much broader range ofitems. 
Monteagudo is a service town, offering many products, ranging from clothing, footwear 
and tools to domestic utensils. In addition to shops, the service sector includes librerías 
offering office equipment, copy shops, and pharmacies.  
Market trade is found mainly in Sopachuy and Monteagudo, whilst in Yotala and 
Huacareta this function is found in combination with shops. The daily market in 
Sopachuy offers a limited number of products, mainly meat and potatoes, focusing its 
activities on serving meals (breakfast, almuerzo and cena).  Market trade in Monteagudo 
is concentrated in the new market building in the centre of town. A wide range of 
products is offered here, including fruits, vegetables, canned goods and meat. In this 
market, the selling of products is combined with the serving of meals.  
There are no regular regional markets in the research municipalities, like in other parts 
of Bolivia emerged after the land reform. Casanovas (1988, p. 258) explains the lack of a 
regional market and the low level of commercialisation in Chuquisaca by the isolated 
position of most communities, due to the weakly developed road infrastructure. 
Traditionally, most commercialised production is sold through the markets at 
Cochabamba and La Paz.   
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An analysis of the hotel and restaurant sector provides a varied picture. In Poroma and 
Presto this sector is not present: visitors wishing to lodge there depend on the hospitality 
of the Sisters of the Congregation for accommodation, and on the owner of the town’s 
only shop for food. Yotala has three restaurants, but no hotels, probably because of the 
proximity of Sucre where lodging facilities are abundantly available. The facilities in 
Sopachuy and Huacareta are more varied, with a number of restaurants and two places to 
sleep. Monteagudo provides the most varied picture, with eight hotels and six restaurants, 
ranging from informal to well equipped. The limited supply of accommodation and 
restaurants can be explained by the lack of demand for these services: there is almost no 
tourism, partly due to the lack of infrastructure, and the only visitors to the towns are on 
business (e.g. officials from the departmental and the national government, and 
representatives from NGOs).  
The importance of services in Huacareta has its source in the prevalent hacienda 
system. This sector is dominated by women, who are employed at the haciendas of large 
landowners.     
4.4.3 Migration as a way of life 
In addition to agricultural and non-agricultural employment, migration forms an 
important source of income for the rural households in the research municipalities. 
During the implementation of the LPP it was suggested that an increase in investments in 
the social and productive sector would lead to a reduction of temporary and, in the end, 
permanent migration.  
When considering the importance of migration, a distinction should be made between 
temporary and permanent migration. The former can be considered a strategy to secure 
additional income in periods of crisis (such as droughts or low agricultural production) or 
as a response to unfavourable production climates. In a study on temporary migration in 
several peasant communities in northern Potosí and Chuquisaca, Vargas (1998, p. 155) 
found that 48% of the population migrates temporarily. The main reason to migrate 
temporarily is the need for additional income to buy clothing, household articles, food, 
production items, livestock and land. The period of temporary migration coincides 
largely with the agricultural calendar, as most people leave after the harvest. 
The main reasons to migrate permanently are the prevalent agricultural conditions and 
the lack of access to land. Linkages with the market are also important, because in 
communities where the commercialisation of agricultural products (potatoes) is possible, 
permanent migration is less pronounced.  
The dividing line between temporary and permanent migration is a thin one. Often 
individuals start their migration career with temporary migration, to consider after a 
while the option of permanently moving out. Also, a temporary stay in Sucre or Santa 
Cruz for educational reasons often leads to a permanent stay. The permanent moving out 
of rural households to other regions, especially to cities, is a national phenomenon.  
The department of Chuquisaca has undergone a process of urbanisation during the last 
50 years. In 1950, 82% of the population lived in rural areas, a percentage that had 
declined to 78% in 1976 and to 67% in 1992. As Barron and Goudsmit state (1998, p. 
177) permanent migration is ‘un modo de vivir’ (‘a way of life’). In their study of the 
migration process in the north of Potosí and Chuquisaca – a region that partly 
corresponds with the research municipalities of Yotala, Poroma and Presto – they found 
that 18% of the population had migrated permanently in the period 1983-96. The main 
motives inspiring the decision to migrate permanently were work (52%), study (32%) 
and marriage (16%). Limited agricultural production, related to limited access to land, 
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and scarcity of alternative sources of income were the most important push factors. 
Popular destination areas for permanent migrants were Sucre (45%), the city of Santa 
Cruz (18%), the rural areas in Santa Cruz (7%) and Argentina (10%). Other destinations 
(20%) are the Chapare, the coca-producing region north of Cochabamba, and Tarija. 
With respect to the personal characteristics of those who migrate, Barron and Goudsmit 
found that women are slightly over-represented. Furthermore, they found that it is mainly 
young (18-22 years), single people who migrate. A last finding of their study worth 
mentioning here is that only 24% of the migrants maintain contact with their community 
of origin.    
Although there is no information on temporary and permanent migration at the 
household level in the study area, some comments can be made on the basis of the studies 
of Vargas and Barron and Goudsmit, and on the basis of municipal development plans. 
Both temporary and permanent migration are more common in the municipalities of 
Yotala (52% temporary, 18% permanent), Poroma (24% temporary, 2% permanent), 
Sopachuy (11% permanent) and Presto (18% temporary) than in Monteagudo and 
Huacareta (both around 0.02 % temporary). The difference between the higher zones and 
the lowland municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta can probably be explained by 
the more favourable agricultural conditions in these two municipalities, including the 
availability of land and the presence of wage labour in the same municipality.   
4.5 The institutional context 
The introduction of the Law on Popular Participation (LPP) in 1994 changed the 
institutional landscape completely, particularly in rural Bolivia. The following sections 
describe the institutional landscape after 1994 in the six research municipalities. Six main 
actors are discerned: the local government, the Organizaciones Territoriales de Base 
(OTBs), other forms of organisations, the Comité de Vigilancia, the private sector and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).          
4.5.1 The local government 
Before starting the analysis, it is important to define local government.5 Generally, local 
government is understood as both the mayor and the municipal council. In this study, 
civil servants are also considered to be part of the local government, as they are an 
annexe to the mayor and, albeit to a lesser extent, to the municipal council. Moreover, in 
many municipalities local policies bear the stamp of the civil servants, specifically that of 
the oficial mayor, the head of the administrative department. 
The implementation of the LPP had a profound impact on the role of the mayor in 
several aspects, not only with regards to the nature of the job, but also regarding the 
characteristics of the mayor (Box 4.1). Before 1994, being a mayor in Bolivia’s towns 
was mainly a decorative function, with the main task to promote the (urban part of the) 
municipality. Although, in theory, a mayor was responsible for several tasks, the lack of 
financial resources restricted his ability to act (see Chapter 3 and Ardaya 1995). Mayors 
did not receive a wage or a budget, and their only income came from local taxes.  
A second change involved the mayors’ backgrounds. When the LPP was introduced in 
1994, the mayors of the municipalities in the study area were mestizos, coming from the 
towns. Most were leading residents from the middle or upper class, such as merchants, 
lawyers and notables. The advantage of electing a middle- or upper-class mayor in the 
pre-LPP period was twofold. A well-to-do mayor can invest in the town, in contrast to a 
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mayor from a lower income class. Also, upper class sometimes implies involvement in 
some interesting networks, for example with politicians or the CORDECH (the state-
owned Regional Development Corporation). Box 4.1 illustrates these changes.  
 
 
 
 
Since 1995, municipal elections are held every four years6 in the month of December. 
The number of councillors to be elected depends on the size of the population. 
Municipalities with up to 30,000 inhabitants have five councillors, the minimum 
number.7 Candidates have to be affiliated to a political party that participates in the 
national elections. Consequently, local parties that might be more focused on the specific 
local context are absent. 
From the perspective of political parties, municipal elections have gained much 
importance since 1994. Electoral campaigns determine daily life in the municipal villages 
in the pre-elections period: every inch of every wall is covered with candidates’ posters, 
political parties organise parades, and pickups tour the streets informing the population 
why they should vote for a particular party.  
The candidate who obtains the majority of votes is appointed mayor. If there is not a 
majority candidate, the councillors elect a candidate, generally of the party that acquired 
most votes. An analysis of the results of the municipal elections at the national level 
shows that the direct election of the mayor is generally the exception rather than a rule. In 
the 1995 elections, 14% of the candidates obtained a majority. Among the six research 
municipalities, only the candidate of the MBL in Sopachuy obtained a majority in the 
1995 elections and was elected directly as mayor. In the 1999 elections, this was the case 
with the MBL candidate in Yotala. If no candidate gets a majority, the elected councillors 
have to negotiate over the candidate who will become the mayor.   
 
Table 4.7 shows the composition of the local government, including the mayor, in the 
research municipalities as a result of the 1995 and 1999 elections. The four parties that 
dominate the local governments in the study area are the MBL, ADN, MNR and the MIR 
(Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario). Among the category ‘other’ are the smaller 
parties, the IU (Izquierda Unita), Eje Pachakuti and UCS (Unión Civica Solidaridad) 
(see Appendix II for a description of these political parties). Comparing the results of 
1995 with those of 1999, the ADN and MIR experienced an increase in the number of 
Box 4.1   Being a mayor before 1994 
Don Orlando has twice been mayor of Sopachuy. The first time (1980-2) he was appointed by the 
military rulers; the second time (1985-7) he was elected. However, during both periods he received 
only US$ 10 a month. He stated: 
 
‘ … yes, in those times we also called it the municipio, but this concerned only the town of 
Sopachuy. However, we did not receive any funds from the central government, we only had 
our taxes. During the first period, early in the 1980s, mostly on chicha [beer brewed from 
maize], during the second taxes on leather.’ 
 
‘… when I wanted to do something for the town I asked the mayor of Sucre, I really had a 
good contact with him. I also got along very well with the then director of the CORDECH. 
He got me some cement, which I gave to Padre Juan, who used it for the hotel, health projects 
and the graveyard …’. 
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councillors, at the cost of the MBL. The results of the national elections in June 1997, 
which brought the ADN to power, might have influenced these changes. 
 
 
Table 4.7  Composition of local government by political party, as a result of the 1995 and 1999 elections 
MBL ADN MNR  MIR  Other   
95 99 95 99 95 99 95 99 95 99 
Yotala 3 2 
 
 1 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 
Poroma 3 1  1 1  1 3   1  1  
Sopachuy 4 4   1  1   1 1    
Presto 3 1   1  2 3  1 1    
Monteagudo    3 2  2 2   2  1 1 
Huacareta 1    3  4 1   2    
MBL = Movimiento Bolivia Libre; ADN = Acción Democratico y Nacionalista; MNR = Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario; and MIR = Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario).  
Source:  SNPP 1996 for 1995; CNE 1999 for 1999. 
 
 
For the purpose of this study it is useful to pay attention to some characteristics of the 
individual council members (during the period 1995-9), such as their background and 
educational level. A majority of the councillors comes from towns. In Monteagudo this is 
the case for all councillors. In Huacareta, 60% of the councillors live in a peasant 
community, but these are all large farmers. The picture in the other municipalities is 
more diverse, with an average of two councillors living in a peasant community.  
Since council members are elected directly, basic skills like writing and reading are 
not major selection criteria. Most council members have two or three years of basic 
education. An exception is the council of Monteagudo, where all members but one had 
received higher education, including university level. In other municipalities, however, 
there are illiterate council members. Considering the way council work is organised this 
is not always a problem. Bolivian society is still oriented towards oral, more traditional 
communication. An example is the reading aloud of the minutes at the start of the 
municipal council meetings.  
The mayor has a special position within local government. He is responsible for the 
daily management of local government. One of the specific objectives of the LPP is to 
increase the participation of all layers of the population in the local decision-making 
process. It is suggested that through the LPP, former underdog groups in society (e.g. 
peasants and indigenous groups) can now obtain a more powerful position in society, by 
becoming mayor or a member of the municipal council. Within the research 
municipalities, the share of small farmers in local government positions is small: Poroma 
and Sopachuy had a peasant mayor in the period 1995-9. This issue will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter.  
4.5.2 Civil servants 
Civil service is a relatively new phenomenon in the research municipalities, except in 
Monteagudo. Since 1994, all municipalities have established a corps of civil servants, 
generally consisting of the oficial mayor (who is responsible for overall management), a 
technical adviser, a secretary and – if funds are available – various other advisors and 
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supporting staff. As shown in Table 4.8, the number of civil servants varies largely in the 
research municipalities.  
 
 
Table 4.8  Number of civil servants in 1997 and 2000, in person years  
 Employees 1997 Employees 2000 
Yotala   7   7 
Poroma   4   4 
Sopachuy   6   7 
Presto   6   5 
Monteagudo 29 15 
Huacareta   5   4 
Source: Municipal Annual Plans 1997 and 2000. 
 
 
The difference in number of employees between Monteagudo and the other 
municipalities is partly the result of the former having a longer municipal history. The 
municipality of Monteagudo is also richer, because it receives, on the basis of its number 
of inhabitants, more Popular Participation funds than the other, smaller municipalities. A 
third reason is that Monteagudo generates a considerable amount of other funds, such as 
local taxes, which can be used to pay the wages of civil servants.8 Despite these 
favourable factors, Monteagudo had to reduce the number of civil servants as a 
consequence of new regulations in 1998, which restricted the amount of other funds that 
could be spent on wages.    
In addition to the number of staff, the abilities or quality of civil servants is another, 
perhaps even more significant aspect. In view of today’s rapid technological changes it is 
not surprising that many civil servants need to be trained in order to meet the 
requirements of the central level, such as in the use of certain computer programmes, 
planning methodologies, etc. Although NGOs and the departmental service for municipal 
strengthening have developed training programmes, their success is seriously hindered by 
the frequent turnover of municipal staff. There is lack of continuity, due to a number of 
reasons, some of which are interrelated. 
The most common reason of changing civil servants is a change of mayor. Usually, 
the new mayor fires all the personnel of the former one (for fear of disloyalty) and 
appoints members of his own party. We will return to this issue in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Secondly, the resignation of civil servants is a common phenomenon in rural 
municipalities. Because of the low wages, people try to find better jobs, sometimes by 
migration. Another reason is the limited facilities in the municipalities: most do not have 
electricity, housing is quite basic and due to bad roads living in a small rural village can 
be a lonely experience. This makes it difficult for municipalities to find qualified persons. 
Sometimes, municipalities cannot fill a vacancy, like in Presto, where the vacancy of 
oficial mayor could not be filled for months because candidates prefer to live in places 
with more facilities.  
4.5.3 Territorial Base Organisations  
The OTBs are the target group of the LPP. OTBs consist of peasant communities 
(comunidades campesinas), indigenous communities (pueblos indígenas) and 
neighbourhood organisations (juntas vecinales), each of which is organised and functions 
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according to its own values and customs.9 Immediately after the LPP came into effect 
(June 1994), the government launched training programmes to inform the population of 
the LPP. The LPP states that each of these three types of organisations (of which there 
are some 14,500 at the national level) should register at the town hall of the municipality, 
in order to obtain juridical personality, so they can participate in the local decision-
making process. The registration of the various organisations was a complex 
administrative operation, as each potential OTB had to collect the signatures of its 
members. At the national level, only 16% of the peasant communities, neighbourhood 
organisations and indigenous communities had been registered by May 1995.         
Despite the enormous differences between the three different kinds of organisation, 
the existing literature on the LPP hardly considers their different backgrounds, contexts 
and functions. Generally, research is carried out in one specific context, and as such 
centres on one specific category of OTBs. This implies that limited attention is paid to 
the impact of the type of OTB (i.e. peasant community, neighbourhood organisation or 
indigenous community) on the process of participatory planning, decision-making and 
local development. Also, little is known about the factors which influence the success of 
each OTB in acquiring projects. This section focuses on the main characteristics of each 
type of OTB; in Chapter 5, the more fundamental questions mentioned above are 
addressed. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the total number of OTBs in each research municipality in 1998, 
according to type. What stands out in this table are the differences between the 
municipalities in the total number of OTBs and the dominance of peasant communities 
and the presence of indigenous communities in the municipalities of Monteagudo and 
Huacareta. These differences might affect the impact of decentralisation on local 
development and local governance. 
 
 
Table 4.9  Number of OTBs registered in the municipality by type, 1999  
Municipality Peasant communities Neighbourhood 
organisations 
Indigenous 
communities 
Total 
Yotala 49 3 - 52 
Poroma 78 1 - 79 
Sopachuy 21 2 - 23 
Presto 25 2 - 27 
Monteagudo 73 3 4 80 
Huacareta 25 1 3 29 
Source: Fieldwork 1998-9. 
 
 
Compared to other municipalities, the number of OTBs in the six municipalities of the 
study area is not so high, ranging from 23 in Sopachuy to 80 in Monteagudo. This 
contrasts the situation in the department of La Paz, where there are municipalities with 
more than 200 OTBs (Viacha, Achacachi and Puerto Acosta), and the municipality of 
Puerto Villaroel in the Chapare region of Cochabamba, which has more than 175 OTBs.   
The dominance of peasant communities in the total number of OTBs confirms the 
rural identity of the municipalities. The indigenous communities in Monteagudo and 
Huacareta consist of recently established (rural) Guaraní communities. The size of the 
OTBs varies according to type (Table 4.10). With respect to the peasant communities, all 
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households that live and own a piece of a land in a certain territory are considered an 
afiliado (member). According to sindicato rules, a peasant community should be 
composed of at least 25 member-households.10 The Guaraní communities are generally 
somewhat smaller than the peasant communities, because they are recently established 
communities with only a limited amount of land.  
 
 
Table 4.10  Size of the OTBs in number of households by type of OTB, as % of total number of OTBs 
 1-49 50-99 100-149 150-199 >200 Mean 
Peasant community   45 39   9   5   2   70 
Neighbourhood organisation  14 43 29 14 185 
Indigenous community 100       34 
Source: Fieldwork 1998-9. 
 
 
The differences between the three different types of OTBs are reflected in the use of the 
term OTB. In the two lowland municipalities (Monteagudo and Huacareta), the new 
concept of OTB was used to refer to the communal organisation, whilst in the other four 
municipalities people of the peasant OTBs continued using the term sindicato or 
comunidad.11 
 
Peasant communities  
The organisation of the peasant communities is largely based on the system of the 
sindicatos, the socio-economic structure of Bolivian rural society since 1953. The MNR 
government promoted the sindicatos after the 1953 land reform as the most important 
organisation through which the land of the haciendas was redistributed. All households 
that work a piece of land within the community are considered members of the sindicato. 
Generally, only a few households are not affiliated to the sindicato, such as households 
without any land, and men who have their own household but still live with their parents. 
Although the sindicato system was introduced to redistribute land to ex-hacienda 
communities, the system also became active in communities that had never belonged to a 
hacienda, the so-called comunidades originarias (see De Morrée 1998b, p. 340 and 
Urioste 1993). This illustrates the importance given to this form of community 
organisation. 
The main functions of the sindicato are organising communal projects, administering 
collective goods, intervening in conflicts, defending the community’s land from other 
communities, and representing the community vis-à-vis external institutions, such as the 
government and NGOs. The sindicato system imposes two main obligations on its 
members: they have to attend meetings and work the communal land. Generally, 
affiliated households also have to pay a monthly contribution of between a half and one 
boliviano.12 Members who do not comply with the sindicato’s obligations are fined. 
According to the statutes, each year the leadership13 of a sindicato (and thus of the OTB, 
since 1994) changes when the new secretario general is elected. This task cannot be 
refused, as it forms part of the sindicato tradition.  
During recent decades, both the structure and the organisation of the sindicato have 
changed, partly due to the occurrence of migration. Some parts of the study area 
experience very high rates of out-migration. In periods of economic recession, it is not 
only the young, single men who migrate, but also married men with a family. Although 
this results in an improvement of the financial position of the households, it has a 
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dramatic impact on the composition of the population in these areas, as only females, 
male adolescents and the elderly remain in the community. The lack of adult men has 
serious consequences for the functioning of the OTBs in relation to local decision-
making and the acquisition of projects. A young boy generally does not know how to 
negotiate about projects, and will consequently acquire fewer projects than other OTBs 
with more experienced leaders.  
 
Neighbourhood organisations 
In contrast to urban neighbourhood organisations, neighbourhood organisations in rural 
areas used to have a pretty elitist character. Although everyone who lives in the 
neighbourhood is considered to be a member of the neighbourhood organisation, the 
board generally consists of the village elite: the judge, the owner of the cooperative or the 
lawyer. Before 1994, the activities of the organisations were mainly directed at urban 
improvement and the raising of funds. This corresponds with the functioning of 
neighbourhood organisations in large cities, where the first juntas vecinales were 
established in order to obtain legal status for the neighbourhoods. Later, access to basic 
services and the overall improvement of the neighbourhoods became the principal focus 
of their actions.  
In the villages a strong involvement with the situation of the ‘rural poor’ existed 
before 1994, although there was also some arrogance. The prevailing attitude of the 
board of the neighbourhood organisation in the rural villages was that they differed much 
from the peasant population, and that, fortunately, they had not much to do with the 
peasant communities. This changed with the implementation of the LPP, as a result of 
which the two types of organisation, the peasant communities and the neighbourhood 
organisations, had to collaborate in priority-setting and local decision-making.  
 
Indigenous communities  
The south-eastern part of the department of Chuquisaca remained practically untouched 
by the 1953 land reform. Until the 1990s, rural society in the province of Hernando Siles 
– comprising the research municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta – and adjacent 
provinces had been dominated by haciendas, which functioned within a two-tier working 
system comprising paid workers (peones) and the Guaranies – the original inhabitants of 
the Chaco14 region who lived on the property and worked for a small fee. Earlier land 
reforms had bypassed this region almost unnoticed and only a few properties had been 
expropriated. After implementation of the LPP in 1994, many large landowners assumed 
a function (as mayor or council member) in the newly formed local government, thus 
gaining access to funds and projects. It is notable that many OTBs that registered in these 
regions corresponded with the property of a large landowner. While the landowner 
became president of the OTB, the households working at the hacienda were kept 
ignorant. Therefore, large landowners were in full control of local decision-making 
processes, and had access to projects such as road improvements, which were mainly 
aimed at improving access to markets and as such increased the profits of large 
landowners. This is in stark contrast to the situation in other parts of Bolivia, where rural 
OTBs are composed of peasant communities and are relatively democratic, and where the 
projects funded by the municipality benefit the community as a whole.   
This situation, in which large landowners co-opted the OTBs is, however, changing. 
In the mid-1990s, several Guaraní families decided to leave the haciendas, settle 
elsewhere and form an indigenous community independent of the haciendas and large 
landowners.15 Other groups quickly followed, and in 1998 there were seven indigenous 
communities in the municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta that successfully 
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applied for a formal OTB status. These developments are the result of increasing 
awareness among the Guaraní population of their own capabilities and identities, and– 
more indirectly – of the decentralisation process. This increased awareness was 
stimulated by NGO projects aimed at strengthening the organisation of the Guaraní and 
supporting the purchase of land.  
The decentralisation process enhances community development, since the LPP 
enables the quick integration of the newly established communities as OTBs into the 
administrative-political structure. Moreover, decentralisation gave these indigenous 
communities direct access to municipal funds with which investments in education and 
health were relatively easy to make. The indigenous communities in the study area are 
organised around the Regional Assembly of Guaraní People, which resembles the 
structure of the agrarian syndicates. Within this system, leadership (capitanía) is passed 
down from father to son (Grootaert and Narayan 2001).   
4.5.4 Other forms of organisation 
In addition to the OTBs, there is a whole array of other organisations at the communal 
and local level in the six municipalities, such as Civic Committees (CCs), women groups 
(clubes de madres), producer organisations and functional organisations involved in the 
provision of services. These heterogeneous organisations have one thing in common: 
they are all excluded from local decision-making within the context of the LPP since they 
are not territorially organised and thus not formally recognised.  
The CCs consist of the traditionally dominant groups at the local level, such as the 
population in the villages of the municipalities, local entrepreneurs, transporters and 
notabilities such as doctors and lawyers. There is such a committee in each of the six 
research municipalities. With respect to these committees, Sandoval and colleagues 
(1998, p. 45) point out that their position has been weakened since the implementation of 
the LPP, since they formally are not considered in local decision-making as prescribed by 
the law. The clubes de madres, once established to channel food donations, are often 
initiated by external organisations, such as NGOs (Grootaert and Narayan 2001, p. 16). 
Nowadays, their main activities involve formal and informal education, sewing and 
managing kitchen gardens. The internal structure is often weak, and the organisations 
tend to disappear when the project is concluded (Sandoval 1998, p. 56).  
Producers’ organisations are organisations of peasants who coordinate production 
activities or the commercialisation and provision of basic services. Examples are 
cooperatives involved in the commercialisation of maize and wheat, associations of milk 
producers and cooperatives that facilitate access to credit. The collaboration with the 
peasant OTBs differs: in some municipalities there is a fluid, formal collaboration, but in 
others there is hardly any collaboration at all (De Morrée 1998a).  
Another group comprises functional organisations that are involved in the 
maintenance and regulation of communal infrastructure, such as roads and irrigation 
systems, and organisations centred on the management of communal interests, such as 
sport, schools and health posts and juntas escolares (school committees).  
A last group consists of organisations that are affiliated to an NGO and consist of 
households that form the target group of the NGOs’ activities. This will be addressed in 
Section 4.5.7. 
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4.5.5 The Comité de Vigilancia 
In each of the six research municipalities a Comité de Vigilancia is functioning. The task 
of the Comité de Vigilancia is to exercise popular supervision (or control) over the 
conduct of local government. The Comités de Vigilancia are established by means of 
elections. Although the population elects, through the OTBs, the members of the Comités 
– generally the leaders of the OTBs – the establishment of the first ones after 1994 
depended heavily on the initiative of the mayor who called the elections. Once elected, 
this initiating role was taken over by the population.  
There are several ways of electing a Comité de Vigilancia. Following the criterion that 
each canton16 within the municipality should be represented in the Comité, the population 
in some municipalities first elects a committee on the canton level, from which a 
municipal committee is elected. An example of such a committee is that of Huacareta, 
Poroma and Sopachuy. Elections in the presence of all the dirigentes of all OTBs are 
held in Monteagudo, Presto and Yotala. According to the director of the departmental 
office for Communal Strengthening (Fortalecimiento Comunitaria), every OTB has to 
send a delegation of two persons, with voz y voto, to the meeting in which the Comité de 
Vigilancia is being elected.  
Table 4.11 gives an overview of the composition of the Comités de Vigilancia in the 
study area. It can be seen from this table that most members come from the peasant 
communities, as a result of which rural representatives have a majority. This can be 
explained by two factors: firstly, because the election of the Comité de Vigilancia is 
based on the canton division within the municipality. Since the cantons in the research 
municipality are predominantly rural – except for the canton in which the municipal 
capital is situated - it is mainly peasants who have a position in this Committee.  
Moreover, the election of rural representatives is more efficient considering the distances 
and limited accessibility of the municipal territory. Generally, the representative of a 
canton is responsible for his own district for reasons of efficiency, as someone who lives 
in the canton is better equipped to visit projects than someone who does not live further 
away in the town.   
 
 
Table 4.11  Composition of the Comités de Vigilancia by type of OTB, 1999 
Municipality Urban OTBs Rural OTBs Total 
Yotala - 4 4 
Poroma - 9 9 
Sopachuy 1 5 6 
Presto - 4 4 
Monteagudo 1 3 4 
Huacareta 1 4 5 
Source: Fieldwork 1999. 
 
 
Secondly, differences in the level of social organisation between the three types of OTBs 
play a role.  
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This is illustrated by the case of Yotala, where the president of the Comité de Vigilancia 
gave the following reply when asked why townspeople are not represented on the Comité 
de Vigilancia of Yotala:  
 
‘Because they are not organised, the social structure of the communities is much better 
and organised. Also, the people of the village are much more oriented towards Sucre: the 
majority work there and so are not very interested in local, municipal affairs.’  
 
4.5.6 The private sector 
The six municipalities offer a varied picture with respect to the presence and 
characteristics of the private sector. Three categories of municipalities can be 
distinguished: those were the private sector is relatively well developed (Monteagudo and 
Yotala), those with a moderately developed private sector (Sopachuy and Huacareta), and 
those where the private sector is hardly present (Poroma and Presto). The development of 
the private sector corresponds with the economic structure in the municipalities and 
despite the differences in the presence of the private sector, the characteristics are more 
or less the same: it concerns mostly small-scale enterprises with a retail function, mainly 
based on family labour and not organised in associations. An exception is formed by the 
owners of the retail shops in Monteagudo, who are organised in the local association of 
retailers.        
4.5.7 Non-governmental organisations 
NGOs are another important institutional actor in the research municipalities. In the past 
20 years, NGOs have left their mark on the development of rural Bolivia, with projects 
directed at increasing the agricultural production and strengthening of social 
organisation. Chapter 3 described the most important implications of the LPP for the 
NGOs, namely the changing relationship with the Bolivian state, the obligation to 
collaborate with local government and the loss of financial independence. The LPP 
implied the curtailment of NGOs, but at the same time created room to diversify 
activities, such as providing training to OTBs and local government, and consultancies.    
All six municipalities have NGOs working within their boundaries (Table 4.12), 
varying in number from two to five. With respect to the selection of working areas it is 
remarkable that some NGOs have divided up the ‘territory’. An example of such a 
division is the agreement between the NGOs of ACLO (Acción Cultural Loyola) and 
CEDEC (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Chuquisaca). The first carries out 
activities in the province of Tomina and the municipality of Presto (province of 
Zudañez), whilst the other works in Villa Serrano and the other municipalities in 
Zudañez. According to the president of UNISUR (the regional network of NGOs), this 
territorial division has grown historically. There is a similar agreement between ACLO, 
PROSCAM and ProAgro concerning the territory around the municipalities of Tarabuco 
and Zudañez. The aim of such agreements is to allow the NGOs to specialise in certain 
activities and to obtain more coordination.  
 
The intensity of the contact between the NGO and the municipality varies greatly (see 
‘duration’ in Table 4.12). In some municipalities the NGO has been present for years, 
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indicating a long and often intense relationship, while in other municipalities the 
presence is for only one project or only one year.  
 
 
Table 4.12  Number and main characteristics of NGOs working in the research municipalities (1998-9)  
 No. Name Origin¹ Sector Dura-
tion² 
Agreement 
Yotala 2 PROSCAM 
Caritas 
C/N 
C/I 
Health 
Health 
L 
M 
Yes 
Yes 
Poroma 4 ETAPAS 
IPTK 
Plan 
Internacional 
CARE 
N 
N 
I 
 
I 
Agriculture 
Health/Environment 
Health/Education 
 
Health/Basic 
Sanitation/Agriculture 
L 
L 
S 
 
S 
No 
Yes 
No 
 
No 
Sopachuy 
 
5 ACLO 
PLAFOR 
COSV 
Caritas 
SNV 
C 
I 
I 
C/I 
I 
Agriculture/Planning 
Forestry 
Agriculture 
Health 
Institutional 
Strengthening  
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Presto 4 ACLO 
CESAT-CH 
Peace Corps 
Plan 
Internacional 
C/N 
N 
I 
I 
Agriculture/Planning 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
L 
L 
M 
M 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Monte-
agudo 
3 CARE 
 
Medicos 
Mundi 
Peace Corps 
I 
 
I 
 
I 
Institutional 
Strengthening 
Health 
 
Institutional 
Strengthening 
M 
 
M 
 
S 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Huacareta 4 Medicos 
Mundi 
CIAC 
 
CIPCA 
Peace Corps 
I 
 
N 
 
I 
I 
Health 
 
Institutional 
Strengthening 
Agriculture 
Institutional 
Strengthening 
M 
 
S 
 
S 
S 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
No 
¹ Origin of NGO: C = church-related, N = national, I = international. 
² Duration of relation between NGO and municipality: S = short (< 1 year), M = medium (1-3 years), L = 
long (> 3 years).  
 
 
The presence of ACLO in Sopachuy and Presto is illustrative of the first situation, with 
14 and 12 years of experience, respectively, in mainly integrated rural development 
programmes. ETAPAS in Poroma is another example of an enduring working relation. 
On the other hand, CIAC in Huacareta is a typical example of a short-term stay, with a 
clearly defined objective, i.e. adjusting the financial and accountability systems of the 
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municipality. The intensity of the relationship between NGOs and municipalities is 
important, as a more intense relationship can have important advantages for the 
municipality in terms of funds and the quality of the support offered. These aspects can 
determine the potential for good governance as well as local development.  
The transformation of NGO activities as a consequence of the implementation of the LPP 
(see Chapter 3) can also be observed in the study area. Institutional strengthening has 
become an increasingly important activity in recent years, with OTBs and local 
government as target groups. Here, a core activity is training in the field of participatory 
planning.A second new activity concerns the involvement of NGOs in the formulation 
and elaboration of municipal five-year development plans. Despite the emergence of new 
working areas, most NGOs continue their initial activities in health, agriculture and 
education. In this sense, the transformation should be seen as complementary rather than 
substitutory.  
With respect to the origin of the NGOs working in the study area, there are two main 
groups: nationally based and internationally based NGOs. The respective backgrounds 
affect the presence of a formal agreement between NGO and municipality. Since 1994, 
the formal registration of the working relation between the NGO and the municipality is 
a prerequisite for NGOs to have access to national funds. International NGOs often 
operate without such a formal agreement with the local government, as they often have 
sufficient funds at their disposal. The financial situation of national NGOs is often less 
favourable, and they consequently depend more on the funds available through 
cooperation with local governments. As can be seen from the last column in Table 4.12, 
such an agreement is, however, not yet common practice in the six municipalities. 
 
When comparing the six research municipalities with respect to the presence and 
characteristics of NGOs, three categories of municipalities can be discerned. The first 
category includes the municipalities with a considerable number of NGOs, with which an 
agreement is made and with an enduring working relation exists. Both Sopachuy and 
Presto fit this category. The second category refers to municipalities with a smaller 
number of NGOs, often without an agreement, and often for a short period. Both Yotala 
and Poroma are in this category. The third category consists of municipalities that have 
NGOs working within their boundaries, but generally without agreement and only for 
short-term activities. The municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta are in this 
category. 
4.6 Summary  
The foregoing review of the geographical, socio-economic and institutional context 
showed that the six research municipalities in the department of Chuquisaca form a 
heterogeneous group. In this final section, we summarise the main findings The main 
spatial, socio-economic and institutional characteristics of the six research municipalities 
as described in this chapter are presented in Table 4.13. 
The decision to realise the study in the department of Chuquisaca was motivated by 
three reasons. First, Chuquisaca offers a diverse picture with respect to environmental 
and socio-economic characteristics. Secondly, the department is one of the poorest 
departments in Bolivia. Thirdly, the department had some promising experiences with 
decentralisation prior to 1994. The implementation of the LPP resulted in Chuquisaca in 
the creation of 28 relatively small and predominantly rural municipalities. Of these 28 
municipalities, 6 were selected to realise an in-depth study of the contribution of 
decentralisation to good governance and local development.  
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Table 4.13  Summary of the main spatial, socio-economic and institutional characteristics of the research 
municipalities 
 Spatial context Socio-economic context Institutional context 
Yotala - high zone 
- well accessible 
- small size municipality 
- rel. high % non-agrarian 
activities 
- employment oriented 
towards Sucre 
- mod. migration 
- urban local 
government 
- moderate number of 
OTBs 
- ‘rural’ CdV 
- large private sector 
- 2 NGOs with 
agreement 
Poroma - high zone 
- poorly accessible 
- medium size municipality 
- subsistence agriculture 
- high migration 
 
- peasant mayor, urban 
council 
- high number of OTBs 
- ‘rural’ CdV 
- very small private 
sector 
- 4 NGOs, 1 with 
agreement 
- very small private 
sector 
Sopachuy - valley 
- moderately 
accessible 
- small size municipality 
- subsistence agriculture 
- high migration 
- peasant mayor, urban 
council 
- low number of OTBs 
- ‘rural’ CdV 
- 5 NGOs, 4 with 
agreement 
- small private sector 
Presto - valley 
- poorly accessible 
- small size municipality 
- subsistence agriculture 
- high migration 
- urban government 
- low number of OTBs 
- ‘rural’ CdV 
- very small private 
sector 
- 4 NGOs, 2 with 
agreement 
Monteagudo - lowland 
- well accessible 
- large municipality 
- regional service centre 
- high % non-agrarian 
employment 
- low migration 
- urban government 
- high number of OTBs 
- ‘rural’ CdV 
- rel. large private 
sector 
- 3 NGOs without 
agreement 
Huacareta - lowland 
- moderately 
accessible 
- medium size municipality 
- mod. % non-agrarian 
employment 
- low migration 
- large farmers in 
government 
- mod.private sector 
- mod. number of OTBs 
- 4 NGOs, 1 with 
agreement 
 
 
 91 
The aim of this selection was to obtain a heterogeneous sample of municipalities, with 
respect to spatial, socio-economic and institutional characteristics.   
The six municipalities have a number of socio-economic characteristics in common. 
First, they are all relatively small municipalities, except Monteagudo. Second, they are 
mainly rural municipalities, since the majority of the households live in a rural setting, in 
peasant communities, and work in the agricultural sector. Third, the municipalities can be 
considered as marginal, located outside the main commercialisation systems, and with a 
population mainly involved in subsistence agriculture.  
The municipalities of Yotala and Monteagudo are an exception, since non-agrarian 
activities are a more important source of income for the population. Fourth, they are poor 
municipalities, with scores on the Human Development Index among the lowest in 
Bolivia.  
With respect to the spatial context, the mountainous character of the environment, 
intersected by rivers, accompanied by soil degradation and erosion, make changes in the 
current system of agriculture difficult. As a result, levels of migration – both temporary 
and permanent – are high, particularly in the higher regions of Poroma, Presto and 
Sopachuy, where there is no alternative employment.  
 
As regards the institutional context, the administrative structure in all municipalities 
underwent significant changes as a result of the implementation of the LPP in 1994. Each 
municipality has a local government consisting of a mayor, the municipal council and 
civil servants. The composition of these new local governments differs. In some 
municipalities (in particular Monteagudo and Huacareta), traditional elites, urban as well 
as rural, dominate the local government. In other municipalities (e.g. Sopachuy and 
Poroma), formerly excluded sectors of society (e.g. the peasantry) are now involved in 
local government. Within the OTBs, peasant communities are most common, which is in 
line with the rural character of the municipalities. Neighbourhood organisations can be 
found in the villages in all municipalities, whilst indigenous communities are only 
present in Monteagudo and Huacareta. The main difference between the three types of 
OTBs is in the degree of organisation. Compared to the two other types, peasant 
communities tend to be better organised and their communal meetings have higher 
attendance figures.  
In addition to OTBs, there are many other types of community organisation. Since 
these organisations are not territorially based, hence do not have access to formal 
decision-making. In each municipality functions a Comité de Vigilancia, the formal 
representation of the OTBs that is charge with the control of local government on the 
proper implementation of the Law on Popular Participation. Representatives of rural 
OTBs have a majority in the composition of these committees.  
The private sector is limited in all municipalities except Yotala and Monteagudo. In 
these two municipalities there are quite a few enterprises. This finding corresponds with 
the main characteristic features of the economic structure in the research municipalities. 
By far the majority of the private sector consists of relatively small scale, family run 
enterprises.  
A last actor discussed in this chapter are NGOs. It was observed that although NGOs 
are working in all municipalities, their characteristics differ greatly with respect to the 
relation they have with local government (expressed in the presence of an agreement) and 
the intensity of the contact.  
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Notes 
 
1. The most recent population census dates from 2001, but the results were not yet available at the time 
of writing. 
2. Most municipalities emphasise their population growth in official documents, since the number of 
inhabitants in a municipality, as well as the size of the municipal council, is the key to the distribution 
of funds from the central level to the local level under the LPP. Thus, Yotala grew from 9,486 
inhabitants in 1992 to 11,997 in 1998, Poroma from 13,659 to 19,265 (2000), Sopachuy from 6,121 to 
7,417 in (1996), Presto from 7,874 to 10,339 (1996), Monteagudo from 25,240 to 26,073 (1996) and 
Huacareta from 10,015 to 11,989 (1999). (Source: PDMs municipalities and prognose INE 1998). 
3. The municipality of Mojocoya, adjacent to Presto, is an exception to this, as the town of Redención 
Pampa is far more important than the official capital Mojocoya. 
4. The HDI combines three variables of human wellbeing: life expectancy, income and education. 
5. Chapter 2 contains a more detailed discussion of the concept of local government used in this study. 
6. This is five years since the change to the Law on Municipalities in June 1999. 
7. Monteagudo is an exception to this, since this municipality was assigned 7 councillors in the 1999 
municipal elections. 
8. The financial position will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
9. According to Art. 3, section I of the LPP (1994) ‘Se define como sujetos de la Participación Popular a 
las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, expresadas en las comunidades campesinas, pueblos 
indígenas y juntas vecinales, organizadas según sus usos, costumbres o disposiciones estatutarias’. 
10. Interview with the CSUTCB, Sucre, May 1997. 
11. According to Archondo (1997b), the different uses of the term OTB were only temporarily, and 
related to the mixed feelings the introduction of the LPP raised among the sindicatos, as they thought 
the term OTB had been invented in order for the national government to co-opt them. He writes: ‘in 
the course of time, the common denominator for all representative organisations of the municipalities 
became solidly rooted in popular speech…..’ (p. 274).   
12. US$ 1  = 5.45 bolivianos (1998). 
13. The sindicato has a large board or directiva, with the Secretario General as the most important 
authority, followed by the Secretario de Relaciones and the Secretario de Actas. Other representations 
are that of Finance, Press, Agriculture, Human rights, Sports, Projects.  
14. The Chaco region is a desert-like region stretching from the north of Paraguay to the south of Bolivia. 
15. This refers to the community of Casapa in Huacareta. 
16. A canton is the lowest political-administrative unit in Bolivia. Within each municipality, there are one 
of more cantons. The most recent population census dates from 2001, but the results were not yet 
available at the time of writing. 
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5 DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE  
For years, rural Bolivia was ignored by the national government and as such was not 
represented in decision-making processes. The LPP marked a dramatic change in this, as 
it broke the hierarchical relationships between civil society and the centralist state, and 
offered the rural population the possibility to enter into dialogue with lower government 
levels. Through the LPP, the rural regions became part of the municipalities, and the 
population of these municipalities had to organise themselves into OTBs 
(Organizaciones Territoriales de Base).  
OTBs were based on existing organisations, namely, the comunidades campesinas in 
the rural areas (peasant communities), the juntas vecinales in the cities and the towns 
(neighbourhood organisations), and the pueblos indígenas in the lowlands (indigenous 
communities). Through the LPP, these organisations received the status of OTB, and thus 
share the same rights and obligations. All OTBs can now direct their own development, 
influence their living conditions and formulate projects and programmes in line with their 
demands. They can request funds for these projects from the local government. In order 
to be sure that all this conforms to the procedures, a delegation of these OTBs – the 
Comité de Vigilancia  – was created to control and supervise local government. The role 
of local government is to manage the process of participatory planning, to translate the 
priorities into viable projects and to facilitate the implementation of these projects 
through the acquisition of additional funds, the hiring of contractors and the monitoring 
of project execution.  
In this chapter, we analyse the impact of the Bolivian decentralisation policy on local 
governance, in particular the element of participation, whilst the contribution of 
decentralisation to local development will be addressed in Chapter 6.   
 
This chapter reviews the various forms local participation can take. From a political 
perspective, the implementation of the LPP in 1994 sanctioned the political participation 
of the population; that is, it empowered the population to elect officials (Section 5.1). The 
LPP also enabled formerly excluded segments of the population, such as peasants and 
indigenous groups, to be a part of local government (Section 5.2). Furthermore, 
representatives of the population can perform functions in the Comité de Vigilancia  
(Section 5.3). The population can also participate in OTBs and as such become involved 
in priority setting of demands (Section 5.4). Finally, the population can participate in all 
stages of participatory planning, from problem identification and priority setting to the 
design and implementation of projects (Section 5.5). What this all means to the leaders of 
OTBs, i.e. how they perceive participatory planning will be discussed in Section 5.6.    
The analysis in this chapter is based on structured interviews with representatives 
from 101 OTBs (see Appendix 1 for an overview) and interviews with presidents and 
members of Comités de Vigilancia.    
5.1 Political participation  
Before decentralisation, electoral behaviour in Bolivia was characterised by a low turnout 
at both national and municipal elections. With regard to municipal elections, the limited 
importance of the local level – and thus of the municipality – in terms of financial 
resources was the reason for such low participation levels. In addition, the majority of the 
rural population was not entitled to vote before 1995, since they lacked the required 
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identity card. Consequently, local politics before 1994 was mainly an urban affair and the 
rural population was not inclined to vote. In this respect, the 1995 municipal elections 
mark an important turning point in Bolivian electoral history. These were the first post-
LPP elections to be held and the general opinion was that the increased share of the 
population that turned out to vote would illustrate the changes brought about by the LPP 
at the local level. Table 5.1 demonstrates that the absolute number of the population that 
voted in the period 1993-9 in municipal elections increased. The table also shows that the 
share of non-voters of the total population that is entitled to vote decreased in the period 
1993-9 from 47.1% to 31.0%.  
 
  
Table 5.1  Electoral behaviour in municipal elections at the national level, 1993-9 
 1993 1995 1999 
Non-voters (%) 47.1 35.0 31.0 
Abs. number of voters 1,189,896 1,797,526 2,486,743 
Source: SNPP 1996; CNE 1999.  
 
 
The population’s increased participation in municipal elections can largely be attributed 
to the increased attractiveness of local level politics, in the sense that local authorities are 
now equipped with functions and funds. Another factor contributing to the increase in the 
number of voters are the efforts made by the government to provide the population with 
an identity card. Finally, the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 had an effect.  
Table 5.1 comprises the total urban and the rural population. If one distinguishes 
between the urban and the rural population at the national level, however, a different 
picture emerges. Electoral turnout is lower in rural areas because electoral campaigns are 
primarily directed at the cities. The physical distance to the voting station for rural voters 
can also be mentioned as an explanation. Although information on the municipal 
elections is only available for 1999, it shows that the voting behaviour in the six 
municipalities corresponds with the lower turnout of voters in rural areas observed above 
(Table 5.2), with turnout ranging from 65% in Sopachuy to 55% in Yotala and 
Monteagudo.  
 
 
Table 5.2  Non-voters as share of population entitled to vote in the 1999 municipal elections in the 
research municipalities 
Yotala Poroma Sopachuy Presto Monteagudo Huacareta 
45% 38% 35% 36% 45% 43% 
Source: CNE 1999. 
 
 
A comparison of the six municipalities shows that turnout is relatively low in Yotala, 
Monteagudo and Huacareta, and somewhat higher in Poroma, Sopachuy and Presto. This 
is remarkable, since we found in Chapter 4 that the limiting factor of distance applies 
more to the latter municipalities than to the first three. This might be explained by the 
engagement of NGOs in directing the electoral campaign of political parties in Poroma, 
Presto and Sopachuy at the peasant communities. 
 95 
5.2 Participation in local government 
In addition to the increasing number of voters, the 1995 municipal elections introduced a 
new phenomenon in local government. The LPP enabled formerly excluded groups, such 
as peasants and indigenous groups, to obtain a more powerful position in society, by 
becoming mayor or member of the municipal council.  
Before the implementation of the LPP, municipal councils in the research 
municipalities consisted exclusively of urban representatives. After 1994, this situation 
seems to change gradually in favour of the rural population. Although the results of the 
municipal elections of 1995 and 1999 (Table 5.3) show that in all municipalities except 
Huacareta urban councillors still have a majority, the proportion of rural councillors 
increases. In Monteagudo, all the municipal councillors are professionals, living and 
working in the town of Monteagudo. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Background of the members of the municipal councils as a result of the 1995 and 1999 
municipal elections 
1995 1999  
Urban Rural Urban  Rural 
Yotala 5  4 1 
Poroma 3 2 3 2 
Sopachuy 5  3 2 
Presto 4 1 4 1 
Monteagudo 5  7  
Huacareta  5 
 
 5 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
 
 
Among the councillors with a rural background, distinction should be made between 
small farmers – peasants – and large ones. The rural municipal councillors in Yotala, 
Poroma, Sopachuy and Presto belong to the first category. The rural councillors in 
Huacareta can all be characterised as large to very large farmers, both in 1995 and 1999. 
The main explanation for these differences is that the Land Reform of 1953 was applied 
more profoundly in the higher regions and the valleys of the department. In the eastern 
lowlands of the department, large properties remained almost untouched, maintaining the 
traditional power structure of large landowners. In all municipal councils, women and 
indigenous people are not represented.   
Peasants are also underrepresented among the mayors in the research municipalities, 
as can be seen in the last column in Table 5.4. This table presents the main characteristics 
of the mayors in the study area during the period 1994-9, and also shows that there are 
frequent changes of mayors (up to six times in some municipalities, excluding changes 
resulting from the elections), that some political parties dominate local government and 
that women are hardly present. 
Although there have been rural mayors1 in the research municipalities, their number is 
rather low. Only two municipalities – Sopachuy and Poroma – had a rural mayor during 
the period 1995-9. In Huacareta, the same observation can be made with respect to the 
municipal councillors. The mayors in Huacareta are rural mayors in the pure sense, that 
is, they make a living in the agricultural sector and live in a peasant community. 
Nevertheless, the size of their property (sometimes over 500 ha), their standard of living 
and the fact that they received higher education and have children studying in Santa Cruz 
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or La Paz means that they should be considered with some care. A comparison between 
the proportion of rural mayors in the study area resulting from the 1995 elections with the 
proportion at national level shows that the research municipalities score lower. At the 
national level, 20% of the municipalities had a peasant or indigenous mayor (Ministério 
de Desarrollo Humano/SNPP 1997). In the research municipalities this amounted to 17 
%.  
 
 
Table 5.4  Main characteristics of the mayors in the study area, 1994-9 
 Period Type Political affiliation Sex Occupation 
Yotala 94-95 U MBL M Agronomist 
 95-98 U MNR M Photographer* 
 98-99 U MBL M Agronomist* 
 1999 U MBL M Agronomist 
Poroma 94-95 U MNR M Agronomist 
 95-95 U MNR M Entrepreneur 
 95-97 U MBL M Law student* 
 97-98 R Eje Pachakuti M Small farmer* 
 98-99 R MNR M Small farmer* 
 1999 U MNR M Farmer 
Sopachuy 94-95 U MNR M Entrepreneur 
 95-98 R MBL M Small farmer* 
 98-99 U MBL/ADN M Truck driver* 
 1999 U MBL M Architect* 
Presto 94-95 U MNR M Agronomist 
 95-97 U MNR M Agronomist* 
 97-99 U MBL/ADN M Agronomy student* 
 1999 U MNR M Agronomist* 
Monteagudo 94-96 U MNR M Entrepreneur 
 97-98 U ADN M Teacher* 
 98 U ADN F Entrepreneur* 
 98-99 U ADN M Lawyer* 
 1999 U MIR M Doctor 
Huacareta 94-97 R MNR M Large farmer 
 97-98 R MNR M Large farmer*  
 98-99 R ADN M Large farmer* 
 1999 R ADN M Large farmer 
Source:  Fieldwork. 
Notes: Under ‘Period’, underlined dates refer to the results of elections. 
 Under ‘Type’, R = peasant mayor, U= mayor from the village. 
* = mayor was interviewed for this study. 
 Italics = mayor performed this function twice during the period 1995-9. 
 
 
The transfer of responsibilities and funds to the local level introduced a completely new 
scenario and new activities for mayors. Examples are the introduction of participatory 
local planning, the complex system of financial administration and the cooperation with 
third parties such as NGOs and departmental government. Although every mayor had to 
adjust to this new scenario, the rural mayors, in particular the peasants, experienced more 
difficulties. All three peasant mayors in the study area (two in Poroma and one in 
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Sopachuy) were political militants, affiliated to different parties with ample experience in 
the peasant unions at both the community and higher levels. Despite this political 
experience, all stated that being a mayor with a peasant background caused several 
problems. Most evident in this respect is the lack of knowledge of administrative and 
financial regulations. Other aspects frequently mentioned are the lack of knowledge of 
which funds are available for co-financing projects, how to access these funds and the 
language problem some peasant mayors experience, since Spanish is not their first 
language. To address the problem of the lack of knowledge, mayors often hire a personal 
adviser. In some cases this is a former employee of the Regional Development 
Corporation, while in other municipalities NGOs perform this role.  
The mayor’s lack of support from the municipal council is another bottleneck. In some 
municipalities the weakest council member in terms of capacities, experience and 
political support is elected mayor. This leaves ample room for the other councillors to 
manipulate matters.  
These bottlenecks are confirmed by a study carried out by Albo in 1999 among rural 
and indigenous mayors and municipal councillors. Over half (53%) mentioned the lack of 
knowledge and experience as the main obstacle to performing their role. Internal 
conflicts related to party politics are mentioned as the second in importance (34%). The 
idea of being marginalised and even discriminated against was mentioned by 27% of the 
peasant mayors and councillors, followed by a lack of financial resources to perform 
their tasks (Albo 1999, p. 84-95).  
The newly acquired status of the municipality has led to a situation in which party 
politics play an increasingly decisive role in local government. The Bolivian electoral 
system allows persons to stand for municipal office only if they are affiliated to a 
national party. As a consequence, these parties determine the local agenda. This is also 
expressed in the frequent changes of the mayors during the period 1994-9 (Table 5.4).  
Each time period in Table 5.4 represents a change in mayor. Some of these changes 
are the result of the 1995 and 1999 elections. Some changes can also be attributed to the 
fact that mayors should resign 60 days before the elections in order to be re-elected. 
Finally, some changes are the consequence of the application of article 201 of the 
Political Constitution of the State, the voto constructivo de censura.2 By means of this 
clause it is quite easy for a municipal council to get rid of ‘annoying’ mayors. According 
to information from the Vice-Ministry of Popular Participation, during the four-year 
existence of the voto de censura constructiva, 189 mayors from a total of 314 
municipalities were removed, mainly due to political pressure of the municipal council 
(Los Tiempos, 01-10-99; La Razón, 30-09-99). In the case of Monteagudo in 1998, the 
death of the incumbent mayor was the reason to elect a new one. In Poroma, one mayor 
resigned for personal reasons. In all other cases, the mayor was dismissed because he was 
no longer supported by the municipal council. In some cases3 this was because evidence 
of fraud was found. In two other cases the mayor resigned, with the case of Sopachuy as 
an extreme example of party politics. As a result of the municipal elections in 1995, a 
peasant mayor affiliated to the MBL (the party many peasant mayors are affiliated to) 
was elected by a considerable majority as the only peasant on the municipal council. His 
election occurred with a large support of the peasant communities and the local NGO.  
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Once in function, however, he was threatened by the councillors and finally resigned: 
 
‘… I didn’t really want to become a mayor. I’m a peasant and not used to dealing with 
financial administration etc. But I had to, because I was elected: you have to do what the 
people want you to do. It was the same with my work as dirigente, I didn’t want to do 
that either. Women said to me: ‘Man, you’d think you’re a maricón [pansy], you’re 
scared to death.’ It’s quite natural, you know, that when you’re afraid, you don’t do your 
work well. When you get more responsibilities, you don’t eat well, you don’t sleep well 
and you do strange things.’4   
 
A truck driver from the village, who was also from the MBL, succeeded him as mayor. 
After the 1997 elections, which put Banzer’s ADN in government, this second mayor 
deserted the MBL and joined the ADN. One of the MNR councillors did the same. The 
desertion and joining of another party was considered too much, and as a result one of the 
remaining loyal MBL councillors was elected mayor.  
To sum up, we can conclude that the introduction of the LPP created the opportunity 
for peasants and other formerly excluded groups to participate in local government, but 
that their background made it difficult for them to function as mayor or council under the 
new political configuration and the prevailing political culture. As a result, changes of 
mayor frequently occur, adversely affecting the efficiency of local government.  
5.3 Participation in the Comité de Vigilancia 
Becoming a member of the Comité de Vigilancia is a third way to participate in local 
government. Briefly, the role of this committee is to oversee the local government with 
respect to (1) the equal distribution of municipal resources between the urban and the 
rural part of the municipality; (2) the condition that local government spends no more 
than 15% on overheads and wages; (3) municipal investments; and (4) the participatory 
character of planning. 
The task of the Comité de Vigilancia is thus to exercise popular supervision (or 
control) over the conduct of local government. This is a delicate job, as the committee, in 
fact, has to oversee the accountability of local government, a function that is normally 
performed by the municipal council. In this section, we will assess whether civil society 
is up to this task.  
In all the research municipalities, the Comité de Vigilancia consists mainly of 
representatives of rural OTBs (see Section 4.5.7). Most committees encounter many 
problems in the implementation of their responsibilities. The two most frequently 
mentioned problems – the lack of cooperation of local government and lack of 
information on rules, norms and projects – are interrelated and come down to the same 
thing, namely a local government not accepting any control.  
The success of the Comité de Vigilancia in the performance of its functions heavily 
depends on the relationship with the local government. This relationship can take many 
forms, but generally three main types can be distinguished. Firstly, the municipalities 
with a Comité de Vigilancia that are co-opted by the local government, as is the case in 
Monteagudo and Poroma. In these municipalities, local government manipulated the 
elections of the Comité de Vigilancia and made arrangements with the democratically 
elected president of the committee in order to secure his support. This means that the 
president is paid, or receives payment in kind (e.g. a house or a job as a civil servant) for 
his loyalty to the local government.  A second type comprises Comités de Vigilancia that 
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operate in complete isolation from local governments, a situation that applies to 
Huacareta and Presto.  
The Comité de Vigilancia of Huacareta represents the second type: it is completely 
ignored by the local government. Although this committee was established in 1994, it has 
never functioned properly: it is not recognised by the local government and, as a result, 
its members are not informed about the POA, the annual plan (Plan de Operaciones 
Anuales), changes in local policy or other matters. Nor is the committee invited to attend 
the delivery of projects. Only on special occasions (e.g. when foreign delegations visit 
Huacareta) is the committee invited to appear in public, in order to ‘do some 
handshaking’. In Presto, the mayor illegally dismissed the president of the Comité de 
Vigilancia, saying that the situation was not workable: he felt excessively obstructed by 
the committee. The mayor established another committee, an action that was heavily 
criticised by the former one, which informed the departmental government about the 
conflict. This occurred in August 1997, just after the mega-coalition of Hugo Banzer had 
come to power. The MIR/ADN prefectura brought the case to La Paz, making it a 
political conflict, and the mayor (an MBL supporter) was threatened with the freezing of 
municipal accounts. The political solution to this conflict was that the mayor first 
reinstated the former Comité de Vigilancia. In order to prevent the freezing of accounts it 
was also decided that the MIR party would become part of the municipal council, and 
that the mayor would also become a member of the MIR5.  
The third type of relationship between the Comité de Vigilancia and local government 
comes closest to the ideal situation, in which the committee operates independently, but 
in dialogue with the local government, representing the needs of the OTBs. This is the 
case in the municipalities of Yotala and, to a lesser extent, Sopachuy. In both 
municipalities, the Comité de Vigilancia is invited to join the meetings of the municipal 
council, and has access to the financial records of the municipality.  
The question is, then, why does the committee not do anything about the attitude of 
the local government? The answer is simple: there is not much that it can do, except 
refusing to sign documents and other official paperwork. The missing signature of the 
president of the Comité de Vigilancia leads in the course of time to the freezing of the 
municipal accounts. This is, however, a quite drastic approach and often considered the 
last available measure6. As the former president of the Comité de Vigilancia in Sopachuy 
remarked: 
 
‘The work of the Comité de Vigilancia is not considered important and we experienced 
much resistance from the mayor. At a certain moment we decided to freeze the accounts, 
but after some discussions we changed our minds: we didn’t want to wash our dirty linen 
in public.’  
 
Another reason not to freeze municipal accounts lies in the potential reaction of the local 
government. In some cases of frozen accounts, the local government threatened the 
Comité de Vigilancia. In Huacareta, the president of the Comité de Vigilancia once 
threatened to make public the local government’s abuse of funds and power. The 
following day, he found that his water and electricity had been cut off. 
In addition to difficulties perceived in the relation with local government, there are 
some more practical bottlenecks. The lack of a budget for the Comités de Vigilancia 
seriously obstructs their performance. To do their job, they are supposed to visit all the 
projects implemented in the municipality. Since most projects are not within walking 
distance, access to motorised transport would facilitate the control of projects. But for 
this, the Comités de Vigilancia depend on the goodwill of local government, a 
cooperation that in most cases is lacking. Another more practical bottleneck is the lack of 
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coordination between the different members of the committee, caused by the physical 
distance and absence of members due to labour migration for some months per year. The 
president of the Comité de Vigilancia in Yotala explained: 
 
‘We used to have a meeting each month, but now we haven’t had a meeting for three 
months, as the other four members are working in Santa Cruz. This means I’m the only 
one, and as I can’t do all the work myself, much work is left over.’  
 
A last difficulty members of the Comité de Vigilancia are confronted with is the lack of 
knowledge to properly perform their function. The Comité de Vigilancia should control 
local government, and thus the financial records. This requires specific knowledge, the 
members often not have. An example of this is the control of investments. According to 
the LPP, municipalities should not spend more than 15% of the funds stemming from the 
LPP on functional costs, such as salaries and expense allowances for members of 
municipal councils. The Comités de Vigilancia in the research municipalities pointed to 
the fact that this is difficult to control, since one should know the codes assigned to the 
LPP-funds in the books.  
Although formally the Comité de Vigilancia   represents the population and is elected 
by dirigentes of the OTBs, the population does not seem to view them as such. The 
leaders of the OTBs comment that there is a large gap between the Comité de Vigilancia   
and them, all with different arguments. The neighbourhood organisations argue that the 
Comité de Vigilancia is mainly a rural matter, as representatives of the peasant 
communities form a majority in the committees. The recently established Guaraní 
communities state that, because they recently joined the municipality, they are seen as 
taking away funds that could have been invested in other OTBs. The Comité de 
Vigilancia   does not take any actions to defend the rights of these Guaraní communities. 
The peasant communities view the Comités de Vigilancia as not representing their 
interests, because they expect all their wishes to be fulfilled. This is, of course, not a very 
realistic idea. Sometimes they complained about the attitude of the members of the 
Comité de Vigilancia , saying they are arrogant once they are elected or are under the 
control of the mayor.     
The knowledge of the leaders of the OTBs about the functions, members and election 
of the committee, differs between the different types of OTBs. Neighbourhood 
organisations appear to be much more informed than the peasant communities, since all 
leaders of the neighbourhood organisations in the sample knew the functions of the 
Comité de Vigilancia  and could mention the name of its President. One explanation for 
this is distance: as a neighbourhood committee is located relatively close to where the 
committee works, it hears more about its performance. Surprisingly, a relatively small 
proportion (50%) of the neighbourhood organisations in the sample participated in the 
elections of the committee, against 82% of the peasant communities. The rural bias of the 
committee may play a part in this, as neighbourhood organisations do not feel 
represented by the committee. Another factor mentioned is that the neighbourhood 
organisations do not consider the committee as necessary or even helpful. In fact, the 
neighbourhood organisations bypass the Comité de Vigilancia by consulting the local 
government directly:  
 
‘Why should I go to this committee when I need something from the mayor? It’s much 
easier to go straight to him, without the committee interfering.’7 
 
Of the pueblos indígenas, only one participated in the elections of the Comité de 
Vigilancia. As these communities were established only recently and the sample 
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comprised only three indigenous communities, it is, however, difficult to make any 
comparisons with the other two types of OTBs.  
5.4 Participation in OTBs 
In addition to participation in municipal elections, a position in local government or in 
the Comité de Vigilancia, the population can also participate in the OTBs. The dominant 
type of OTB in the six research municipalities is the peasant community, as described in 
Chapter 4. Neighbourhood organisations are only found in the municipal capital villages 
and indigenous communities solely in the lowland municipalities of Monteagudo and 
Huacareta. 
 
With respect to the peasant communities, all those who live and own a piece of land in a 
certain territory are considered afiliados (members). According to sindicato rules, a 
peasant community should be composed of at least 25 members.8 The neighbourhood 
organisations comprise every independent household in a certain neighbourhood. The 
Guaraní communities, which form indigenous communities, are generally somewhat 
smaller than the peasant communities. This may be because these communities were 
created recently and generally have limited areas of land at their disposal.  
Each type of OTB has a different type of internal organisation. Peasant communities 
are led by a board, of which the dirigente (leader) is the highest authority. The board 
consists of several members, each of whom has a specific task. Generally, the board 
comprises nine members: the general secretary or the dirigente, the treasurer, the 
secretary of sports, the secretary of public affairs, etc. Such boards are elected by the 
members each year. Since the task of leading the community is considered a cargo (duty) 
that everyone must perform, all members of the sindicato are potential candidates. In 
some cases, performing a function in the community is a first step up the political ladder.  
The Guaraní communities are organised in a different way, with a system of capitania 
based on inheritance, and as such the authority is passed from father to son, within the 
family.  
The board of the neighbourhood organisations changes less frequently, as illustrated 
by the fact that the majority of the representatives held office for more than three years at 
the time of fieldwork. The board is also elected but since members are not obliged to 
offer themselves as a candidate, often the same people are elected.      
According to the sindical tradition, the peasant communities meet frequently, as do the 
indigenous communities (Table 5.5). The neighbourhood organisations, in contrast, do 
not have very frequent assemblies, generally only once or twice a year. This is very 
unlike the neighbourhood organisations in the large urban areas, and it could indicate a 
weaker organisational structure. 
 
  
Table 5.5  Frequency of meetings by type of OTB, as % of all OTBs of that type 
  Weekly Twice a month Once a month Less than 
 once a month 
Total 
Peasant community 19 25 40   16 100 
Neighbourhood 
organisation 
   100 100 
Indigenous community 25 50 25  100 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
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The assemblies in the peasant communities are held at weekends (56%) or on a set day, 
such as the fourth day of each month (30%). These asambleas are generally held in the 
communal hall or, if there is no such hall, the school. The meetings start early in the 
morning and sometimes continue late into the afternoon. Attendance is compulsory, on 
pain of a fine, and as a result most households attend.  
The two indigenous Guaraní communities meet on Sunday, in the school or in the open 
air. The meetings of both the peasant communities and indigenous communities have an 
informal character, with ample room for discussion and without a clearly defined agenda. 
The topics discussed concern communal affairs, such as communal activities, the 
priorities for projects to be carried out under the LPP and discussions about the 
interventions of NGOs. Whenever external organisations want to start an activity in the 
community, they are invited to present their plans at the assembly. At the assemblies of 
the Guaraní communities, often a representative of the local NGO is present. Since these 
communities existed for only a short while, the organisational tradition is very weak. The 
presence of the NGO is aimed at community strengthening, for instance by supporting 
the organisation of an assembly.      
Not only do neighbourhood organisations meet less frequent than the other two OTBs, 
but also the percentage of members attending these meetings is smaller. According to the 
presidents of the organisations, this is primarily due to the members’ lack of interest. 
Another reason is that attendance to the meetings of the neighbourhood organisations is 
not compulsory. The president of one of the neighbourhood organisations in Sopachuy, 
for example, told me that:  
  
‘….the families in the neighbourhood, which form the base, are not very interested, not in 
the committee, nor in municipal affairs. They say the local government doesn’t do 
anything. This is reflected in the assemblies: generally only a few people – two or three – 
attend the biannual assembly, mostly the board.’  
 
The president of a large neighbourhood organisation in Monteagudo, when asked about 
the way assemblies are arranged, stated that: 
 
‘If an emergency arises, a meeting is called. Generally, the board is present, some 15 
persons, and another 30-40 members of the barrio, out of a total membership of 550. Any 
initiative by the population is lacking; people are busy with their jobs, with their families, 
etc.’ 
 
This lack of participation by the population creates a problem of representation, as only a 
few people are actively involved in the neighbourhood organisations9. This can be 
explained by a number of factors. Historically, the neighbourhood organisations in 
Bolivia emerged as a response to the lack of basic services, such as piped water, access to 
public transport and sewage. After obtaining these services they tended to dissolve, and 
after a while even disappeared. The members of the neighbourhood organisations in the 
research municipalities present the same attitude, mentioning that the LPP is not directed 
at them, but at the peasant communities, since the villages already have access to the 
main basic services. This attitude was engendered by the fact that the LPP was explicitly 
presented as an instrument to improve the living conditions of rural households. A 
second factor explaining the difference in participation between peasant communities and 
neighbourhood organisations is the fact that the former have had a well-developed 
system of communal consultation since the early 1950s.   
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5.5 Participatory planning 
The introduction of the LPP meant the introduction of a new development device, 
namely that of participatory planning. Within this process, several phases can be 
discerned: the population can express their demands and set priorities, and on the basis of 
these priorities a strategy is formulated, which should be the starting point of the annual 
municipal investment plans. In this section, we discuss the different phases, with an 
emphasis on the role of the population.  
 
Although the aim of the LPP is to increase the participation of the population, the law 
does not specify the way in which this should be done (Van Cott 1998, p. 179). The first 
two years after the introduction of the LPP were therefore spent on elaborating the 
participatory planning methodology. A complicating factor for the application of this 
methodology was that it took some time before the population had been registered in 
OTBs and had some basic knowledge of participatory planning. In connection with this, 
Van Cott (1998, p. 208) observes that:  
 
‘…the government chose to speed resources to municipalities faster than communities 
could be trained for effective participation in local development decisions.’  
 
In the six research municipalities this lack of guidance in the first years resulted in rather 
top-down designed annual plans, prepared by the local government. Generally, the local 
government announced a meeting at the end of the year at which all the priorities set by 
the OTBs would be discussed. Thereafter, the OTBs would have to identify their 
demands. However, this was only done by a very limited number of OTBs, since not all 
the peasant communities were registered. The registered OTBs discussed the demands in 
a plenary meeting at the communal level, with all the members present, except the 
neighbourhood organisations. Once they reached an agreement (often after hours of 
discussion), the leader of the OTB went to the local government to inform the mayor of 
the demands. Sometimes these demands had to be written on a piece of paper specially 
designed for the occasion, while in other cases the leader simply told the mayor the 
demands of the OTB. On the set date, the leaders of all OTBs in a municipality would 
meet to discuss the demands proposed. This procedure was not only very time 
consuming, but it was felt that the OTBs did not have the knowledge and capacity to 
identify the demands. The collection of demands presented by the OTBs resembled a 
shopping list, showing much resemblance, since every OTB wanted the same projects: a 
school, a health post, irrigation and road improvement. The population’s lack of 
knowledge about participatory planning was accompanied by the local governments’ lack 
of experience with this methodology, and with planning in general. Soon after 
implementation, it appeared that local governments were not prepared to assume the role 
of facilitating participatory planning. The former mayor of Presto remarked: 
 
‘We started for the first time in November 1994 by asking the OTBs to present their 
demands to us. In fact, we didn’t know how to organise it, since it was the first time we’d 
done something like that. So we just let the communities know that they could bring us a 
list with the projects they wanted for their community, before the end of November. 
However, not all the OTBs did this, since we were not able to inform all of them. Also, 
some of the communities that brought us a list were not yet registered; we heard later that 
that was not possible. On the set date, we had lists from only 14 of the 34 communities. 
When we saw these lists, we knew something had gone wrong: all the communities 
wanted a school, a hospital, irrigation, etc. This was also related to the fact that at the 
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time, not all the OTBs had received training in the objectives of the LPP. We simply 
didn’t have the money to implement all these projects. At the meeting, almost all the 
communities showed up and we had to explain that not all these projects could be 
implemented. Of course, they felt cheated: they thought we had millions of dollars to 
invest, and it turned out that we had much less. They told us we had to find extra money, 
but we simply didn’t know how to do this.’   
 
The population’s limited participation and the local governments’ lack of knowledge of 
how to stimulate participation resulted in a dominant role for the local governments in 
the formulation of annual plans in the first years of the LPP.  
 
In 1996, after two years of pilot projects (Van Cott 1998, p. 207), the Participatory 
Planning Methodology was introduced. The objective of this methodology is the design 
of a Municipal Development Plan (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal – PDM), that is, a 
development strategy for a period of five years. This methodology consists of six phases, 
presented in Figure 5.1. In the preparation and organisation phase (phase 1), the 
conditions to prepare the PDM are set by identifying the main actors, hiring the executing 
entity and training communal promotores. The second phase (phase 2) involves an 
analysis of the concrete situation and the problems experienced by the main actors. 
Subsequently, the PDM is formulated in phase 3. In the subsequent five years, annual 
plans have to prepared, derived from the PDM (phase 4). The implementation of the 
annual plans and the administration of implementation comprises phase 5. Finally, over 
the course of time, the contents of the PDM are evaluated and adjusted as needed (phase 
6) (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Phases, actors and products of the Participatory Planning Methodology. Source: Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Humano/SNPP 1996 and 1997. 
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5.5.1 Organisation of the participatory planning process (phase 1) 
The first phase of preparation and organisation is the main responsibility of the local 
government. Some of the municipalities in the study area receive support in this from the 
Programme for the Development of Rural Communities (Programa de Desarrollo de 
Comunidades Rurales – PDCR). This programme is supported by the World Bank and 
was aimed in the first phase (1995-9) at the formulation of the PDMs in 129 
municipalities10, under the responsibility of the Sub-secretary of Rural Development. 
Like in other Bolivian municipalities, the first three phases of the participatory planning 
in the six research municipalities are contracted out to external parties (NGOs and 
consultants), since local governments lack the capacity. When the PDCR is involved, 
they formulate the tender document, hire the consultant and supervise the drawing up of 
the plan. However, the PDCR does not work in some municipalities (e.g. Poroma and 
Yotala), because the PDCR opted in the first phase for municipalities that already had 
some experience with participatory planning, through NGOs.11 The whole process of 
formulating the PDM takes up to five months and costs US$ 12,000-19,000 (rates of 
1999), depending on the size and number of OTBs within the municipality. All the six 
municipalities had a PDM by 1999 (Table 5.6). With respect to the executing entity, there 
was a shift from NGOs to consultants. 
 
 
Table 5.6  Main characteristics of PDMs 
Municipality By whom Year Financed by 
Yotala Consultancy 1999 Dutch Embassy 
Poroma Consultancy 1999 PDCR-II; Mun. of Poroma 
Sopachuy NGO 
NGO 
1994 
1998 
FIS/SNDR 
PDCR-I 
Presto NGO 1997 PDCR-I 
Monteagudo NGO 
Consultancy 
1995 
1997 
FIS/SNDR 
PDCR-I 
Huacareta NGO 1995 FIS/SNDR 
 Consultancy 1999 PDCR-I 
Source: PDMs municipalities. 
 
 
The reason for this shift is that in 1994/5 the planning strategy was still in its infancy. 
Knowledge of participatory planning was absent and there were few consultants available 
who had obtained experience with this kind of work. NGOs took advantage of this 
situation, supported by the long experience they had in rural areas. The eagerness of 
NGOs to engage in the drafting of PDMs was also inspired by the profits they can gain, 
since NGOs can put their own projects in the PDM, thereby securing funds. The main 
criteria for the selection of consultants for the design of the PDM are knowledge of the 
region and participatory planning, the availability of a multidisciplinary team and the 
availability of own resources. This last criterion is important, as the contracted entity 
receives the sum in three parts, and thus has to have some financial reserves at its 
disposal. The stringent guidelines might also be a reason for the observed shift to 
consultants as executing entities, since especially NGOs complain about the complexity 
of the guidelines and the number of forms that have to be filled in.  
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Some municipalities (e.g. Sopachuy, Monteagudo and Huacareta) started to draw up a 
PDM soon after the implementation of the LPP.12 Others started only recently, not only 
because of a lack of funds but also because the municipalities question the sense of such 
a plan. The oficial mayor of the municipality of Poroma mentioned in this respect: 
 
‘The formulation of a PDM is wasted money. It’s nothing more than a listing of schools 
and health posts, and all communities want such projects. It would be much more 
efficient to use the sectoral analyses we’ve already made [by NGOs and the CORDECH] 
for health and agriculture. These were much less expensive and will do. Moreover, 
coordination between the different institutes working within the municipality is lacking, 
as is the case in almost all municipalities. Therefore, the implementation of such a plan 
will be very difficult.’   
  
In the first phase, the consultant is hired and subsequently identifies the main local actors 
involved, organises the process and trains the communal promotores who are assigned to 
do the autodiagnóstico (self-analysis). According to the guidelines, each OTB should 
assign two representatives, one of each sex. There are three main categories of 
promotores: those that have been involved in projects of NGOs before, those that occupy 
functions within the OTB (such as communal leaders, the dirigentes) and those 
performing governmental functions, such as corregidores. If an NGO that works in the 
municipality formulates the PDM, this NGO will prefer promotores they have worked 
with before. 
5.5.2 Analysis of problems and demands and priority setting (phase 2) 
During the PDM’s five-month elaboration period, all OTBs are asked for the specific 
problems they experience (phase 2: diagnosis of the situation and the problems). This 
consultation has two elements: a communal workshop and questionnaires sent to a 
number of households. In the communal workshop, the households of the OTB work on 
an autodiagnóstico. The main elements of this analysis are a sketch with some 
geographical aspects (e.g. the location of houses, rivers, land use and irrigation), a 
description of the production structure of the community, a sketch with information on 
the availability of services and roads, an overview of the commercialisation system and a 
description of the institutions working in the community. Questionnaires are also realised 
with a sample of households13 in the community in order to obtain in-depth information 
about the aforementioned aspects.  
Although all municipalities have a PDM, sometimes for several years already, only 
27% of the peasant communities in the sample mentioned having being involved in the 
formulation of such a document, compared with 83% of the neighbourhood 
organisations. Not one of the indigenous communities was involved in the formulation of 
the PDM (Table 5.7).    
Not only did a limited number of OTBs participate in the design of the PDM, but there 
are also differences in the proportion of households in the OTBs which participate in the 
communal workshops. 
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Table 5.7  Percentage of the OTBs in the sample that participated in the elaboration of the PDM, 1999 
 Peasant communities Neighbourhood 
organisations 
Indigenous communities 
Yotala 40     0 n.p. 
Poroma 29     0 n.p. 
Sopachuy 10     0 n.p. 
Presto   8     0 n.p. 
Monteagudo 33 100 0 
Huacareta 22     0 0 
Source:  Fieldwork 1998-9 
n.p. = not present 
 
 
In the peasant communities almost all households participate – as is the case in the 
regular meetings of this type of OTB. The following quote illustrates this: 
 
‘Of course, all households – men and women – participate in the talleres [workshops]. 
This is important, since we can decide what kind of projects they’re going to implement. 
But the fact is, the women don’t say much. They’re very shy as they’re not used to 
talking in front of an audience. (…) On that day, someone came to explain the objective 
of this plan. Then, we had to mention the specific problems we faced in our community, 
the water that is contaminated, the lack of a school, the women who die after giving birth, 
all those kinds of problems. We had to split up into groups, and each group had to make a 
sketch of the community, write down what we produce and where we sell it, what kind of 
school we have and what kind of organisations work here. After we’d done all that, I had 
to tell the group what we, our group, had written.’  
 
The limited participation of women is also observed in other OTBs, and is generally 
explained by the fact that ‘they are not used to it’. Women mentioned that they are often 
ignored in such meetings, and that they would prefer to talk about projects in groups with 
only women present.  
In the neighbourhood organisations often only a limited proportion of households 
participate, as is the case in Sopachuy, Presto and Poroma. The neighbourhood 
organisations of Monteagudo are an exception to this, since the attendance of households 
there is much higher than in the other villages. The three indigenous communities in the 
municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta were not consulted, due to their recent 
establishment. 
To provide more insight into the formulated demands, the OTBs in the sample were 
asked to mention the three main problems they face (Table 5.8). The two main groups of 
problems were those related to agricultural production and those related to living 
conditions. The large number of difficulties in the category ‘other’ concern such 
problems as river pollution and health care. Comparing the six municipalities, there are 
no large differences in the problems encountered. 
After analysing the main weaknesses and opportunities of the OTBs in the 
municipalities, the collected data are analysed. The results are discussed at a municipal 
level meeting, in the presence of local government, a representative of each OTB – 
generally the dirigente – and the Comité de Vigilancia. 
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Table 5.8  Frequency of problems mentioned by the three different types of OTBs in the six research 
municipalities, 1998-9 
 Peasant communities Neighbourhood 
organisations 
Indigenous 
communities 
Chagas’ disease   35   - - 
Lack of basic services   30   7 - 
Livestock diseases    29   - - 
Accessibility   27   2 - 
Drought / rain   25   - - 
Human diseases   20   1 2 
Low production   13   - - 
Lack of drinking water   13   2 - 
Crop diseases      9   - - 
Insufficient housing     4   2 - 
Lack of electricity     2   2 - 
Other   16   6 - 
Total (n =) 260 22 2 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
 
 
Representatives of NGOs and the departmental government are not always present in this 
meeting. NGOs explained this by mentioning the lack of coordination with the local 
government and the fact that the local government does not tolerate any intrusion by 
NGOs. Often the departmental government is not represented due to a lack of funds. 
This meeting, at which all priorities are set, can be characterised as one of ample 
discussion, sometimes culminating in conflicts. Because of such conflicts, the 
municipality of Monteagudo decided to organise two separate meetings, one with all the 
peasant OTBs and one with all the neighbourhood organisations. Various factors 
contribute to such a situation. Firstly, many OTBs are disappointed when they realise that 
there is not enough money to implement all their priorities.  
Secondly, and more fundamental, not all the demands of the population can be met, in 
particular those that aim at more fundamental problems, such as the low agricultural 
production, climate-related problems, etc. At the central meeting, the local government 
attempts to show the OTBs that it is difficult to solve such problems under the LPP. 
Local government often advises the OTBs to reformulate their demands so that it these 
can be taken into consideration. The community of Chimuri in Poroma, for example, 
asked for the construction of an irrigation system for 20 households. The local 
government rejected this with the argument that it was not possible for technical reasons, 
and advised the renovation of the local school.  
Thirdly, the OTBs are of the opinion that they should receive annual funds in 
proportion to the number of inhabitants in the community. As the dirigente of the 
community of La Joya pointed out: 
 
‘We have 146 inhabitants in our community. This means that this year a project costing 
US$ 3,504 can be implemented. But at the meeting they told us that there isn’t enough 
money for that. How can they say that, whilst at the same meeting they decide that the 
community of Molani – which is much smaller than ours – will get two projects next 
year, which exceeds the amount they have right to?’   
 
A fourth issue worth mentioning here is the distribution of funds between the 
neighbourhood organisations and the peasant communities. The latter sometimes 
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consider this distribution to be unfair, since the former already have a school, a medical 
centre and much better living conditions.  
The problems observed can partly be attributed to the lack of knowledge about the 
LPP and lack of experience with participatory planning. The implementation of the LPP 
was accompanied by a number of measures intended to inform the population about the 
law and its consequences. To disseminate the information on the LPP among the 
population and local government, the Unidades de Fortalecimiento Institucional (Units 
for Institutional Strengthening – UFIs; see also Chapter 3) were created immediately 
after the LPP came into force. After the Law on Administrative Decentralisation14 
became operative and the CORDES and the UFIs were dismantled, NGOs – and to a 
lesser extent, the local and departmental government – took over this role.  
Two categories of institutional support can be discerned: informal support and formal 
support, often in the form of training. With respect to the first, the majority of the OTBs 
in the sample (75%), particularly the peasant communities, received support in 
formulating their demands and priority setting. This support came mainly from the local 
schoolteacher (51%), an NGO (16%) or local government (14%). The remaining 18% 
consisted of support from the departmental government and the church. 
With respect to formal training in the LPP and participatory planning, an average of 
37% had not had any training or instruction (Table 5.9).  
The role of NGOs as providers of training to the OTBs is remarkable and supports our 
observation in Chapter 3 that the activities of NGOs had changed as a result of the 
implementation of the LPP. Their actions shifted from projects aimed at increasing 
agricultural production and training related to economic activities (before the LPP), to 
training (when the LPP was launched) and support to participatory planning and priority 
setting after the LPP.  
 
 
Table 5.9   Participation in training of OTBs, in percentage of total OTBs in the sample, by type of 
provider 
Yes, provided by No Total  
 Local 
government 
% 
NGO 
% 
Prefectura 
% 
Other 
% 
% %  
Yotala (n = 17) 20 26 26   7 21 100 
Poroma (n = 23) 24 33 14   5 24 100 
Sopachuy (n = 12)   9 18   0 27 46 100 
Presto (n = 13)   0 31 15 15 39 100 
Monteagudo (n = 21) 19 19 14 14 34 100 
Huacareta (n = 14) 10   0   0 20 
 
70 100 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9  
 
 
The departmental government plays a relatively important role in Yotala, which can be 
explained by its location close to Sucre, which is the seat of the departmental 
government. The high percentage of help in the category ‘other’ in Sopachuy refers to the 
peasant sindicato. Here, the centralía (the representation of the sindicatos at the 
provincial level) organised the training in the LPP. In Huacareta, the 20% in the category 
‘other’ refers to training by a German priest who was based in the village. 
If we compare the training aspect in the six municipalities, we see that in Huacareta, 
and to a lesser extent in Sopachuy, a relative high proportion of OTBs received no 
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training at all (70% and 46%, respectively). The lack of NGOs working in the 
municipality, the uneven social relations and the reluctant attitude of the local 
government in Huacareta probably explain this situation. In Sopachuy, however, the 
relatively small proportion of OTBs that have received training is difficult to explain, 
since there are many NGOs and relatively well-organised peasant sindicatos working in 
this municipality. The only possible explanation is that the centralía aimed the training at 
a specific group of OTBs. In addition to training in the participatory planning 
methodology, a considerable number of OTBs receive some support from external actors 
in the formulation of their demands, namely 60% of the peasant communities and 29% of 
the neighbourhood organisations (but 0% of the indigenous communities). Within the 
peasant communities, the local teacher occupies a central position with respect to the 
formulation of demands (53%). NGOs provide support in 16% and mayors in 17% of the 
peasant communities. The local government is the main provider of support to 
neighbourhood organisations.       
5.5.3 Formulating the development strategy (phase 3) 
After discussing the needs and priorities, the development strategy document is prepared 
(phase 3: the design of the PDM). Most strategies consist of two parts. The first 
encompasses an analysis (diagnóstico) of the main features and problems of the 
municipality at the communal level, such as physical aspects, socio-economic 
characteristics and the main bottlenecks in health, education and production. In the 
second part, the demands are translated into project proposals which should be 
implemented in the next five years. These proposals consist of a project description, the 
target group and the costs involved and the source of funding.  
Despite the fact that all six research municipalities had such a PDM in 1999, only a 
minority of the OTBs in the sample had been told that such a plan existed (Table 5.10), 
with Yotala and Monteagudo as the municipalities where OTBs are the best informed.  
 
 
Table 5.10  Percentage of OTBs that were aware of the presence of a development strategy 
Yotala Poroma Sopachuy Presto Monteagudo Huacareta 
40 29 15 15 48 20 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9  
 
 
The relatively low figures for Sopachuy and Presto can be explained by the fact that these 
strategies were drew up by the local NGO, ACLO. ACLO has worked for years in many 
communities, so the data collection for the design of the PDM was mixed up with the 
NGO’s general activities. Another factor explaining these differences is the fact that the 
PDM of Yotala was designed in 1999, just before the OTBs were interviewed for this 
study. This might have resulted in a higher percentage of OTBs being aware if the 
existence of the PDM. 
The existence of a PDM represents a population’s first step towards participation in 
local decision-making. However, an analysis of the translation of these PDMs into annual 
plans and their implementation shows the limited value of these PDMs. A comparison of 
the projects appearing in the development strategy (PDM) and those in the corresponding 
investment plans (POA) shows hardly any correspondence. The municipality of 
Huacareta is a case in point. According to its PDM, Huacareta planned to implement 125 
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projects in the period 1995-2000. However, only eight of these projects are included in 
the POAs of 1995-9 and all of these were implemented in 1995. This also occurred in the 
other municipalities, for various reasons. The main argument of local governments for 
not using the PDM is that they dispute its contents, by saying that the PDM was not 
drafted according to the norms and as such does not represent the actual situation. The 
frequently changing composition of local governments also contributes to the limited use 
of the PDM, since local governments refuse to use a PDM which was drafted under the 
previous government, particularly when that government was affiliated to another 
political party. We return to this aspect in Chapter 6. 
5.5.4 From strategy to plan: formulating the annual investment plan (phase 4) 
The analysis of participatory planning in the six research municipalities showed that for 
most actors (OTBs and local governments) the PDM has only recently gained 
importance. The annual planning document – the POA – appeared to be much more 
important for the OTBs in the sample. Since the introduction of the LPP, most OTBs 
have identified some projects (an average of two projects in five years). These are mainly 
projects related to education and urban improvement. In the peasant communities, the 
proposed urban improvement projects mainly concerned the improvement of the roofs of 
the houses, as a defence against Chagas’ disease (Table 5.11).  
When comparing the characteristics of the planned projects with the problems of the 
OTBs (Table 5.8), the lack of coincidence between them is obvious. The observed 
economic bias in the problems identified is not translated into productive projects. The 
complexity of the observed problems, such as that of drought, is one explaining factor. 
On the other hand, this phenomenon is inherent to the principle of participatory planning. 
Most projects are directed at the community as a whole, and thus benefit all families. As 
productive projects tend to be directed more at individual households, these are less 
frequently planned. This is especially the case with the peasant communities. Projects in 
the neighbourhood organisations are more often targeted at a more limited group of 
families. Examples of such projects are road improvement or the establishment of a 
kindergarten, which will only benefit families with children or those who plan to have 
children.  
 
 
Table 5.11  Projects planned in the OTBs in the sample in the period 1994-8, by sector in absolute 
numbers 
 Peasant community Neighbourhood 
organisation 
Indigenous community 
Educational infrastructure   52   2 1 
Health infrastructure   16   1  
Agriculture infrastructure     6   1 2 
Irrigation   10   
Roads   37   5  
Housing improvement   26   2  
Basic sanitation   33   4 1 
Sports/culture     9   
Other   19   1  
Total (n) 208 16 4 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
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In all municipalities, the local government makes some modifications to the annual plan 
without consulting the OTB concerned. This was the case in the municipalities of Yotala 
and Huacareta. A leader of a peasant community in Yotala commented: 
 
‘Last year [1997], it took us three months to elaborate the annual plan. The problem was 
in the distribution of projects between the town of Yotala [the neighbourhood 
organisations] and the other OTBs. According to the five-year plan, the town’s sewage 
system would be renewed. Such a project is very expensive and would absorb 90% of the 
funds available that year, so only a few other projects could be implemented. After long 
discussions, it was decided to split the sewage project into two parts, over two years, so 
there would be more funds for other projects. However, when the final annual plan was 
published, the council had put the sewage project on the roll for one year, so that no other 
project could be financed.’   
 
In 1997, the OTBs in Huacareta proposed a number of projects, but to their surprise not 
one of them showed up in the definitive plan. The neglect of popular demands and the 
lack of transparency led to a situation in which the population is no longer eager to 
participate in project identification and priority setting. Especially in the municipalities of 
Poroma and Huacareta, the OTBs complain about the local government’s lack of 
motivation to incorporate their demands. Many OTBs feel they are only considered ‘a 
collection of potential votes’, as is illustrated by the following quote: 
 
‘They [the mayor and some members of the council] only come when they need 
something from us, our support for a programme, a project, our votes, or our labour. . In 
election times, they come every week and promise a lot: everything will change once we 
give them our votes. They even come with beer and coca, to seduce us. But once we give 
them our votes we will not see them again. They never come when we need them.’ 
 
Besides not incorporating the demands, some peasant OTBs complain about the mayor’s 
or the municipal council’s lack of interest in rural affairs. This is especially the case with 
mayors who come from a village and are thus not very familiar with rural problems. 
They also complain about the local government’s lack of flexibility, particularly in 
relation to the implementation of projects. In 1998, many farmers suffered from a long 
period of drought. Crops could not be harvested and seed as input for the next year’s crop 
was therefore lacking. Many peasant communities asked the local government to support 
them with seed donations, or to exchange a planned project (e.g. road improvement or the 
construction of a school building) for the purchase of seed. This was, however, refused 
by all local governments, with the argument that the planning process did not allow 
modifications on such a short term.    
5.5.5 Participation in the implementation of projects (phase 5) 
In most OTBs in our sample, projects have been implemented since 1994, whether or not 
in collaboration with NGOs or national funds. Table 5.12 gives an overview of the 
number of projects implemented in each of the three types of OTB.  
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Table 5.12  Number of local projects implemented in the OTBs in the sample, 1994-9 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total no. of  
projects 
Peasant communities 19 46 23   8   4 1 108 
Neighbourhood organisations  43 - 14 29 14 -   12 
Indigenous communities - 50 50 - - -    3 
Source: Fieldwork 1999. 
 
 
The high proportion of neighbourhood organisations that did not have any implemented 
projects in their barrio is remarkable. This can be attributed to the fact that projects 
implemented in the towns are not always considered (by the juntas themselves) as 
demanded by the neighbourhood organisations. An example of such a project is the 
construction of the new market building in Monteagudo. The neighbourhood 
organisations of Monteagudo considered this purely as a project of the market women, 
not as an improvement of their neighbourhood. Also, the high proportion of 
neighbourhood organisations without implemented projects can be explained by their 
relatively small share in funds, based on the number of people affiliated to them.        
The projects that were implemented (Table 5.13) largely coincide with the projects 
that had been planned. The most common project is the improvement or construction of 
schools. Urban improvement and basic sanitation (principally mains water) ranks second. 
As can be seen from the table, the implemented projects are directed more at social 
sectors than economic sectors.  
 
 
Table 5.13  Implemented projects in the sample OTBs, by sector in %, 1994-8 
 Peasant community Neighbourhood organisation Indigenous 
community 
Education 
(infrastrcuture) 
  34  69 100 
Basic sanitation   20     -      - 
Urban improvement   14  15      - 
Health 
(infrastructure) 
    8     -      - 
Roads     8  13      - 
Irrigation     5     -       - 
Sports / culture     5    4      - 
Agriculture 
(infrastructure) 
    1     -      - 
Other     5     -      - 
N =  108  12     3 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
 
 
OTBs sometimes contribute to the implementation of projects, with work, materials 
and/or money. Peasant communities, in particular, have a long history of performing 
communal activities, such as working the communal lands or constructing schools. 
Literature on participation points to the favourable results of the participation of 
households in the construction of irrigation and road improvement, since the involvement 
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of households leads to more responsibility for the maintenance of the project. With 
respect to the contribution of the OTBs to the implementation of projects, there is a 
difference between peasant communities and neighbourhood organisations (Table 5.14).  
 
 
Table 5.14  Participation of OTBs in the implementation of projects, as % of total OTBs  
 Yes  No 
  Kind of contribution  
(in % of total OTBs that participate): 
 
  Work Work and 
materials 
Money Other  
Peasant communities 92 22   76  2 -   8 
Neighbourhood organisations 43 32 - 34 34 57 
Indigenous communities 50 - 100 - - 50 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
 
 
The contribution from peasant communities consists almost entirely of manual work in 
the execution of projects, while the contribution from the neighbourhood organisations 
consists of money. The reason for this difference is simply the fact that peasants do not 
have any money. The neighbourhood organisations collect money in the form of 
individual gifts, and by organising kermesses (festivities during the town’s memorial 
day), or during the feria (special fair). The joint neighbourhood organisations serve 
drinks and meals, and organise activities for children, such as games. Afterwards, they 
divide the money they earned and use it to finance projects. Not all members assist in 
these activities, as a president of a neighbourhood organisation told me:  
 
‘The attendance of members at the biannual assemblies is very low: hardly 30% attend. 
The people – the base – is used to having a board that arranges everything (…) People are 
also very passive, they can be very indolent. An example of such an attitude is the 
treatment of our houses against mosquitos and vinchugas, offered by a firm specialised in 
this. Nobody wanted to do this. Well, I did, but as both my neighbours didn’t, it was 
useless. People are very well off, too well off, they complain about all the things they 
have to do. Another example of peoples’ lack of willingness was the Christmas breakfast 
for the children in our neighbourhood, offered by the municipality. Generally, they offer 
toys, but we thought a breakfast would be more convenient. So, the municipality paid for 
the sugar, the chocolate and the flour, with which the neighbourhood committee would 
prepare a breakfast. We did it all with only five people, a hell of a job, because nobody 
wanted to help.’ 
5.5.6 Evaluation and adjustment (phase 6) 
According to the Participatory Planning Methodology, the implementation of the 
development strategy should be regularly evaluated and, when necessary, be adjusted. 
The local government should take the initiative for this evaluation, but the guidelines 
remain rather vague about the way of doing this.  
In practice, the majority of the municipalities in the study area did not evaluate the 
contents of the development strategy. The fact that most municipalities have only 
recently prepared such a strategy and just started the implementation of projects certainly 
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has much to do with this. Also, as we observed before, some municipalities question the 
sense of such a plan and consider it more a prerequisite for receiving funds than a useful 
way for efficient planning. Adjustments are therefore considered as a time and money-
consuming activity. When OTBs request alternative projects (e.g. the supply of seed after 
a period of drought), municipalities often decline such requests, for the reason that 
adjustments in the development strategy would not be allowed.  
The development strategy of Monteagudo elaborated in 1997 by the NUR University 
was evaluated once, at the end of 1999. This evaluation was foreseen in the initial 
agreement on the elaboration of the plan. The evaluation was also carried out by the 
NUR, and involved a couple of municipal meetings with the leaders of all OTBs. As a 
result, some adjustments in the strategy were made, such as the provision of a bus 
terminal and activities aimed at the training of OTB-leaders. The evaluation left the main 
contents of the initial strategy remained intact.   
5.6 Perceptions of participatory planning 
We asked the leaders of OTBs in the six municipalities about their perception of the 
process of participatory planning in their municipality. Almost 45% regarded planning as 
a participatory process, but 30% called it a matter for the mayor and municipal council, 
because the ultimate decision on which projects would be part of the POA was taken by 
these actors.  
Another indication of how participatory is the planning process is the degree to which 
the leaders of the OTBs are informed by the local government about the outcome of the 
planning, i.e. the contents of the definitive POA. Fifty-two percent of the leaders said 
they had not been informed about the contents of the POA, 40% had been informed and 
8% did not know, mainly because they were not in office at the time. Neither did the 
majority receive a copy of this plan. Information on the final annual planning document 
also appeared to be scarce, since 51% of the leaders had not been informed. Again, 
leaders of the neighbourhood organisations are better informed than the peasant 
communities. 
For the purpose of this study, it is interesting to analyse whether the presence of a peasant 
mayor makes any difference to the leaders’ perceptions of participation. Asked who 
makes the ultimate decision on the POA, 73% of the leaders of OTBs in Sopachuy said 
the decision involved everyone. In contrast, 80% of the leaders of OTBs in Huacareta 
said that this decision was made by the mayor and the council. Peasant communities with 
a campesino mayor seem to be better informed. This is the case in Sopachuy and Poroma, 
where 60% of the OTBs had received information on the definitive annual plan. In the 
other municipalities, with urban mayors, the share of OTBs that had received such 
information was 35%.  
5.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we discussed the different ways of popular participation in the context of 
decentralisation and the difficulties that accompany this participation. The population can 
participate in five ways in local decision-making: by voting, by being elected as council 
or mayor, by participating in the Comité de Vigilancia , through the OTBs in priority 
setting, and the implementation of projects.  
It was shown that indirect participation by means of electing the local government has 
gained popularity since 1994, as the turnout of voters increased in this period. This may 
indicate that population feels more involved in local affairs. Direct participation – 
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expressed by the relative number of formally excluded segments of the population now 
holding positions in local government – increased in the municipalities of Presto, 
Sopachuy and Poroma, but in the municipalities of Huacareta and Monteagudo it is still 
the traditional elite that controls local government.  
The third way, participation in the Comité de Vigilancia, is related to the issue of 
accountability. The Comité de Vigilancia, a representation of the population in the 
municipality, was established in 1994 to ensure the accountability of local government. 
The committee is charged with overseeing the local government’s use of funds. Although 
such a committee has been established in all municipalities, their performance was 
disappointing. The main factors behind this are the troubled relationship with local 
government (mayors and the municipal council do not want to be controlled) and the lack 
of funds to properly perform their role.  
The fourth option for the population to participate is via one of the three types of 
OTBs, that is, the peasant communities, the neighbourhood organisations and the 
indigenous communities. The peasant communities are the dominant OTB in the 
municipalities, followed by the neighbourhood organisations. Indigenous communities 
are only present in the municipalities of Monteagudo and Huacareta. Although the LPP 
recognises the different customs and values of these organisations, they are all expected 
to fit in the same procedures to plan and implement projects. Because of differences in 
the organisational structure and historical factors, the peasant communities can be 
considered the strongest OTBs, because they score high on aspects of participation of the 
members and participatory planning. The indigenous communities have only recently 
been established and have weakly developed social organisations. The neighbourhood 
organisations can be characterised by their members’ very low attendance at meetings. 
One of the specific aims of the LPP was to increase the participation of women in 
local decision-making. The data presented in Section 5.1.4 showed that the position of 
women in all three dimensions of participation (indirect and direct political participation 
and involvement in OTBs) hardly improved during the period 1994-2000. The 
participation of rural women in elections is low, and women are absent from local 
governments. The participation of women in OTBs is very low in the peasant 
communities, since women do not have the right to vote. The position of women in 
peasant communities contrasts with that in neighbourhood organisations, since these are 
often led by women.    
Since 1997, participatory planning has been institutionalised in the Bolivian 
municipalities. Within this methodology several phases can be discerned, resulting in the 
development strategy. In all municipalities the preparation of the PDM was contracted 
out to an external consultant. With respect to the implementing entity, a shift has 
occurred from NGOs to external consultants. The involvement of NGOs in the 
preparation of PDMs offers both advantages and disadvantages. For NGOs, this is a way 
of acquiring additional funds both directly and indirectly, since they have the opportunity 
to influence the projects to be planned.  
Theoretically, the participation of the population is most dominant in the second and 
third phase of participatory planning, respectively analysis and priority setting and the 
definition of the development strategy, including the projects to be planned. The main 
problems identified by the OTBs are related to economic activities. This economic bias 
is, however, not translated into planned and implemented projects, as these are aimed at 
the improvement of social living conditions. This can be explained by the fact that 
communal consensus and benefits are important. Moreover, in the process of priority 
setting, local governments often have to persuade the OTBs that many demands are not 
viable, since these address more structural problems.   
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Training appears to play a determining role in participation, planning and 
implementation. It appeared that many, though not all, OTBs had received training, with 
Huacareta and Sopachuy lagging behind. NGOs are the most important providers of 
training, which illustrates the shift in their activities. 
Although at the national level strong emphasis is put on the elaboration of the 
development strategy, the OTBs attach much more importance to the design of the 
annual plan. This can be attributed to the fact that during the fieldwork period (1998-9), 
the development strategy had not been elaborated according the participatory planning 
methodology. Another factor is the limited follow-up to the development strategies by 
the local government, leading to a distrust among the OTBs with respect to midterm 
planning. They perceive the annual planning as being much more concrete. 
Although participatory planning is an important aspect of the LPP, for the OTBs the 
implementation of projects is much more important. In the majority of the sampled OTBs 
at least one project has been implemented since 1994. Most projects concern social sector 
investments, such as education and health infrastructure, and basic sanitation.  
With regard to the contribution of OTBs in the implementation of projects, there is a 
difference between peasant communities and indigenous communities, on the one hand, 
and neighbourhood organisations, on the other. The majority of the first two types of 
communities often contribute to the implementation of projects with work and materials, 
while the neighbourhood organisations contribute much less. When the neighbourhood 
organisations contribute to the projects, it is often in the form of money. This difference 
can be attributed to the fact that peasant communities have a rich tradition of communal 
participation in projects, while households in the villages are generally wealthier.  
To sum up, we may conclude that decentralisation in Bolivia empowered the rural 
population and gave them considerable more influence on the process of making 
decisions about public investments. Although there are still several bottlenecks to solve, 
such as lack of knowledge and conflicts between the urban centre and surrounding rural 
communities, the model certainly has a surplus value in terms of participation compared 
to the situation before 1994. Large differences exist, however, between the three types of 
OTBs with respect to participation in organisations and implementation, while the 
population does not really cherish the participatory planning methodology (i.e. the 
bottom-up development of five-year plans). The Comités de Vigilancia, although a 
representation of the population, do not function well, due to lack of political will and 
practical obstacles. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. A rural mayor is someone who lives in a peasant community.   
2. The relevant passage states: ‘Cumplido por lo menos un año desde la posesión del Mayor que hubiese 
sido elegido conforme al párrafo 6 del artículo 200 (entre los dos más votados, si no hubiese mayoría 
absoluta), el Concejo podrá censurarlo y removerlo por tres quintos del total de sus miembros, 
mediante voto constructivo de censura, siempre que simultáneamiente elija al sucesor de entre los 
concejales. El sucesor así elegido ejercerá el cargo hasta concluir el período respectivo. Este 
procedimiento no podrá volverse a intentar sino hasta cumplido un año después del cambio de un 
mayor, ni tampoco en el último año de gestión municipal’ (República de Bolivia, 1995, Capítulo V, 
Título Sexto, Artículo 201).  
3. Examples of such cases are that of Lopez in Huacareta, Guzman in Monteagudo, Davila in Presto and 
Michel and Torres in Poroma. 
4. Interview with the mayor of Sopachuy May 1997. 
5. Orellana (2000, p. 187) mentions with respect to the functioning of the Comités de Vigilancia: ‘The 
possibilities for cooptation, subordination or instrumentalisation of the Committee by the official 
parties through clientelism or pre-bends loom large. In fact, by now it has become clear that in many 
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municipalities the Vigilance Committees, if they function at all, are mere appendices of the political 
parties ensconced in the municipal governments.’   
6. See also Ardaya (1998) for an analysis of the difficulties Comités de Vigilancia are faced with. 
7. Interview with the president of neighbourhood organisation Naranjos Monteagudo. 
8. Interview with the CSUTCB, Sucre, May 1997. 
9. Schalkwijk (2001) observes in a study on neighbourhood organisations in El Alto, Bolivia, that 
participation is highest in those neighbourhoods that are not yet consolidated. See also Clisby 1998. 
10. The second phase (1999-2003) is directed at improving municipal investment. 
11. Interview with Lic. R. Porcel, director PDCR-Chuquisaca, 20-11-1998.  
12. The fact that these municipalities already had some experience with micro-regional planning, 
introduced by NGOs working in the area, undoubtedly played a role in this. 
13. The sample is based on the following criteria: if the total population comprises 10 or fewer 
households, 1 questionnaire is used. Between 10-20 households, 2 questionnaires are used; between 
20-40 households: 3 questionnaires; more than 40 households: 4 questionnaires (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Humano/SNPP 1997).  
14. See Chapter 3; this law regulates the functions of the departmental level. 
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6 DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT  
While driving through rural Bolivia, one passes numerous small wooden billboards at the 
side of the road. These billboards announce the implementation of public works in the 
municipalities, mentioning the name of the contractor, the financing entity and the kind 
of project. The boards and the projects they refer to are an illustration of the 
implementation of the LPP in Bolivia. As said in Chapter 2, the implementation of 
decentralisation policies is often inspired by economic motives. By transferring 
responsibilities to lower levels, planning in public policy can become more effective and 
public funds can be allocated more efficiently. Furthermore, decentralisation is believed 
to have a positive impact on public policy in that projects implemented by lower levels of 
government respond more and better to local development-related demands. This chapter 
deals with this theme, by analysing the impact of decentralisation on local development 
in the six research municipalities. 
The first section provides an insight into the development strategies. Next, we present 
an overview of the financial position of the six research municipalities and analyse the 
performance of the six local governments in managing the planned budget. Section 6.4 
focuses on the main characteristics of the investments made by local governments in the 
six research municipalities, whilst Section 6.5 analyses where these investments were 
made. Finally, we analyse whether a multiplier effect occurs as a result of the 
implementation of the LPP. We do so by highlighting the effects on employment in the 
construction industry.   
6.1 Development strategies 
In the first years after the introduction of the LPP, the municipalities in the study area 
focused on the formulation of the yearly action plan (the POA). According to the mayors 
of the six municipalities, they experienced many difficulties in elaborating these plans. In 
the first years, 1994-5, the population was not always organised in OTBs and often 
lacked the knowledge to understand the purpose of the LPP and the concept of 
participatory planning. As a result, the first POAs often had an ad-hoc character, and 
were ‘shopping lists’ rather than thoroughly discussed products of participatory planning. 
It was obvious that the formulation of POAs could not serve as a solid base for medium-
term planning. The national government therefore stressed the importance of formulating 
plans in which municipal development over a longer period was planned: the five-year 
PDMs. The idea was that once general policy lines had been developed, it would be 
easier to elaborate the annual plans. All Bolivian municipalities were obliged to have a 
PDM by 1 January 1999, on pain of not receiving money from popular participation 
funds.1 In Chapter 5 we paid attention to the participation of the population in the 
preparation of the PDMs.  In this section we focus on the contents of these plans, paying 
special attention to their development objectives. 
 
PDMs are usually formulated by a consultant (hired by the municipality) who prepares 
the plan, with input of the local government and the population organised in OTBs. 
Improving the population’s quality of life (generally defined as an increase of income) is 
the main objective of the PDMs in all research municipalities. A more specific aim is to 
bring man and nature in balance, as is the case with the PDM of the municipality of 
Sopachuy. The PDM of Huacareta is different in emphasising the process of participatory  
 120
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Billboards in Poroma announce the execution of projects in three peasant communities, the 
construction of mains water. 
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planning. This PDM aims at introducing participatory planning into all communities and 
stresses the need to train local agents to this end. The development of information 
systems and technologies for planning and facilitation of the deliberation process 
between communities and institutions are also mentioned in this regard. As such, the 
planning process in Huacareta is considered more a goal in itself than an instrument.  
Improving the infrastructure in the social sector and road improvement have priority in 
the development strategies. Increased agricultural production is a second aim of the 
development strategy in all the research municipalities. Instruments to achieve this 
include an improvement of production infrastructure (e.g. irrigation and storage 
facilities), improvement of access to credit and diversification of production. The PDMs 
of Sopachuy and Yotala specifically mention the training of peasants, and that of 
Sopachuy the coordination of public and private institutions. The PDM of Monteagudo is 
the only one that attempts to look somewhat further. It mentions explicitly the existence 
of planning documents at the central and departmental level, and tries to elaborate these 
into practical planning strategies at the local level. This is also the only plan that clearly 
discerns general objectives, strategies, policies and activities.  
 
 
Table 6.1  Total number of projects in PDMs, % of total that concern production-oriented projects and % 
of projects in PDMs incorporated in the annual plans 
 Number of projects 
in abs. number 
production-oriented projects 
as % of total projects in 
PDM 
projects of PDM in annual 
plans (POAs) as % of total 
projects in PDM 
Yotala    
PDM 99 230 30 47 
Poroma    
PDM 99 155 43 23 
Sopachuy    
PDM 94   22 41 16 
PDM 98 130 32 42 
Presto    
PDM 98 172 25 45 
Monteagudo    
PDM 95 254 27 10 
PDM 97 152 29 18 
Huacareta    
PDM 95 125 14    6 
PDM 99   45    8 44 
Source:    PDMs and POAs municipalities. 
Note:    Some municipalities started relatively early with the eleboration of PDMs, and updated these 
PDMs recently. 
 
 
The majority of the projects in the development strategy of the municipalities is directed 
at the social sector and road infrastructure.  The share of production-oriented projects in 
the total number of programmed projects in the development strategy (Table 6.1) is 
relatively small. All municipalities, except Huacareta, comply with the condition of 
central government that at least 25% of all expenditures have to be invested in 
production-oriented projects, excluding road infrastructure. Almost all programmed 
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production-oriented projects concern infrastructural improvements in the agricultural 
sector, such as micro-irrigation projects, storage yards for agricultural products, 
veterinary services and the supply of seeds.  
It is remarkable is that particularly in the early PDMs (i.e. those elaborated in the 
period 1994-6), only a small percentage of the programmed projects actually show up in 
the yearly plans (POAs). A comparison of the projects appearing in the PDMs with those 
in the corresponding POAs shows hardly any correspondence (see the third column in 
Table 6.1).  
The lack of coincidence between the medium term development strategy and the yearly 
plans is confirmed by a study by Barragán and Fernandez (1999) involving 101 Bolivian 
municipalities. They found that only 34% of the projects in the POA were incorporated 
into the PDM.  
A first explanation for this lack of correspondence between medium-term (PDM) and 
short-term planning (POA) lies in the lack of financial resources, as municipalities do not 
manage to find the required counterpart of one of the external funds.2 This is related to 
both external and internal factors. The mayor of Presto mentioned in this regard that a 
request for co-funding from the Prosabar fund for piped water systems was rejected 
because the proposal was poorly formulated. The consultant hired to prepare the project 
profiles had insufficient knowledge to do this, and the municipality, in turn, lacked the 
knowledge to control it. The funds also follow bureaucratic procedures, causing delays in 
payments of months and sometimes even years.  
A second explanation for the lack of correspondence between the PDMs and POAs is 
the highly politicised governmental culture. The frequent change of local government, as 
shown in Chapter 5, provides an example. Since most mayors want to leave their mark on 
local policy, the policies of former local mayors and councils are rejected. On the other 
hand, the politicised character is expressed in the relationship between local governments 
and the departmental and national governments. Representatives of the departmental 
government in Sucre publicly admitted that requests for support from a municipality 
affiliated to a different political party are put on the bottom of the pile.  
A third explanation is that some local governments consider the PDM as a pure means 
to secure funds from the central government. Perceived in this way, planning forms a 
goal in itself, instead of an instrument for local development. 
 
In sum, we may conclude that the 5-year PDMs did not provide the solid basis for 
medium-term planning they were intended for. Lack of financial resources, a highly 
politicised governmental culture and not taking PDMs serious as planning instruments 
make that the early PDMs, in particular, were not translated into yearly development 
plans or projects. This poor match between PDMs and POAs indicates a failure of the 
participatory planning methodology. The use of the PDM as a development strategy is 
considered to be the responsibility of the municipality itself and no regulations exist to 
guarantee its deployment.3 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Comité de Vigilancia does not 
have the power to oblige local government to implement the PDM.  
 Nevertheless, support from the PDCR4 in getting access to national funds 
provides an incentive for municipalities to implement PDM-related projects, since such 
support is only offered for projects that form part of the PDM.  
6.2 Generating funds 
As we already made clear in foregoing chapters, the amount of available funds 
determines a local government’s investment capacity and the opportunities for 
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contracting a larger and more qualified civil staff, hereby facilitating local development 
initiatives. This section analyses and explains the financial position of the six research 
municipalities and the impact it has on local investments.  
During the period 1995-2000, all research municipalities experienced an increase in 
the total budget (Table 6.2). Several peaks and drops can, however, be observed in this 
period. In 1997, the budget of all municipalities except Yotala and Poroma doubled 
compared to 1996. This increase can be attributed to the transfer of projects of the ex-
CORDECH to the municipalities, as a consequence of the Law on Administrative 
Decentralisation coming into force. In 1998, all municipalities (except those of 
Monteagudo and Poroma) experienced a decrease of the municipal budget compared with 
that of 1997. The main reason for this decrease was the reduction of the aforementioned 
transfer of funds from the departmental to the local government. The municipal budget 
comprises the following sources, all of which are discussed in this section: 
a.  LPP-funds supplied by the central government, the co-participación tributaria, a 
percentage of the national tax income. As is shown in Figure 6.1, the amount allocated 
to the municipalities under the LPP increases steadily every year. In 1994, each 
municipality received US$ 9.8 per inhabitant, an amount that increased to US$ 35.2 in 
1999. In 2000, the absolute amount of LPP-funds reduced, due to a reduction in 
national tax income. 
b.  Own resources. These can be divided into the sale of goods and services, tax income 
(property, vehicle, patents, and other taxes) and non-tax income (fees, fines, tolls, 
interest and other rents).  
c.  Contributions from OTBs in the form of work and materials which can be translated 
into money. 
d.  Contributions from NGOs.  
e. Other governmental funds: funds supplied by the national and departmental 
government to pay the wages of public employees, especially in the local health and 
education sector. 
f. National funds: credit and donations. Municipalities can apply for counterpart finance 
from one of the three national funds:  
• FIS (Fondo de Inversión Social), which co-finances projects in the social sector, 
mainly health, education and basic sanitation. 
• FDC (Fondo de Desarrollo del Campesinado), which co-finances projects with a 
productive character aimed at improving the agricultural sector in rural areas, 
through investments such as in market buildings, road improvement and irrigation. 
• FNDR (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional), which mainly co-finances projects 
in the production sphere, such as improvement of marketing facilities etc. 
g. Other funds. 
 
 
Table 6.2  Total programmed budget of the research municipalities, in $US, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Yotala    327,962    509,622    303,813    718,324    775,226 1,042,642 
Poroma    436,403    824,326    536,926 1,148,333 2,024,994 1,593,957 
Sopachuy    169,249    384,630    873,055    735,280    678,965    714,157 
Presto    169,259    487,581 1,425,224    583,699    654,864 1,251,019 
Monteagudo 1,919,910 1,828,976 2,216,538 3,261,732 3,952,506 2,102,261 
Huacareta    575,517    454,999    816,948    710,150    693,130 1,008,936 
Source: Annual programming six municipalities 1995-2000. 
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Figure 6.2  LPP-funds transferred to all municipalities in US $/capita, 1994-2000. Source: SNPP, 2000. 
 
 
Table 6.3 presents the composition of the programmed budget of the six research 
municipalities in the period 1995-2000, with respect to these different sources. A number 
of observations can be made with respect to the information in this table. 
 
 
Table 6.3  Composition of the budget of the six research municipalities, 1995-2000, as % of total budget² 
Internal funds External funds  
LPP Own OTBs NGOs Governmentª Funds Other Total 
Yotala 41 5 3 15   5 28 3 100 
Poroma 42 0 3   8   8 34 5 100 
Sopachuy 29 1 5 36   7 16 6 100 
Presto 28 1 5 35   8 22 1 100 
Monteagudo 30 5 2 14   8 39 2 100 
Huacareta 43 2 2   7 10 34 2 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
ª = departmental as well national government 
² See for a detailed overview of the individual years Appendix III-Tables III.1-III.6. 
 
 
A first observation is that the LPP-funds stemming from the coparticipación tributaria, 
which account for 28-43% of the annual budget, are not the only source of income for the 
municipalities. This indicates that the research municipalities are able to mobilise other 
financial resources. When considering the individual years, a tendency towards a 
decreasing share of LPP-funds is observed (see Appendix III).  
One such alternative source of income is the mobilisation of own resources. Own 
resources consist mainly of taxes on production – such as on chicha (maize beer: US $3 
tax per gallon) and leather (US $9 tax per coat) – and on retail sales. The introduction of 
taxes is not a popular measure and many producers refuse to pay them. From a political 
perspective, it is therefore difficult to implement. Although preparations have been made 
to levy taxes on all property, taxes are thus far levied only on urban property such as 
 125 
land. However, this is only done in Monteagudo and Yotala, since levying taxes is rather 
complex, due to a lack of a register of property (catastro). The share of own resources in 
the municipal budget ranges from zero to 5%, with the highest shares in Yotala and 
Monteagudo. Taking into consideration the main characteristics of both municipalities, it 
appears that these more commercialised villages have more potential to generate own 
funds. Nevertheless, it was observed that also the other municipalities recently started 
levying taxes.    
In addition to LPP-funds and own resources, the contributions from OTBs constitute 
another source of income for the municipalities. The contribution of peasant communities 
is generally paid in kind and then, translated into bolivianos, incorporated in the annual 
budget. The contribution from the peasant communities may comprise work, food, 
offering shelter, etc. Neighbourhood organisations generally contribute in cash. Although 
almost all OTBs are involved in the implementation of, mainly infrastructural, projects, 
the share of this support in the municipal budget is low, ranging from 2% in Huacareta to 
5% in Presto. The share of this source decreased slightly during the period 1995-2000. 
Local governments indicated that they prefer to execute projects without this contribution 
from OTBs. Motives against involving OTBs include the difficulties in organising 
projects and the fact that comunarios do not stick to the agreements. They sometimes do 
not show up and work less than agreed. A last factor limiting the participation of the 
comunarios in the implementation of projects is their lack of knowledge and experience 
with the technical aspects of project implementation. 
This description shows that the share of internal funds (popular participation funds, 
own resources and the contribution from the OTBs) is an important component of the 
budgets of the municipalities. Besides internal funds, the acquisition of external funds 
from NGOs, the departmental government and national funds, forms an important source 
of income for the research municipalities. During the period 1995-2000, external funds 
accounted for more than half of the municipal budget. The two main sources of external 
funds are NGOs and national funds, such as the FIS, the FDC and the FNDR. With 
regards to the principal source of external funds, the six municipalities in our sample can 
be divided into two groups.  In the budgets of the municipalities of Sopachuy and Presto, 
NGOs are the main providers of external funds. For the budgets of the other four 
municipalities, national funds are much more important. The main differences between 
the contribution of NGOs and national funds are that NGO funding involves smaller 
amounts of money and that access to NGO funds is relatively easy, since in most cases 
NGOs and local governments know each other quite well, and that administrative lines 
are relatively short. Obtaining access to the resources of national funds is relatively 
difficult, due to complex application procedures. Application is also a rather time-
consuming process, since the period between sending the application and the final 
approval can take up to 20 months5.  
Political differences play a role in the access to funds, as does lack of knowledge of 
the procedures. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the capacity of small rural municipalities to 
attract qualified staff is limited and it is therefore mainly the young, less experienced 
professionals who work in these municipalities. This was also the case in the 
municipality of Poroma until in 1998, when it decided to contract the former oficial 
mayor of the city of Sucre. This person had ample experience with the acquisition of 
funds and in exchange for a more than modest salary he arranged several long-term 
contracts with national funds. 
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Figure 6.3 Latrines in Yotala, constructed with LPP-funds. 
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In sum, the availability of funds, hence investment capacity, increased considerably since 
1994, especially for the rural municipalities. The contribution of LPP funds and tax 
incomes to the total budget is important, but access to national funds and funds from 
NGOs increased substantially. In the next section, we will highlight the kind of 
investments that are made with these budgets. 
6.3 Main characteristics of local investments 
The implementation of the LPP in Bolivia meant an enormous increase in the investment 
capacity of local governments. Immediately after the LPP came into force in June 1994, 
bank accounts were opened for the new municipalities to receive the LPP-funds 
channelled by the central government. A substantial part of these funds had to be 
invested in projects according to the system of participatory planning. We already noted 
in Chapter 5 that the problems of the OTBs in the research municipalities, which consist 
mainly of peasant communities, were mainly directed at increasing the agricultural 
production. Table 6.4 shows the investments by sector the local government made in the 
six municipalities in the study area in the period 1995-9. Social sector investments 
dominate, with a substantial proportion of the funds being invested in education, health 
and basic sanitation. Within the education sector, the construction and improvement of 
schools were the most important projects. When the LPP was launched, the state of most 
rural schools was deplorable: many rural communities lacked a school building and 
classes often were held in small, one-room adobe buildings. Equipment was often limited 
to wooden benches without writing desks, and school utilities such as books and pencils 
were absent. The situation with regard to health services was more or less the same: most 
communities had no health posts and only limited facilities.  
 The construction and improvement of local rural roads6 is a second important sector. 
Ninety-five percent of the vital infrastructure in all the research municipalities consists of 
tracks. During the rainy season these tracks are vulnerable to washouts and, 
consequently, many of them are accessible only in the dry season. Municipalities usually 
start improvement activities around April each year.  
A third important category is that of urban improvement. Projects within this sector 
include improvement of the central square, construction of community buildings and the 
maintenance of streets within the town.  
Institutional strengthening is a fourth category and comprises training of local 
government officials, leaders of the OTBs and members of Comités de Vigilancia. The 
figures for the municipalities of Sopachuy and Presto, and to a lesser extent also of 
Huacareta, show a relative high share of the sector ‘unspecified’, i.e. projects that are 
specified neither in the budgets nor in the balances of the implemented projects.  
Investments aimed at the agricultural sector – the main source of income for the rural 
households in the study area – are relatively low. This means that the problems of the 
majority of the OTBs in this field are not translated into projects. The projects 
implemented in this sector mainly involve improving the production infrastructure by, for 
example, constructing irrigation systems, storage facilities for cash crops and dykes to 
protect agricultural land from flooding. ‘Energy’ refers to the construction of electricity 
systems, and ‘communication’ to the provision of radio systems in rural communities. 
Industry and tourism projects are directed at the provision of facilities (e.g. mills) and the 
promotion of tourism, respectively. The sector sports and culture has two main 
components: the construction of playing grounds and the organisation of cultural 
manifestations.         
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Table 6.4  Investments per sector as % of total investments, 1995-9 
 Yotala Poroma Sopachuy Presto Monteagudo Huacareta 
Social sector       
Education   30   32   21   18   26   18 
Health   12     8     7     4     8   10 
Sport and culture     4     4     3     1     3     1 
Basic sanitation   14   12     4     5     5     2 
Communication     0     1     1     0     0     0 
Productive sector       
Agriculture     5     4     8     4     4     1 
Industry and tourism     0     0     1     0     6     0 
Roads and urban 
infrastructure 
      
Roads     9   31   10   26   16   22 
Energy     1     0     0     1     1     3 
Urban improvement     3   12     5     5     5     9 
Other        
Institutional strengthening     2     8   12     4     6   11 
Other     1     0     2     3     2     0 
Local administration   19     7   11     9   12     9 
Unspecified      0     6   14   18     5   12 
       
Total investments in US $ 1,033,354 1,883,933 2,150,433 1,503,396 6,017,231 1,820,552 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Implementation reports of the municipalities, 1995-9. 
 
 
Table 6.4 covers the period 1995-9. An analysis of each individual year shows that 
investments in education and roads remain high, and that investments aimed at 
institutional strengthening gained importance after 1997 (see Appendix III-Table III.7-
12). Investments in health and basic sanitation (e.g. the construction of sewerage systems 
and toilets) decreased slightly. This indicates an investment pattern that is strongly aimed 
at infrastructural projects, with an emphasis on the social sector. This is confirmed by a 
comparison of investments in production-oriented and non-production-oriented projects. 
Production-oriented projects are those directed at strengthening the agricultural sector of 
a municipality. Examples are projects in the agricultural sector (irrigation), marketing 
and commercialisation, veterinary services, seed supply, forest management and non-
agricultural, alternative employment (such as weaving and pottery). In this study, roads 
are not considered production-oriented investments, nor are investments in education, 
health, sports, culture or urban improvement. Table 6.5 shows the share of production-
oriented projects in the total costs of implemented projects. 
 
The share of production-oriented projects in overall total investments over the period 
1995-9 is very low (ranging from 1.4% in Huacareta to 11% in Monteagudo) compared 
to that in non-production-oriented projects. If the average cost per production-oriented 
project is compared to that of each non-production-oriented project, the costs of the 
former are only a quarter to one-third of the latter.  
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Table 6.5  Share of production-oriented projects in % of total investments 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Mean 
Yotala   0   0   1 8 5   4.9 
Poroma   0   0   1 3 7   3.6 
Sopachuy    3 11 20 3 5   6.7 
Presto   7   4   9 7 2   4.6 
Monteagudo 16 20 20 3 7 11.0 
Huacareta   2   2   0 2 1   1.4 
Source: Implementation reports municipalities. 
    
 
Thus, investment patterns in the six research municipalities can be characterised as 
directed mainly to infrastructural projects, with an emphasis on projects in the social 
sector – education, health and basic sanitation, sports and communication - in terms of 
costs and absolute numbers. These findings contrast with the problems experienced by 
the population as presented in Chapter 5, which mainly relate to the production sector. 
Findings of the UIA (1998) show a similar divergence of demand and implementation 
with respect to production-oriented projects. In their study of 98 Bolivian municipalities, 
they found that 36% of the problems of OTBs were in the agricultural sector. However, 
only 3% of investments were made in this sector. The dominance of social sector 
investments can be attributed to several factors. First, especially during the first years of 
the LPP, most municipalities were not aware of their possibilities to promote and/or 
stimulate local economic development. This was enforced by the fact that originally the 
Lozada government had presented the LPP as a law that improves the social living 
conditions of the population, thus underestimating the opportunities the law offers for 
local economic development. In 1997, the Bolivian government tried to correct this by 
imposing various conditions on the investments of local governments, such as the rule 
that 30% of all funds stemming from the co-participation funds should be invested in the 
social sector, 6% in basic security and 25% in the production sector.  
Second, the lack of consultation with the private sector, cooperatives and 
representatives of farmers (i.e. producers’ associations) in the participatory planning 
process is another important factor, as noted in the previous chapter.  
A third explanation is in the lack of technical capacities among the administrative staff 
of the municipalities. Production-oriented and technical assistance projects are generally 
complex to implement (UIA 1998, p. 79), while the construction of a small school 
building or health post is much easier.    
A fourth explanation is related to elections. During the run-up to elections, mayors are 
primarily concerned with improving their image and thus try to execute as many projects 
as possible. Since projects in the social sector are the most visible, these will yield most 
votes and thus receive priority.  
6.4 Performance in implementation 
It was noted in Section 6.1 that only a small proportion of the projects programmed in 
PDMs show up in the POAs. However, this analysis referred to the programmed projects, 
and a more accurate indicator of the performance of local government is the degree to 
which planned projects in POAs have actually been implemented. Figure 6.4 shows that 
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the municipality of Sopachuy has by far the best figures in the implementation of the 
programmed annual budget, followed by Huacareta and Presto. Monteagudo, Poroma 
and, to a lesser extent, Yotala have less success in implementing the programmed budget. 
Porcel and Thevoz (1998, p. 107) found in a study on the performance of 101 Bolivian 
municipalities similar figures. In these municipalities, an average of 45% of the 
programmed annual budget was implemented.  
Most municipalities, except Sopachuy, experienced a reduction in the share of the 
programmed budget that is implemented in 1999, compared to 1998. A plausible 
explanation for this is the frequent change of mayors in this year, leading to an 
interruption in the implementation of projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Share of programmed annual budget that has been implemented, as % of total programmed 
budget in the research municipalities 
Source: Implementation reports municipalities 1995-9. 
 See Appendix III-Table III.13 for a detailed overview. 
 
 
How well a local government performs in the implementation of projects depends on a 
number of factors. Particularly during the first years of the LPP, the POAs strongly 
resembled a shopping list: an enumeration of projects accompanied by a randomly 
chosen amount of budget. The priorities set by the OTBs formed the basis for these 
plans, but a project profile of the individual projects was not elaborated. Thus the 
specification of the annual budget was nothing more than a rough calculation. When 
starting project implementation, it soon became clear that there was not enough budget to 
implement the project. Moreover, the available LPP-funds were the starting point to 
finance the projects: when municipalities were short of cash, a project was put under a 
fictitious post ‘FDC’ or ‘FIS’. This was done without having contacted the relevant fund 
to check whether a contribution of the fund indeed was possible, meaning that real 
 131 
support from the funds was very insecure. Afterwards, it often turned out that the hoped 
for support could not be provided.  
Projects almost exclusively financed with internal resources – such as LPP-funds and 
own resources – appear to have some difficulties with finding contractors to execute the 
projects. This is related to the lack of experienced, qualified construction firms in the 
municipalities. This phenomenon occurs most often at the end of the year. In this period, 
just before the financial year ends and municipalities are judged on their performance in 
project implementation, a large number of projects still have to be executed. Since the 
number of capable local contractors is limited, some municipalities cannot implement all 
planned projects.  
Another factor affecting the performance in project implementation is the rainy 
season, during which it is difficult to implement projects. The Bolivian rainy season 
starts late October, meaning that the more isolated communities become inaccessible to 
motorised vehicles and thus project materials cannot be supplied. The start of the rainy 
season also means that projects in which adobe is used have to be suspended.  
All these restrictions are more or less technical in character. A more political 
explanation for not executing projects is the suspension of projects by the municipal 
council. This arises from internal troubles, which often have a political character.  
In analysing the performance of local governments, it is interesting to see whether the 
investments made by the municipalities are influenced by the presence of a development 
strategy, the PDM. When comparing the investment performance of the municipalities 
that had a PDM in 1995 with those that did not, the former group had more success in the 
implementation of the planned budget. In contrast, Yotala and Poroma, both without a 
PDM until 1999, had less success in implementing the programmed budget. In explaining 
the favourable impact of the presence of a PDM on investment capacity, attention should 
be paid to the institutional background of these municipalities, with respect to the actors 
involved in the process of PDM elaboration. In both Sopachuy and Presto, the NGO 
ACLO elaborated the PDM. Both PDMs include a large share of projects that are 
implemented by this NGO and, as a consequence, the NGO benefits from the 
implementation of these projects and will attempt to secure their implementation. The 
first PDMs of Monteagudo and Huacareta were also formulated by this NGO, but since 
this NGO is not working in these municipalities and other NGOs were not consulted, the 
positive effect of the PDM is negligible. Based on this analysis, one can conclude that the 
presence of a PDM, formulated with the participation of all NGOs present in the 
municipality will contribute positively to the investment performance of a municipality.  
In addition to the projects that were never realised, there is a group of projects that 
were started but have not been completed. The main reason for not completing the work 
is that the project appeared not to be implemented according the rules. According to the 
municipalities, the contractors should be blamed for this. Some construction firms point 
out, however, that the municipality also plays a role in this, since price and duration are 
the most important selection criteria in tender procedures, whereas experience is hardly 
considered (see also Section 6.6.1). Lack of cooperation on the part of the communities is 
another factor that may contribute to the failing implementation of projects.  
A last group of projects are those that have been executed, but badly. There appears to 
be no difference between social and production-oriented projects in this respect (see also 
Box 6.1).  
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6.5 Kind of investments  
Decentralisation can have a favourable impact on inequalities in development 
opportunities within municipalities, in particular between the more developed municipal 
capital and the poorer peasant communities. When considering the percentage of projects 
implemented (as a % of the total number of projects), all municipalities implemented 
most projects in the rural areas, ranging from 42% in Sopachuy to 70% in Poroma.  
When comparing the investments in the urban part of the municipality (the municipal 
capital) with the investments in the rural areas (the peasant communities) during the 
period 1995-9, investments in peasant communities dominate, together with investments 
that are directed at the municipality as a whole (Figure 6.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 
Source: Implementation reports 1995-9. 
 
Box 6.1  Examples of poorly implemented projects 
In 1995, the municipality of Presto started a tender procedure for studies into drinking water facilities in 
14 communities. Consultancy X, a small firm in Sucre, was selected to carry out the studies. The 14 
studies were duly delivered and the municipality sent them to the FIS for approval. After six months, the 
FIS informed the municipality that the projects could not be financed because the studies were 
inadequate: the consultancy firm had visited just one community and had applied the conditions there to 
the other 13 communities, without taking into account their specific context. Because the guarantee had 
expired, the municipality could not pass on the extra costs – $US 9,000 – to the consultancy firm.  
 
In 1995, a school was built in a peasant community in Monteagudo. Only after completion it was realised 
that there were too few children to contract a teacher.  
 
The municipality of Sopachuy was constructing an irrigation channel in cooperation with an NGO. 
Halfway the construction they discovered that the slope on which the channel was being built was a 
fracture zone. A possible consequence was that part of the slope would collapse. This had not been 
foreseen during the feasibility study, but even after the problem had been identified, construction 
continued because the actors involved did not want to look bad in the eyes of the moneylender, the FDC.   
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An important share of local-level investments in the period 1995-9 was oriented towards 
the rural areas, i.e. the peasant communities. These investments concern the construction 
of irrigation systems, rural roads and rural schools and health posts. A considerable 
amount of investments was directed at the municipality as a whole, and as such both the 
neighbourhood organisations and peasant communities benefited. Examples of such 
projects are school breakfasts, strengthening community organisations (neighbourhood 
organisations, peasant communities and indigenous communities), forest management 
and constructing such communal facilities as medical centres. Projects in the urban area 
are investments that favour only the urban population, such as urban schools, urban 
improvement and basic sanitation.  
Figure 6.5 presents the average investments according to location in the period 1995-9. 
When considering the individual years (see Appendix III-Table III.14-III.19), two trends 
can be observed. Firstly, investments in the municipal capitals (the villages) decreased 
during this period.  
Secondly, investments that favour the municipality as a whole increased, resulting in 
less bias towards the urban centre, in favour of investments in the peasant communities. 
During the first years, relatively large investments were done in the municipal capitals, 
which might be attributed to the fact that the neighbourhood organisations were better 
informed about the opportunities provided by the LPP than the peasant communities, as a 
result of which they were able to acquire more investments. Moreover, the deplorable 
situation of some basic services, such as medical centres and secondary schools, led to an 
emphasis on urban-biased investments in the first few years. The municipal elections in 
December 1995 are another factor explaining the projects’ urban bias.  Driven by the 
desire to be re-elected, many local governments opted for tangible projects in the towns, 
such as improving the plaza central, complete with benches labelled with the name of the 
mayor, the construction of electricity systems and the upgrading of soccer fields. In later 
years, OTBs in the peasant communities started formulating their demands more 
effectively, and local governments became much more conscious of the voting potential 
in these communities. 
The shift towards projects that favour the municipality as a whole was accompanied 
by a shift towards fewer, but larger projects which could benefit from economies of 
scale. Related to this is the access to contributions of the national funds. The acquisition 
of these funds demands much of local governments, and in order to limit the costs and 
time required to acquire these funds, many local governments decided to bundle requests 
for funds into larger projects. Moreover, projects favouring the municipality as a whole 
are an easy way to satisfy the demands of all OTBs.   
       
When analysing the distribution of investments between urban and rural areas in 
proportion to the population, another picture emerges. Two municipalities (Sopachuy and 
Yotala) invested relatively less exclusively in the urban part of the municipality than in 
the rural communities (see Appendix III-Table III.20). Poroma, Presto and Monteagudo 
invested almost equally in both parts, according to the share of the population living in 
the urban and rural areas. Huacareta invested relatively more in the municipal capital. In 
their study on local investments in Bolivia, Barragán and Fernandez (2000, p. 34) found 
similar results, with 38% of the municipalities investing relatively more in urban areas, 
38% more in rural areas, and 24% of the municipalities investing equally in both areas.  
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6.6 The impact of decentralisation on local employment: the case of the 
construction sector 
In addition to offering conditions for local economic development, the LPP is expected to 
have a positive impact on employment in the municipalities. Local government can play 
an important role in this. An example is the increase of employment in the local public 
sector. It is estimated that, as a result of the LPP, nation-wide at least 32,000 jobs have 
been created in the local public sector (SNPP 1996). Another sector that has benefited is 
the hotel and restaurant industry, as a response to the increased number of visits by 
public sector entities, such as the prefectura and NGOs. Before the implementation of the 
LPP, adequate lodging was lacking in all research municipalities except Monteagudo. In 
other municipalities, visitors depended on the hospitality of NGOs, the priest or the 
school. Pensions have now been established, in particular in the municipalities of 
Huacareta, Sopachuy and Presto.  
In 1997, the local government of Sopachuy took the initiative to build the Hotel 
Municipal, a two-story building on the edge of the central square. Although the guest 
house of the Sisters of the Congregation provided some lodging possibilities, the 
municipal council felt that this accommodation did not meet the requirements of today’s 
visitors (i.e. representatives of the departmental government, NGOs and embassies). 
Therefore, they proposed building a new hotel to provide adequate lodging for outside 
visitors. An additional, attractive prospect was that this would generate extra municipal 
income, increasing the investment capacity of the municipalities. The hotel was 
constructed in 1998 by a local contractor with the help of some municipal employees. By 
taking the initiative to build this hotel, the local government performed a pronounced 
entrepreneurial role. Although such initiatives are promising, the question arises why 
individual entrepreneurs in Sopachuy were not interested in such an enterprise. This may 
have had something to do with the viability of the hotel. Although the council thought the 
hotel would attract enough guests to survive, no feasibility study or cost/benefit analysis 
was made. Neither agreements were drawn up about the organisation and administration 
of the hotel.  
In Presto, the only accommodation available was the guest house of the priest and 
there were no restaurants, although it was always possible to ask the women who 
prepared the almuerzo (dinner) for the personnel of the NGO ACLO to prepare an extra 
tray of rice and chicken. In 1998, during the second visit to Presto, the family had 
transformed the living room into a 12-seater restaurant. In 1999, business was good and 
they decided to build some extra bedrooms on the patio. This was mainly the initiative of 
the mother of the family, who expanded her business slowly but steadily.  
Expansion of the hotel sector also took place in Huacareta, where the female owner of 
the local restaurant decided to expand her business and transformed a bedroom on the 
patio into a comfortable guest room. Her main incentive to do this, as she pointed out, 
was the increase of visitors since the mid-1990s and the lack of appropriate lodging in the 
village.  
In addition to increased employment in the public sector and services, one would also 
expect a positive effect of the LPP on the construction industry, through increased 
employment as a result of the execution of infrastructural projects, such as schools, 
health posts and storage facilities, at local level. To check whether this is the case, in the 
next section we look at the effects of decentralisation on the construction industry. 
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6.6.1 Tender procedures 
At the municipal level, there are two7 types of tendering: the public tender and direct 
invitation. The choice between them is determined by the amount of money involved and 
the type of finance. Projects with a total cost of less than US $ 3500 can be tendered 
locally, within the municipality. Projects with a cost above US $ 3500 have to be 
tendered externally. Projects involving co-funding from one of the national funds also 
have to be put out to public tender. In practice, these two criteria are interrelated, as 
projects co-financed by national funds involve larger sums. Locally tendered projects are 
announced in the town hall, while some municipalities send invitations to local 
contractors that are registered in the RUC (Registro Único de Contribuyentes; ‘los que 
tienen RUC’). The contractors receive the project’s terms of reference and have to 
mention a price. The type of contract in the tender procedures is already known. There 
are three types of contract:  
• Mano de obra: the municipality provides the materials and the contractor is paid to 
do the work. 
• Obra vendida (or closed contract/lump sum): the contractor receives a sum of money 
with which to pay for materials and labour, and is responsible for both. 
• Contrato compartido (shared contract): the community has to provide some unskilled 
labourers; this can also imply that the community has to provide meals and/or 
sleeping accommodation. Another component of such a contract is turning in a 
monthly progress report.  
During the first years of the LPP, the obra vendida was the most used contract. Recently, 
however, the preference has shifted to the mano de obra. The collaboration of OTBs in 
municipal projects used to be very popular from both a financial and participatory 
viewpoint. It was thought that if households participated in the implementation of a 
project they would later take better care of it. The first results, however, were 
disappointing: OTBs did not stick to the agreements and lacked the skills to perform the 
activities well.   
The local government makes the final selection of the contractor through a 
qualification committee (comisión calificadora). When a co-financing institute is 
involved, it joins the committee. The committee has four members: the head of the 
administration, the legal officer, the technical officer and another municipal employee. 
According to various sources, the mayor is not a member of this committee, although he 
is able to reject the selected contractor or the offer made. The criteria for choosing the 
contractor are his quotation for the work, the planned time schedule and his experience 
with the specific kind of project. 
An interesting question is whether tendering procedures are determined by nepotism. 
Are projects given to the construction firms of relatives or political twin souls? In other 
words, is the process transparent? Bearing in mind that Latin American culture is 
permeated with clientelism and patronage mechanisms, the expected answer to this 
question is no. Interviews with contractors, civil servants and other key informants, 
however, indicate the absence of such mechanisms. In most municipalities the tender 
procedures seem to progress smoothly, although some people point at the existence of 
nepotism:  
 
‘… Well, there are some suppositions that some firms obtain more projects than others, 
for political reasons, padrinismo, but you can never prove it.’8  
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In addition to political padrinismo, religious belief was mentioned as influencing the 
selection of implementing entity:  
 
‘The best contractors in town are miristas (political affiliates to the MIR – GN), I think, 
and another is emebelista (political affiliates to the MBL). But for the mayor, religion – 
he’s is a convinced Catholic – is far more important than political affiliation’9 
 
This does not mean that the selection of contractors is a transparent process. A contractor 
from Monteagudo mentioned lobbying as a quite efficient strategy to obtain work. He 
maintains good relationships with the mayor of Monteagudo, and nowadays also works 
in the adjacent municipalities of Huacareta and Padilla. But, as he also mentioned, it is 
not difficult to benefit since there is hardly any competition from other contractors.  
Another indicator of the lack of transparency in the selection of contractors is the 
payment of fees to local government officials. During interviews with representatives of 
the municipalities and contractors, it was mentioned that contractors have to pay a ‘fee’ 
(comisión para obras or apoyo al partido) of 10-30% of the total programmed costs to 
the municipality in order to be considered in the selection process.  
This situation applies to projects implemented purely with popular participation funds 
or local resources. What about projects financed by central government agencies, such as 
the FIS and the FNDR? In her study on decentralisation in two municipalities in 
Guatemala, Rendón Labadan (1996) mentions the influence of central government 
agencies in the selection of contractors, resulting in nepotism that favours firms from the 
larger cities. In the six research municipalities, there is evidence that these agencies – the 
national funds - exert some influence on the selection of the contractors. In interviews, 
external contractors – from La Paz and Santa Cruz - mentioned lobbying as an effective 
instrument to benefit during the selection process.  
The influence op nepotism at the local level appears to be limited. How can this 
relative absence be explained? Perhaps the limited number of construction companies 
explains the absence, forcing rural municipalities to look outside the municipal 
boundaries in tendering procedures. Table 6.6 shows the share of the economically active 
population employed in the construction sector. In most municipalities there are only a 
limited number of construction workers, and of them only a few are qualified in the sense 
that they can implement larger projects. The relatively high share of this sector in Yotala 
can be attributed to the proximity of the labour market of Sucre.  
The selection of contractors from other regions means at least that there are have been 
no previous relations with local government, and that nepotism could not have developed 
yet. Also, the small scale on which projects are executed means that almost every 
inhabitant knows who does what, thus discouraging large-scale nepotism. 
 
 
Table 6.6  Percentage of the population that is working in the construction sector and absolute number of 
construction numbers in the research municipalities, 1992 
 % construction Abs. number 
Yotala 1.5   91 
Poroma 0.1   18 
Sopachuy 0.3   20 
Presto 0.2   14 
Monteagudo 0.4 104 
Huacareta 0.6   57 
Source: CNPV, 1992. 
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6.6.2 The impact on local employment 
Although there are conditions for a positive impact of the LPP on employment 
possibilities in the construction sector, the impact itself is limited. Figure 6.6 shows the 
percentage of projects that was executed by local contractors10 and the percentage of the 
budget that was implemented by local contractors, in the period 1996 –7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6  Percentage of projects executed by local contractors and percentage of the budget executed by 
local contractors, 1996-7; Source: Fieldwork 1997. 
 
 
Two issues appear from this figure: firstly, the share of local contractors in the execution 
of projects is limited, ranging from 8% in Presto to 57% in Yotala. This means that 
external contractors are brought in to carry out at least 40% of the projects. Also, the 
smaller municipalities more often contract external contractors than the larger ones. 
Secondly, the overall tendency is for local contractors to be contracted only for smaller 
projects, which involve less money. This means not only that locals execute a limited 
number of projects, but also that the bulk of municipal investment flows to other regions, 
limiting a multiplier effect and the positive effect on local development. Most larger 
projects are executed by firms from one of the three large cities: La Paz, Cochabamba 
and Santa Cruz. The use of external firms can be explained by the limited presence, and 
experience, of the construction sector in the predominantly rural municipalities.  
Although each municipality has a certain number of construction workers, by far the 
majority of them are unskilled labourers (mano de obra non-calificada). They are 
perfectly able to work under supervision or build a simple construction, but lack the 
skills to design and implement larger projects. Besides deficient qualifications, local 
construction firms often also lack the legal requirements for being contracted for larger 
projects. In order to be considered for larger projects, firms must show their financial 
viability by means of bank guarantees. They must also be registered at the departmental 
Chamber of Construction. Most local construction firms or workers are not able to meet 
these requirements. The 10-30% ‘fee’ that has to be paid to the municipality also limits 
the acquisition of projects for local contractors, since these are generally less wealthy 
than large construction firms.  
In addition to the outflow of investments, another less favourable aspect of contracts with 
outsiders is the use of labour and materials by these firms. Most external firms do not use 
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the unskilled labourers living in the municipality concerned, but bring labourers with 
them. As one supervisor stated: 
 
‘Most large projects are executed by firms from outside. They come here with large 
trucks and bring both materials and labour. Sometimes we suggest the input of local 
workers, but the contractors reject this, arguing that they can better manage the input of 
their own people, generally workers they have worked with before.’  
 
Thus, the employment generated by the LPP in the construction sector is limited, as is the 
occurrence of a multiplier effect as a boost for the local economy resulting of the use of 
local materials. Although some municipalities, such as Monteagudo, tried to curb this 
development by municipal regulations, such regulations are largely ignored by 
construction firms.  
The contractors have different opinions about working on municipal projects. Although 
most of them said that the amount of work has increased, all indicated that the number of 
contractors has increased as well, leading to more competition for projects. Most small 
contractors prefer working for the private sector – individual households and firms -, 
because local governments pay less. The amount being paid is the most common 
complaint: the municipality pays one price, whilst projects in a more isolated canton are 
more expensive than other projects due to transportation costs. Another unfavourable 
aspect of executing municipal projects is the 10% guarantee, which means that 10% of 
the project is paid only after the guarantee period has expired, generally after one to three 
months. In case of defects in the project, the contractor has to make improvements. The 
10% is paid only when there are no defects left. Another frequently mentioned problem, 
which makes municipal projects less attractive to execute, is the cooperation with the 
communities. The communication with the population is often dissatisfactory, and 
sometimes the population refuses to make their contribution. 
6.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter discussed the impact of the LPP on local development, through the 
implementation of projects in the context of the LPP, starting with the main 
characteristics of the municipal development strategy, the PDM.  By 1999, all six 
research municipalities had such a plan. Although the PDMs aim at a broad consultation 
of relevant actors, this consultation is generally limited to local government and OTBs. 
Sectoral organisations (e.g. producers’ associations) are not involved in strategy 
development and priority-setting, nor are other government levels. The position of NGOs 
is a special one. If an NGO is the institution that formulates the PDM, the projects are 
often incorporated into the PDM. Other NGOs, however, are seldom consulted. 
Improving the population’s living conditions (and especially increasing its income) is 
the main objective of all plans. Nevertheless, the majority of the programmed budget is 
directed at the social sector and the improvement of roads. The reasons for this social 
bias are the complexity of most production-oriented projects and the absence of sectoral 
organisations in the planning process. With regard to the yearly implementation of the 
PDM (i.e. the formulation of the POA), the lack of correspondence with the PDMs is 
obvious. Only a small number of projects in the PDM are actually included in the POAs.  
Section 6.2 examined the financial position of the municipalities. The municipalities 
depend on LPP-funds for 28-43% of their budget. The importance of own resources in 
municipal budgets remains small, which can be explained by the fact that the base for 
levying tax is weak in most municipalities. Next to LPP-funds, the municipalities depend 
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for an important share of their income on external funds, such as NGO and national 
funds. These last entail a risk, since the procedures followed in order to obtain co-
financing by these funds are complex and time-consuming. In this regard, it would be 
more efficient for municipalities to attract NGOs.  
An overview of the projects implemented in the period 1995-9 in the six 
municipalities shows that investments in the social sector dominate in all municipalities, 
followed by improvements in road infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, agriculture-
oriented investments. The relatively small share of such investments is remarkable, 
considering the predominantly rural character of the municipalities, the bias in the 
problems of OTBs towards agriculture, and the relatively high share of production-
oriented projects that are incorporated into the municipal development strategies, as 
expressed in the PDMs. 
With regard to the performance of local government in the implementation of projects, 
the share of programmed budget that is invested is limited. Problems in the 
implementation of projects are the communal contribution, climatological factors and the 
shortage of funds. The findings show a slight relation between the presence of a PDM 
and the implementation of programmed projects. However, this is only the case if an 
NGO was the executing entity that also works in the municipalities.  
According to the LPP, investments should be distributed equally between the village 
and the rural areas within a municipality, depending on the population of each sector. 
During the first years of the LPP, there was a slight prevalence of urban investments. 
This was corrected in later years in favour of the peasant communities and investments 
aimed at the municipality as a whole, leading to a relatively equal distribution of funds 
between the municipal capital and the surrounding peasant communities. The findings 
show that this is the case in the six research municipalities. However, there are fewer 
investments in the villages, and generally the implemented projects are more expensive. 
Over the course of time, the investments in the villages have decreased and the share of 
investments directed at the municipality as a whole has increased. 
Decentralisation can also have an important multiplier effect, by generating extra local 
employment through the execution of local public works by the construction industry. An 
analysis of the impact of the LPP on the construction industry showed that employment 
increased only slightly, growth being restricted by the limited supply (in absolute number 
and with respect to capabilities) of contractors. This results in the contracting of external 
construction firms for the larger projects, in particular, whereas the smallest projects are 
left for local contractors. Besides the slight increase in employment in the construction 
industry, LPP-related employment in the public sector increased as well, as is probably 
income generation in the hotel and restaurant industry.  
Based on the findings in this chapter, it is fair to assume that decentralisation 
contributes to local development. The implementation of decentralisation in Bolivia has 
resulted in an increased investment capacity of the six research municipalities, an 
increased number of projects implemented at the local level and an increase in local 
employment in the construction sector. However, the extent of this contribution is 
strongly related to the way planning is designed and the opportunities to acquire other 
funds. A development strategy elaborated without the participation of the relevant actors 
is doomed to failure, as the cases of Monteagudo and Huacareta have shown. In this 
regard it would be positive to select only NGOs that work in the area for the formulation 
of the PDMs. However, this also entails some risks, as these NGOs also perform a role in 
project implementation. On the other hand, the cooperation with NGOs is supposed to 
offer more income security for the municipalities, with higher investment capacity as a 
result.   
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To secure the aims defined in the local development strategy, mechanisms for 
accountability and transparency are essential. At this moment there are no such 
mechanisms, and in this respect local governments have the option to go their own way, 
whether or not using the participatory development strategy.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. According to the 1997 census of Bolivian Municipalities (Primer Censo de Gobiernos Municipales), 
127 of all Bolivian municipalities have a PDM, and 116 of all 311 (37%) Bolivian municipalities used 
this plan for project identification (Ministério de Hacienda, 1998). All the research municipalities 
stated that they have a PDM.  
2. As explained later in this chapter, municipalities can finance projects with funds they receive in the 
context of the LPP, with resources generated by themselves (such as taxes), with support from NGOs, 
and by asking a contribution from one of the national funds (FIS, FDC, FNDR). 
3. Interview with Ruben Porcel, director PDCR-Chuquisaca. 
4. Proyecto de Desarrollo de Comunidades Rurales: World Bank financed project that supports Bolivian 
municipalities in the formulation and implementation of the medium-term development strategy (see 
Chapter 5). 
5. Interview with the Directors of the FIS-Chuquisaca and the FDC-Chuquisaca and the mayors of the 
research municipalities.  
6. The maintenance of interdepartmental roads is the responsibility of the departmental government.  
7. The Basic Norms for the Administration of Goods and Services (Resolución Suprema 216145 del 3 de 
agosto 1995) mention two other forms of tendering, which, however, will not be considered in this 
study as they were not used in the study area. 
8. Interview with a constructor from Monteagudo on 18-12-1999. 
9. Interview with the oficial mayor of Sopachuy on 23-05-1997. 
10. Local contractors are contractors coming from the municipality itself. 
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7  THE DIFFERENTIATED IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION  
In Chapter 2, we discussed the factors that condition the impact of decentralisation on 
local governance and local development (Figure 2.1). In this chapter we aim to assess the 
role of the different categories of conditioning factors in the six research municipalities. 
As such, this chapter will serve as the basis for the main conclusions of this study. The 
three broad categories of factors that exert an influence on the impact of decentralisation 
are the spatial context, the socio-economic context and the institutional context, including 
the characteristics of local government.  
In the first section, we focus on the role of the spatial context, in particular the 
accessibility of municipalities. The second section discusses the influence of the socio-
economic context, including the size of the municipality and its economic structure. 
Next, we discuss the institutional context, by analysing the role of OTBs, the 
characteristics of local government (i.e. the issues of capacity and politics), the role of 
intra-governmental organisations, the power structure, NGOs, and the private sector. The 
chapter ends with the main conclusions on the factors that condition the impact of 
decentralisation in the six research municipalities.  
7.1 The spatial context  
The main spatial factor conditioning the effects of decentralisation on local governance 
and local development is accessibility, defined in this section as the distance between the 
communities and the municipal capital, expressed in hours, and the presence of roads. 
Accessibility affects local governance and local development for a number of reasons.   
Firstly, accessibility influences the knowledge of the population about general aspects 
of the LPP and the Comité de Vigilancia, and the assistance of the OTBs at meetings. 
Also, differences can be observed in the perception of OTBs on the changes brought by 
the LPP. With respect to the relation between the knowledge of OTB-members of the 
LPP and accessibility, it appeared that the leaders of the OTBs in less accessible areas1 
had less knowledge about the LPP and the functions of the Comités de Vigilancia. Also, 
leaders of less accessible assisted less to municipal meetings. The leader of Mala Vista, a 
peasant community in the municipality of Presto, refers in this respect to the considerable 
distance he has to bridge to reach the village of Presto. It takes him two days to walk 
there and, as he remarked, he does so only in case of an emergency. Many leaders of 
rural OTBs are in such a situation, and because of these long distances, their level of 
participation in municipal meetings is relatively low.  
With respect to the changes brought by the LPP, it appears that particularly the well 
accessible OTBs are of the opinion that the LPP resulted in an increased participation of 
the OTBs  (Table 7.1).  
Secondly, accessibility does directly impact on accountability, as illustrated by 
experiences of the Comité de Vigilancia in the municipality of Huacareta, for example. 
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Table 7.1  Knowledge, assistance and perceptions on the LPP: the difference between the leaders of the 
well and less accessible OTBs 
 Well accessible OTBs 
% 
Less accessible OTBs 
% 
Knowledge of LPP: 
- high 
- low  
 
61 
39 
 
27 
63 
Knowledge of functions Comité de Vigilancia: 
- high 
- low 
 
68 
32 
 
39 
61 
Assistance to municipal meetings: 
- frequent 
- low 
 
78 
22 
 
46 
54 
Changes brought by the LPP: 
- no changes 
- more participation 
- more projects 
 
52 
28 
20 
 
75 
  5 
20 
Source: Fieldwork 1998-9. 
 
 
This Comité de Vigilancia consists of four members, each representing one of the four 
cantons in the municipality. The canton of Ingre is located in the north-eastern part of the 
municipality, separated by a chain of hills from the rest of Huacareta. To travel to the 
village of Huacareta, the people first have to travel to the town of Monteagudo, and then 
further south to Huacareta, which is a rather long trip of 9 hours. This makes the 
communication with local government and control of local projects quite difficult.   
A third aspect of accessibility is the presence of the media and their role in informing 
the population about the performance of the local, departmental and national government. 
In the urban centres of the municipalities, primarily local and national newspapers, but in 
some cases also local broadcasting companies play an important role in transmitting 
information (Box 7.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the rural areas, the role of television is minimal, since most remote areas do not have 
electricity. Neither newspapers are common here, and the distribution is limited to a 
couple of copies for the teacher. A last obstacle to access to information in newspapers in 
remote areas is the large proportion of illiterate people among the population. Instead of 
Box 7.1  The role of the media: television in Monteagudo 
In the study area, only the municipality of Monteagudo is served by a local television station. 
Each day, the local broadcasting station transmits local news for two hours. In the 
programmes, much attention is paid to the local government: the mayor is seen opening a 
new school, or sitting on a bulldozer at the start of a road construction project. Every Friday 
a special bulletin is dedicated to the meeting of the municipal council that day. However, 
much of the information presented by the station is somewhat coloured – emphasising the 
positive role of local government – which might be related to the fact that the local 
government financially supports the television station. 
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written sources, radio is an important medium in the peasant communities. Radios are 
relatively cheap, can function independent of electricity and have multiple functions.  
 
 
Table 7.2  Distance bias in investments in OTBs by accessibility of OTBs: in average number of projects 
per type of OTB and as % of all investments, 1995-9 
Well accessible Less accessible  
Average no. 
projects 
 % of total 
investments 
Average no. 
projects 
% of total 
investments 
Yotala  2.6  65 
 
1.4 35 
Poroma  1.9  52  0.7 48 
Sopachuy  2.8  42  4.8 58 
Presto  4.3  57  1.8 43 
Monteagudo  3.9  66  2.5 34 
Huacareta  2.3  56  2.3 44 
Source: Implementation reports 1995-9. 
 
 
Fourthly, the accessibility of OTBs affects local investments. In Chapter 6 we 
demonstrated that the distribution of investments between urban and rural areas within 
the municipalities is relatively even distributed, when the size of the population is taken 
into account. Table 7.2 shows the implemented projects in well accessible and less 
accessible OTBs.  
The findings show that all municipalities, except Sopachuy and Huacareta, implemented 
fewer projects in the OTBs that are relatively less accessible, in absolute number as well 
as in total investments, than in OTBs that are relatively well accessible. Several factors 
explain this. The limited participation of the population in less accessible areas, as 
mentioned above, results in the local government receiving fewer demands. Since there 
are fewer demands, fewer projects are planned and consequently fewer are implemented.  
Also, problems in project implementation, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
explain the differences in investments between the two types of OTBs. To implement 
projects, materials need to be transported to the project site. Since the transport of 
materials to remote areas involves a larger physical distance and is often possible only by 
making use of mules, the costs of projects in remote communities are higher than those in 
more accessible communities. Often, however, these additional costs are not included in 
the budget. As a consequence, local governments experience problems hiring contractors 
to implement these projects, resulting in the delay of implementation of projects. A 
constructor in Presto remarked in this respect: 
 
‘Last year the local government put out a project to build a community house in Alto 
Waylla Pampa. This community can only be reached by mules, and you can imagine how 
long it takes to transport all the necessary materials. We refused to do it, and it looks like 
nobody wants to implement, since last week the local government tendered it again, with 
a remarkable increase of the budget.’  
 
Climatological factors, such as the heavy rainfall in summer, also hinder project 
implementation in more remote areas, since many local roads are impassable in the rainy 
season, causing often delays in project implementation.   
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Figure 7.1  Transport of people and goods in the municipality of Poroma. Public transport, in the form of a 
micro-bus often serves only the municipal capitals. Transport by large trucks is much more 
common, because it offers the opportunity to transport also goods, such as potatoes, and small 
animals.  
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Fifthly, accessibility is an important criterion employed by NGOs in the selection of their 
working area. NGOs are an important actor in the planning and implementation of LPP 
projects. The NGOs in the research municipalities prefer working in areas that are 
located near Sucre and that are relatively well accessible. Looking at the relation between 
the presence of NGOs and the accessibility of the municipalities, it appears that indeed 
accessibility plays a role in the presence of NGOs, since Poroma, Huacareta and 
Monteagudo – all less accessible municipalities – have relatively fewer NGOs working 
within their boundaries. This does not explain, however, why few NGOs are working in 
Yotala, which is situated relatively close to the city of Sucre. Asked why they do not 
work in Yotala, NGOs mentioned that the local government of this municipality is not 
very open to NGOs. Yotala has a municipal council the councillors of which work in the 
city of Sucre. According to the NGOs, these councillors are therefore much more 
oriented towards the city of Sucre and not very concerned with development issues 
within their own municipality, or the role NGOs can play herein.  
Within municipalities, a similar bias can be observed, as in all research municipalities the 
number of NGOs working in well accessible OTBs is considerably higher than in OTBs 
that are less accessible (Table 7.3).  
 
 
Table 7.3  Average number of NGOs working in OTBs by accessibility of the OTBs, 1998-9 
 Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Yotala 0.9 0.8 
Poroma 1.3 0.7 
Sopachuy 1.4 1.3 
Presto 1.3 1.0 
Monteagudo 0.8 0.5 
Huacareta 0.8 0.3 
Source: Fieldwork 1998-9. 
 
 
The difference is relatively large in Poroma, and relatively small in Yotala and Sopachuy. 
This might be attributed to the fact that Poroma is by far the least accessible 
municipality, as it is a very large municipality, with very few roads and tracks. In 
contrast, Yotala and Sopachuy are both relatively small and relatively well accessible 
municipalities.  
 
To conclude: the spatial context, discussed in this section in terms of accessibility, is a 
conditioning factor on the impact of decentralisation on local governance and local 
development.  With respect to the issues of participation and accountability, differences 
in accessibility explain variations in the knowledge of OTBs on several aspects of the 
LPP and the assistance to municipal meetings, and the presence of NGOs. Moreover, it 
was shown that the number of projects in less accessible OTBs, and the investments 
involved, is relatively less than in well accessible OTBs. This results in differences in 
development opportunities within municipalities. 
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7.2 The socio-economic context 
In this section we focus on the influence of the socio-economic context on local 
governance and local development opportunities, in particular population size, economic 
structure and the poverty level. The decentralisation model in Bolivia discerns only one 
criterion for the allocation of funds to the municipalities, namely the number of persons 
registered in the municipality according to the 1992 census. Such criteria as poverty, HDI 
or economic potential are not considered, and as such the Bolivian model offers only a 
few possibilities for redistribution between resource richer and resource poorer 
municipalities. In fact, it is often argued that the current criteria deepen existing 
differences, because larger and more prosperous municipalities are able to benefit more, 
through the higher amount of funds transferred.   
 
In Chapter 2 it was held that the size of a municipality is expected to influence the 
contribution of decentralisation to good governance, since smaller municipalities are 
expected to have a disadvantaged position with regard to the amount of funds available 
and the mobilisation of funds.2 When comparing the size of the six municipalities (in 
population number) with the size of the budget, there appears to be no relation between 
the two.  Table 7.4 presents the implemented budget per capita in US$ in the period 
1995-9. The table shows that there is hardly any relation between the population size of 
the municipality and its budget size. Monteagudo, which is by far the largest of the six 
municipalities, had the largest budget in only three of the six years.    
 
 
Table 7.4  Municipal budget per capita in US $ 1995-2000 
 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000ª 
Yotala  50  31  102    75    76  112 
Poroma 30  59  112  111  150  119 
Sopachuy 20  64  142  119  113  119 
Presto 34  60  177    76    92  162 
Monteagudo 81  48    87  145  158    87 
Huacareta 56  45    79    69    69  103 
Source:  Financial records 1995-9 and POAs 2000 municipalities. 
 ª = programmed  
 
 
An explanation for this lack of correspondence between population size and budget size 
is that even though the larger municipalities in the study area (i.e. Monteagudo and to a 
lesser extent Poroma) receive more money from the central government and generate 
more own, local resources, the share of external funds is much more important for the 
budget size. In Chapter 6 it was shown that the share of own resources was the largest in 
Monteagudo, Yotala and – to a lesser extent – Huacareta. This points to the assumption 
that the capacity to generate own resources depends much more on the economic 
structure, the existing tax base, than on the size of the total population.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 6, the base for tax raising is small in most rural municipalities, as a 
tax system is lacking and taxes on rural property are not levied. This implies that the 
raised taxes stem from non-agricultural activities, such as urban property and the retail 
trade. Both Monteagudo and Yotala have a relatively diversified economic structure. 
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Agriculture forms a less important source of income here, and the share of retail, industry 
and services is considerably higher than in the other four municipalities. Both 
municipalities levy taxes on economic activities. Examples of such taxes are those on 
bakeries, market places, ambulant vendors and the processing of agricultural products, 
such as chicha, leather and meat. The taxes are raised on the basis of an annually updated 
inventory of contributors. The criteria for selecting contributors are discussed in the 
municipal council and are subject to change. An example of this is the discussion at the 
meeting of the municipal council of Monteagudo in the spring of 1997 on whether the 
(mainly female) vendors of bread who do not bake should also be subject to taxes. After 
a heated 30-minute discussion, and despite a representative of the street-vending bakers 
explaining the precarious financial position of the mainly female-headed households, it 
was decided that these women should pay tax.  
Also, the economic structure has an impact on the occurrence of a multiplier effect. A 
more diversified economic structure in rural areas might impact positively on the 
multiplier effect. The analysis of the multiplier effect in the construction industry in 
Chapter 6 showed that this effect is highest in Monteagudo and Yotala, which also have 
the highest number of contractors.  
 
A last aspect worth mentioning is the relation between the poverty level of municipalities 
and the type of investments. Within the sample of research municipalities, there are some 
variations with respect to the level of poverty. Yotala, Poroma, Sopachuy and Presto can 
be characterised as the poorest municipalities in the sample (with index-figures for 
Human Development (HDI) of respectively 0,328, 0.317, 0.276 and 0.270), and 
Monteagudo, and Huacareta as the, relatively, richer municipalities (with index-figures 
for Human Development (HDI) of 0.387 and 0.337).  
An analysis of the type of investments in relation to the poverty level in these 
municipalities shows that there are no large differences between the poorer municipalities 
and the richer municipalities (Appendix III:Table III.7-Table III.12). This lack of 
correspondence can be attributed to the fact that all municipalities in the sample are faced 
with the same constraints: deficient facilities in health- and education services and 
deficient road infrastructure.  
7.3 The institutional context 
This section explores the conditioning role of the institutional context in the contribution 
of decentralisation to local governance and local development. The institutional context 
in the six municipalities changed after the implementation of the LPP, since new actors 
emerged and the role of others changed. Within the institutional context there are several 
actors, each of which has a different influence on decentralisation, local governance and 
local development.   
7.3.1 The number and type of OTBs 
Several authors assume a relation between the number of OTBs within a municipality 
and the impact of decentralisation on governance in terms of participation, 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness (see also Rowland 2001). This assumption is 
based on the fact that the participation of fewer groups in local decision-making is easier 
than in cases where there are many groups. The number of OTBs does impact on the way 
participatory planning is organised. As we saw in Chapter 5, Monteagudo and Poroma – 
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municipalities with a relatively high number of OTBs – tend to deconcentrate municipal 
planning by using districts. Each of these districts is assigned a proportion of the total 
budget and the OTBs within these districts have to divide this. Within the other 
municipalities, there is no such intermediate level and planning is done at the municipal 
level. The number of OTBs in this way affects the applied planning methodology.  
The number of OTBs in a municipality has also an impact on local development, since a 
large number of OTBs can result in the extreme dispersion of funds. Table 7.5 shows the 
number of OTBs in the municipalities and the average size per project per OTB in the 
period 1995-9. The table shows that there is a slight relation between the number of 
OTBs and the average size of project per OTB, with a relatively high number of OTBs 
resulting in a larger dispersion of funds. In Monteagudo, however, which has the highest 
number of OTBs, the average size of project per OTB is considerably higher than in the 
other two municipalities with relatively many OTBs, Poroma and Yotala. This can be 
explained by the fact that the local government of Monteagudo attempts to concentrate 
on larger projects that benefit more than one particular OTB.   
 
 
Table 7.5  Number of OTBs and average size of project in US$, 1995-9 
 Nº. of OTBs Absolute number of 
projects 
Average size projects per 
OTB in US$ 
Yotala 52 176   91 
Poroma 79 205   69 
Sopachuy 23 167 338 
Presto 27 252 277 
Monteagudo 80 416 155 
Huacareta 29 177 252 
Source: Implementation reports municipalities 1995-9. 
 
 
It is also worth paying attention to the relation between the type of OTB and the impact 
of decentralisation on participation and equity. The findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
showed that peasant communities are by far the best organised OTBs: attendance at 
communal meetings is higher than in the two other types. However, the neighbourhood 
organisations – being well accessible OTBs - are better informed thanks to their relative 
proximity to local government. This corresponds with the findings of Blanes (2000, p. 
66) who points out that, generally, training on the LPP takes place in the village of the 
municipality, benefiting mainly the leaders of those OTBs that are located near the 
village.  Despite these observations, there appears to be hardly any relation between the 
type of OTB and the impact of decentralisation on local governance and local 
development. As was shown in Chapter 6, investments are relatively even distributed – in 
proportion to the population – between peasant communities and neighbourhood 
organisations.   
7.3.2 The local government  
Several studies have shown that the capacity of local government, in terms of the number 
of employees and of professional experience, determines the success of local 
governments in generating local development opportunities, through policy making, the 
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acquisition of external funds and the success in project implementation. In addition to 
paying attention to capacity, we will also address the role of politics at the local level.  
 
Capacity of local government  
The capacity of local government – comprising the mayor, municipal council and civil 
servants – affects the implementation of projects and the mobilisation of funds. When the 
LPP was implemented, the overall administrative capacity of the research municipalities 
was low. In fact, the municipalities – particularly the smaller ones – had to start from 
scratch. The lack of capacity can be observed in several fields, to start with the 
administrative infrastructure.  
All municipalities except Monteagudo lacked a municipal infrastructure, such as 
appropriate housing, communication media and modern administration systems. The fact 
that Monteagudo has a rather large urban centre meant that its local government also 
performed some tasks before 1994, and as such established some infrastructure. In the 
other municipalities, however, the municipal infrastructure was limited to an adobe 
building and sometimes a typewriter. As soon as the municipalities received funds from 
the LPP, they started to upgrade their infrastructure. In Huacareta and Presto, in 1995 a 
new town hall was constructed, while the other municipalities renovated their existing 
buildings. Communication was also improved, by installing phone lines (in Yotala) and a 
fax. In the municipalities of Poroma, Presto, Sopachuy and Huacareta, the local 
government does not have its own phone line. Here, local government uses the cabina in 
town, an ENTEL office. In 1997, all municipalities but Poroma had personal computers. 
In Huacareta, the PC could only be used in the evening, since the generator is turned on 
between 6 and 10 p.m. only. The municipality of Poroma is a special case, since the 
village of Poroma does not have electricity, meaning that it is not possible to use a 
computer. This, and the poor accessibility of the village, led to the establishment of an 
office on the outskirts of Sucre.     
A second field in which the capacity of the municipalities is expressed is that of 
human resources, i.e. civil servants. Except Monteagudo, not one of the research 
municipalities had, besides a mayor, additional staff. Local governments started hiring 
the head of the administrative departments of the local governments (the oficial mayor), 
charged with overall administrative management, such as accountability systems, the 
application of the Ley Safco3, issues concerning contracting of projects, etc. However, 
administrative capacity building within local governments is seriously hindered by lack 
of funds, since governments are not allowed to use more than 15% of the funds stemming 
from the LPP to cover functional costs. By mid-1998, investments stemming from other 
funds were conditioned, too. This was most evident in Monteagudo, where prior to 1998 
a large proportion of the staff was paid for with other funds. Due to the new conditions 
imposed on municipal spending, the municipal staff was reduced by almost 50%. To 
increase the capacity of local governments within the legal framework, municipalities 
employ various strategies. One such strategy is to hire professionals for a relatively short 
period to perform a specific activity. This is common practice in all municipalities in the 
study area, and is reflected in the composition of municipal staff. Although an increase 
can be observed in the absolute number of employees, the total number of person hours 
per month remains the same. This is mostly found with activities aimed at accountability 
(e.g. working on the balances in the last months of the year) and specific technical 
activities (e.g. hiring an architect to design a project).  
Another strategy is to contract an expert to fulfil the function of oficial mayor. This 
was done by the municipality of Poroma, which contracted the former oficial mayor of 
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the city of Sucre, a man who had gained ample experience with the acquisition of funds. 
As a result, implementation figures and the acquisition of external funds increased.    
 
Besides municipal staff, the characteristics of the mayor and the municipal council are 
also thought to have an impact on the performance of a local government. In Chapter 4 it 
was assumed that a directly elected peasant mayor in a municipality that is predominantly 
rural would be positive for the participation of the population in local decision-making. 
However, in other fields – such as the mobilisation of funds and the overall planning and 
implementation of projects – it was supposed to be negative.  
Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with the presence of peasant mayors as opposed to professional 
urban mayors. We observed that the former experience a number of difficulties, such as 
lack of knowledge of administrative affairs and acquiring funds. To what extent do these 
difficulties limit the performance of these mayors, and thus local government? Figure 6.2 
presented the implementation ratio of the six research municipalities in the period 1995-
9. In Sopachuy there was a directly elected peasant mayor in 1996-8, and Poroma had a 
peasant mayor during the period 1997-8. Both municipalities experienced a decrease in 
the implementation of the programmed budget in those years, in Sopachuy in 1996 and in 
Poroma in 1997-8. In interviews with the peasant mayor in Sopachuy it appeared that 
ever since he had taken office, the municipal council had obstructed policy 
implementation. He was also confronted with his inability to manage the alcaldía. As a 
result, he simply did not dare to implement projects or to take decisions, since he was 
afraid he would make the wrong decision. As a result, implementation paralysed and the 
mayor was criticised for his wavering style of management. The mayor in Poroma 
explained the decrease in the implementation of the programmed budget by his lack of 
experience in overall management, and his deficient knowledge of Spanish. It took him 
much time to understand procedures.  
It was also observed that local governments with a representation of peasants are 
perceived – by the leaders of the peasant communities in these municipalities - as being 
more susceptible to the specific problems rural households are faced with. Asked for the 
relationship with the local government in this period, 54% of the leaders of the peasant 
communities in Poroma and 61% of those in Sopachuy mentioned in particular the rural 
background of the mayor, and his knowledge of agriculture, an advantage of having a 
peasant mayor, as is illustrated by the following quote of the leader of a OTB in Poroma. 
 
‘The former mayor was a lawyer, and didn’t know anything about agriculture. Last year, 
we didn’t have enough seed for potatoes, a consequence of the drought of the year 
before. We went to the mayor to ask him whether the alcaldía could support us with seed. 
He refused, because of the lack of funds, and because we hadn’t asked it before the 
annual plan was prepared. This year, the same happened, but the new mayor, he is a 
campesino too, directly took action. He called an NGO, and they will provide us with 
seed.’  
  
A last issue that can influence the implementation of the planned budget is the stability of 
the local government. It was observed before that most municipalities undergo frequent 
changes of government. However, since all municipalities are affected by this 
phenomenon, it is difficult to measure its impact on local governance and local 
development for each municipality. Nevertheless, some general remarks on the impact of 
this phenomenon can be made. First, the frequent change of mayors often leads to a 
change of municipal staff. This means a loss of expertise and knowledge, since many 
mayors and municipal employees will have received training on specific tasks. Secondly, 
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the change of mayors leads to a situation wherein his successor wants to leave his own 
mark on local management. Decisions are cancelled and planned projects are abandoned 
and replaced by others. However, the impact of the frequent changes of government 
should not be exaggerated: the maximum authority of local government is the municipal 
council, and generally this body remains intact. Moreover, some municipalities employ 
an increasingly technocratic way of management, and abandon the partisan way of 
governing. In the next subsection, we will discuss this issue in more detail.  
 
The role of politics 
The implementation of the LPP resulted in a revaluation of the local level by political 
parties. Before 1994, political parties were hardly interested in marginal areas, because of 
the lack of a population entitled to vote and the limited amount of power and funds at this 
level. Since 1994, increased funds and power assigned to local governments augmented 
the attractiveness of local level politics for political parties. Calla (2000, p. 87) points 
towards the same trend by stating that: ‘the political party that once had a barely 
perceivable presence in rural areas, and then only during electoral periods, now has 
become a daily reality at the local level.’ 
It was held that the number of voters has increased since the implementation of the 
LPP. It was also observed that the political background of the local governments is rather 
heterogeneous in all municipalities. Here, we present an analysis of the role of politics in 
local governance and local development, first by examining the way elections are 
organised and the reasons to do it this way, and by looking at the influence of the 
political composition of local government on local governance and local development.  
 
Although some Bolivian political parties are discussing ‘democratisation’ and fair play, 
practice shows that during election campaigns these principles are discarded. All political 
parties admit that votes are bought by exchanging them either for gifts or a position in the 
public sector. Generally, this way of acquiring votes is considered the most effective way 
to win an election. At the national level, the buying of votes is achieved by distributing 
flowers in the streets of La Paz or the implementation of (small) public works.   
In the six research municipalities, politics before 1994 generally remained limited to 
the urban sphere. Nowadays, the rural areas are fully integrated into and part of the 
election campaigns, for local as well as national elections. In these campaigns, neither 
pain nor expenses are spared to acquire votes, as illustrated in Box 7.2.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7.2  The buying of votes 
An interesting example of the strategy of buying votes is what happened in Huacareta. The MNR hoped 
to win the election of 1997, an apparently difficult task since Sánchez de Lozada was not to be re-
elected. The mayor of Huacareta – an MNR militant through and through – was in a precarious situation 
at the time, because he had been accused of fraud. He was aware that a new government of the 
opposition would make his position impossible, and decided to acquire as many votes as possible. Two 
weeks before the elections, he provided a number of recently created pueblos indígenas without most 
basic services with a fence to prevent the livestock from escaping. He also provided the households 
with identity cards, which are a prerequisite for being able to vote. Early in the morning on election day, 
a truck picked up the voters from the rural communities and took them to the village of Huacareta, 
where they were provided with beer and food. After voting, the group waited in the square for the truck 
to take them back to their community. However, in the afternoon, radios announced the dramatic loss of 
the MNR. The mayor was furious and refused to take the voters back to their communities, so they had 
to walk. Then, two days later, a technician from the alcaldia came and removed the fence.  
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Election campaigns are paid for by the parties, although the largest ones do receive a 
contribution from the central government. In rural areas, often the one who has the most 
money rules: ‘el que tiene la plata manda’. This explains also the important role of 
traditional elites in Monteagudo and Huacareta.      
It is interesting to analyse whether the composition of the municipal council, including 
the mayor, influences the performance of local government. Table 7.6 shows the 
composition of the local government in each of the six research municipalities after the 
December 1995 elections.  
 
 
Table 7.6  Composition of local government by political party, January 1996 – December 1999 
 Mayor Council 
Yotala MNR 2 MBL; 1 MIR; 1 ADN 
Poroma MBL 1 MBL; 1 ADN; 1 MNR; 1 Eje 
Sopachuy MBL 2 MBL; 1 MNR; 1 MIR 
Presto MBL 1 MBL; 2 MNR; 1 MIR 
Monteagudo ADN 1 ADN; 2 MNR; 1 UCS 
Huacareta MNR 1 MBL; 3 MNR 
Source: Fieldwork 1997-9. 
 
 
The table shows that in the period January 1996-December 1999, all municipalities 
except Huacareta had a municipal council in which various political parties were 
represented. When using this information as a basis for further analysis, it should be kept 
in mind that at the MBL and MNR were in charge at the national and departmental level 
until June 1997.  
With respect to the character of the relation between the mayor and the municipal 
council, only in Huacareta this relation can be characterised as rather fluid, with both the 
mayor and the council being part of the national government. In Sopachuy, on paper 
there seems to be a pretty harmonious relation. In practice, however, conflicts are also 
present within the MBL. The other urban MBL militants found it hard to accept that a 
peasant had been directly elected, also because they were convinced that he had too little 
capacity to perform this job. Instead of supporting him, they did everything to obstruct 
him. In Poroma and Presto, in contrast, this relation might be characterised as being 
conflictive, resulting in various changes of the mayor. In Monteagudo, there are some 
conflicts, especially between the ADN and the MNR, but as one of the councillors 
pointed out: ‘We’re used to it. We’ve known each other for years, and although there are 
some differences, we’d never permit escalation’. Finally, in Yotala, the relation between 
the mayor and the municipal council could be characterised as fairly good, despite the 
differences in political background of the members of local government. 
 
A multi-party local government is assumed to have a positive effect on the accountability 
of local government. As shown in Chapter 5, it did, however, also result in frequent 
changes of mayors, hence instability of government.   
Fraud should be mentioned in this respect. A mayor of a small municipality does not 
earn much, and since he has the authority to do whatever he wants and control 
mechanisms were lacking in the early years, fraud is often used to increase the income. 
Mayors of Poroma, Presto, Yotala and Huacareta are an example. Although these cases 
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of fraud are taken to court, trials generally take a lot of time so the ex-mayors continue to 
be on the councils.   
Another explanation for the instability is the increased intervention of political parties at 
the local level. Since 1994, national political agendas have tended to dominate local 
affairs. This is illustrated by the fact that the results of the national elections in 1997, 
which took the ADN-MIR government to power, led to changes in the predominantly 
MNR-MBL local governments in the period 1997-9 (Chapter 5). According to Ayo 
(1999: 131) the main instrument used for this is the application of the voto de censura, 
through which mayors can be removed. Mayors in the research municipalities who had 
been removed said that this instrument was often used at the instigation of political 
parties at the central level.  
 Local governments also attempt to secure access to funds through supporting higher 
government levels and affiliating themselves to the parties that are in government. The 
ex-MBL-mayor of Sopachuy is an example in case. He remarked that his main motive for 
joining the ADN in 1998 was the threat of being marginalised in terms of access to 
national funds and governmental support programmes.   A third factor contributing to 
instability is that many municipal councils make an internal deal by giving each 
councillor a certain period as mayor. In this way, everyone can obtain the maximum 
benefits of the office, varying from US$ 250 to US$ 700 per month. The opportunities 
for such agreements were limited by the 1999 Law on Municipalities, in which it is 
defined that, in case of a change of mayor, the council that acquired most votes should 
choose the mayor.   
7.3.3 Intra-governmental relations  
With the implementation of the LDA, the subnational government – represented by the 
prefectura, the subprefectura and the corregimiento (the provincial and cantonal 
representatives of government) – is supposed to perform a facilitating role with respect to 
the process of popular participation and local policy implementation. We observed in 
Chapter 2 that UFIs (Units for Institutional Strengthening) were created at the 
departmental level in the first year of the LPP (i.e. 1994/5), in order to inform local 
governments and OTBs about the LPP and its consequences. After the Law on 
Administrative Decentralisation came into effect, the UFIs were dismantled and their 
responsibilities were taken over by the departmental Units for Municipal Strengthening 
(UFMs). The UFM in Chuquisaca was rather small, comprising three technicians. The 
Unit supported municipalities in planning and administrative affairs and trained leaders 
and members of the OTBs in the formulation of demands and priority setting. In the 
period 1996-7, the employees of this unit displayed a rather high commitment. 
Municipalities were content with the support offered. This might also be explained by the 
political relations between the departmental level and the political colour of local 
governments which both were related to the MNR/MBL.  In the summer of 1997, when it 
became clear that the MNR had lost the elections, this relatively fluid collaboration 
between the departmental and local level disappeared. Employees started to look for 
other jobs, offices were dismantled, and activities ceased. The new departmental 
government consists of many parties, with the ADN and the MIR sharing the most 
important posts. However, because of frequent conflicts, activities remained paralysed.  
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The director of the Unit for Strengthening of Communities remarked: 
 
‘I’ve worked with this department for four months, and it’s a chaos. We’ve already had 
two different directors. The current one is from the ADN, and we’re all MIR. Each time I 
propose a project, it’s rejected. There’s no continuity; we can’t make any progress. The 
departmental directors change every month, and each one want to do his own thing. In 
the meantime, we sit here twiddling our thumbs.’4  
 
Another problem is that new employees had hardly any knowledge about the LPP, 
participatory planning or administrative issues.  
The politicised environment of the prefecturas impacted the municipalities in several 
ways. First, the municipalities perceived a reduction in the support of the departmental 
level. Secondly, the few projects that were implemented favoured ADN/MIR local 
governments. Requests for support from opposition municipalities were denied. In this 
respect, local governments point to the conditioned support of the prefectura. This is also 
confirmed by interviews with representatives of the departmental government. 
Municipalities ruled by the opposition parties, such as MNR and MBL, suffer much 
delay in the transfer of funds of the prefectura, which is reflected in the balances of the 
prefectura. In 1998, the 11 MBL-MNR municipalities received the funds only in 
November, whilst the ADN-MIR municipalities had the money in their bank accounts by 
February. This is confirmed by employees of the prefectura, who state that it is common 
to manipulate departmental support to the detriment of opposition municipalities, with 
respect not only to the transfer of funds, but also to other activities, such as the 
programme for municipal strengthening and training of municipal employees: 
 
 ‘… although not official policy, in practice requests from ADN-MIR municipalities for 
support have priority over those from MNR-MBL municipalities.’5  
   
7.3.4 The power structure 
We explained in Chapters 3 and 4 that the land reform in 1953 impacted heavily on the 
traditional power structures in rural Bolivia. Before 1953, the hacendados, the large 
landowners, constituted the most powerful group, since they owned the land. The land 
reform of 1953 resulted in some areas in a redistribution of land in favour of the formerly 
serfs. In other areas, however, the impact was much less. Within the study area, this 
differentiated impact can also be observed, between the higher zone and the valleys, on 
the one hand, and the subtropical lowlands, on the other.  
In the higher zone and the valleys, where the municipalities of Poroma, Yotala, 
Sopachuy and Presto are located, a considerable amount of land was redistributed. As a 
result, the position of the large landowners was weakened and the power was placed in 
the hands of the peasant unions. Within these four municipalities, some differences can 
be observed with respect to the relation between the impact of the land reform of 1953 
and the actual power structure. In Yotala, there still are a few large landowners. 
However, they hardly interfere in local affairs, and as such occupy a minor position in the 
current power structure. Much more important in Yotala’s actual local power structure is 
the increasing proportion of the urban population that works in the city of Sucre. This 
group is mainly oriented towards the city of Sucre, and as such is not very much 
interested in the rural areas of this municipality. In Poroma, two power groups function 
side by side. On the one hand, there is a group of former large landowners, which became 
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impoverished after the land reform, but continued to exercise considerable power. 
Members of these families fulfilled the functions of mayor and sub-prefect. With the 
implementation of the LPP in 1994, a second power group emerged, consisting mainly of 
urban-based professionals. From time to time, severe conflicts occur between these 
groups, resulting in accusations of fraud and the establishment of two local governments 
in January 1996 (Correo del Sur, 21-01-96). In Presto, a somewhat similar situation can 
be observed, with several groups striving for power. However, the position of the 
population is somewhat different here, since the peasant unions, the present OTBs, have 
more power. In Sopachuy, there is a group of more powerful, urban and rural families 
that previously dominated public affairs. After the implementation of the LPP, however, 
rural population gradually took control. This was supported by a strong syndical 
organisation that mobilised peasants with the support of NGOs. In fact, in these four 
municipalities, traditional elites were not able to maintain their power position, also 
because they were fragmented due to internal conflicts. New actors emerged in the 
context of the LPP, in which the distinction between urban and rural groups gained in 
importance.  
As a consequence the implementation of decentralisation had a positive impact on the 
participation of the traditional excluded groups in local decision-making, in particular the 
peasant population. Moreover, the LPP had a positive effect on the access to 
development opportunities of the peasant communities. In Chapter 6 it was shown that 
the LPP resulted in an even distribution of investments between the peasant communities 
and the neighbourhood organisations.    
 
In the subtropical lowlands, where there is less pressure on land, there was no land 
reform and the landed elites kept their power. Healy (1983) distinguishes two groups of 
elites in the province of Hernando Siles, which consists of the research municipalities of 
Monteagudo and Huacareta: caciques (urban-based elites) and patrones or hacendados. 
Healy defines caciques as a group of elites with an identical way of dominating: 
informal, autocratic, personalistic and arbitrary (Healy 1983, p. 251). He observes that 
the phenomenon of caciquismo in the province of Hernando Siles emerged in the 1960s, 
when a small group of people took control of all public affairs. This was possible because 
of the economic changes, referred to by Healy as ‘modernisation in this pole of 
development’, including the opening up of roads, the establishment of a provincial entity 
of the CORDECH in Monteagudo and the establishment of various small enterprises. 
Healy’s study reveals how this small group occupied the most important functions of 
mayor, sub-prefect, police commander, director of the local cooperative, tax collector, 
president of the Civic Committee and head of the CORDECH entity. This group not only 
accumulated power, but also controlled all public affairs, hereby accumulating wealth. 
Whereas the caciques were in control of the main urban affairs, the patrones controlled 
the rural areas of the province. Healy (1930, p. 103) estimates that in the 1970s, a group 
of 15 hacendados (1% of the rural population of the province) owned 32% of the land. 
The dominant mode of production was that of the hacienda, with Guaraní people 
working the land, often without remuneration and within a system that stimulated 
indebtedness. By effectively limiting access to education, the Guaraní remained subdued. 
With the implementation of the LPP, traditional elites in Monteagudo and Huacareta – 
the caciques and hacendados – not only maintained their position but were even able to 
strengthen it. In Monteagudo this is expressed in the composition of local government, 
that consists purely of the traditional caciques and their descendants.  Someone from the 
old caciques also occupied the post of sub-prefect in the period 1993-7. After the national 
elections in 1997, he was succeeded by another cacique.6  
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In Huacareta the hacendados continue to dominate local government. Since the 
implementation of the LPP, the local government has consisted of hacendados, with one 
of them holding the office of mayor. Another interesting feature is that in Huacareta, the 
hacendados very quickly adopted the LPP by registering their property, including the 
Guaraní people who work on it, as an OTB, thus securing access to resources and 
projects. This was made possible through the firm relationships between the hacendados. 
This resulted in projects that favoured particular communities, such as the community of 
Añimbo in Huacareta (Box 7.3). 
 
Often, the other communities are not able to change this situation, since they depend on 
these families for their income. Also, the recently established indigenous Guaraní 
communities are weakly organised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings correspond with other empirical evidence. Booth et al. (1998) point out 
that in Moxos (in the department of Bení) ‘the alcaldía and the municipal council 
remained firmly in the hands of the whites and mestizos of the town, …with a strong 
representation of ranching interests’. Calla (2000: 86) observes the same process: 
 
‘... [the LPP] boosted the position of sectors of the local vecino-mestizo elites who were – 
directly or indirectly – associated with the regime of haciendas and latifundios and 
traditionally adverse to the Indian-peasant masses. ... this new-found strength derives 
from the co-participation resources which the state channels to the sectional 
municipalities. These resources have allowed the vecino-mestizo to resurface and form a 
new nucleus of political, economic and social hegemony at the local level.’ 
 
Thus, in the subtropical lowlands the impact of decentralisation on local governance and 
local development is much more obstructed by the prevalent power structure. As a 
consequence, the formerly excluded groups face many problems in participating in local 
decision-making, through being elected or through the OTBs, and in expressing their 
demands to local governments. The influence of the power structure on local 
development is more difficult to assess. In Monteagudo, where urban caciques dominate 
Box 7.3  The mechanisms of traditional power structure in Huacareta 
The peasant OTB of Añimbo is an excellent example of the adoption of the LPP by the 
powerful hacendados, The community is situated in the south-western part of the municipality 
of Huacareta, on a four hours drive (in the dry season) from the town of Huacareta. The 
community counts 120 inhabitants, most of them living in the small village. Añimbo is also 
the home of the Garcia family, traditionally hacendados, owning cattle and cultivating maize 
on various hacienda-like properties. The three sons all occupy positions in the local 
institutions: son Marco is a member of the municipal council, son Roberto is member of the 
Comité de Vigilancia, and son Alejandro is in charge of the function of agente municipal. 
Uncle Román owns one of the largest properties in the province. His son, nephew Miguel, is 
deputy in La Paz for the political party Movimiento Nacional Revolucionário. This network of 
relatives seems to be very important for the acquisition of projects, as since 1994 Añimbo was 
endowed with no less then eight projects; an impressive amount compared to other 
communities. 
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local government, there are no signs of using a position in local government to obtain 
direct personal benefits, through projects. In Huacareta, there are a few examples of the 
abuse of public local funds for the personal benefit of large landowners, such as the case 
of Añimbo. However, the lack of hard evidence makes it impossible to draw any 
conclusions on this aspect.   
7.3.5 Non-governmental organisations   
Before 1994, the activities of NGOs were mainly directed at an increase of the 
agricultural production, such as small irrigation projects and horticulture, often with a 
training component. A characteristic feature of NGOs was their independent position: the 
funds they depended on came largely from international donors, completed with support 
from one of the three national funds, the FIS, FDC and FNDR.  
After the implementation of the LPP in 1994, the emphasis on agriculture continued, 
but more and more NGOs paid attention to informing the communities, now OTBs, on 
their rights and obligations under the LPP, with an emphasis on awareness raising. More 
important was the change in the access to the national funds: the LPP forced NGOs to 
cooperate with the new local governments in the requests for financial support.  
Thus, the relation between the OTBs and NGOs changed. When asked about the main 
results of the LPP, the leaders of OTBs in the sample mentioned that they now have a 
stronger position in negotiations with NGOs on the type of projects that are implemented. 
Before 1994, the population was more dependent on the supply, that is, the projects 
offered by the NGOs, since this was often the only access to projects. With the LPP, they 
are in a position to select the projects that correspond with their demands.  
The presence of NGOs can have a positive impact on both local governance and local 
development, since the activities of NGOs facilitate the implementation of investments 
though institutional strengthening and training focused on the LPP. This might have a 
positive impact on the ability of the population to participate in local decision-making. 
The presence of NGOs may also lead to an increase of the municipal budget, since NGOs 
have to cooperate with municipalities in order to access one of the national funds.  
With respect to institutional strengthening, NGOs play an important role in the 
training of OTBs on the contents of the LPP. The impact of this kind of NGO support 
differs between the research communities, since the number of NGOs varies among 
them. Moreover, as noted before, NGO activities do not cover all OTBs in the 
municipalities, with well accessible OTBs being favoured more. The working area within 
the municipality hardly changed due to the LPP, since NGOs continue to work in OTBs 
where they already worked before the implementation of the LPP. Thus, although 
activities of NGOs changed, the main target groups remained the same, with well 
accessible OTBs having an advantage.  
The differences in presence of NGOs result in a differentiated impact of decentralisation. 
Firstly, we already noted before that the presence of NGOs has a positive impact on the 
budget of municipalities and the implementation of projects: municipalities with a 
relatively high number of NGOs are more successful in implementing the planned 
budget. These findings correspond with that of Kohl (1999), who shows in his study on 
economic and political restructuring in Bolivia that the short-term success of 
participatory planning is strongly related to who elaborated the Municipal Development 
Plan. The planning process in municipalities that were served by NGOs had a higher 
level of citizen participation and a higher degree of citizen involvement than the planning 
process in municipalities that had a strategy developed by a consultant with little 
previous experience in the municipalities.  
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Secondly, the presence of NGOs contributes to institutional strengthening, thus 
stimulating participation.   
Besides these positive impacts, there are also two bottlenecks. First, there is the risk that 
NGOs assume the role of local government in municipalities where this government is 
relatively weak.  
 
Kohl points in this respect to the importance of the LPP for the legitimacy of NGOs: 
 
‘In all cases, the higher level of citizen participation was related to the fact that NGOs 
with political, as well as social, projects used the planning exercise to further their own 
agendas.’ (1999, p. 151) 
 
In municipalities with a relatively weak local government, NGOs can strengthen the 
dependent position of local governments. This happened particularly in the first years 
after the implementation of the LPP. NGOs considered the local governments very weak, 
in particular as regards their experience with local planning and project implementation. 
An example of a paternalistic relationship between an NGO and weak local government 
is that between ACLO and the local government in Presto (Box 7.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7.4  The relation between local government and NGOs: the example of ACLO in Presto 
An example of the uneven, paternalistic relation between NGOs and local governments can be 
found in Presto, where ACLO is active. ACLO had been operating in Presto since 1983, first in 
only one community, but later gradually extending its activities to 20 communities. 
Traditionally, ACLO activities in Presto were directed at improving agricultural production. In 
the 1990s, this was extended to soil management, and a gender component was incorporated 
into the programme. In the first year after the LPP, there were no spectacular changes in the 
relation with the municipality; ACLO continued its activities as before. In December 1995, 
municipal elections were held, which resulted in Presto in an alcalde campesino, affiliated to the 
MBL. This corresponded more with ACLO ideology, because the organisation has its roots in 
the Jesuit community, but is nowadays strongly related to the MBL (the subsequent directors 
were also MBL affiliates). The former mayor had been someone from the town of Presto and 
was affiliated to the MNR.  
After the new mayor was installed, ACLO started to interfere in local decision-making, 
despite the lack of a formal agreement with the municipality: there was only a declaration that 
the municipality sanctions the presence of ACLO in its territory. In 1995, this resulted in ACLO 
being selected to formulate the Municipal Development Plan. ACLO also established a new 
Comité de Vigilancia, as it thought that the old Comité was not functioning properly. ACLO 
was always present at council meetings and gave advice to members. In this way, it 
administered the whole municipality and denied access to other organisations, resulting in a 
conflict of interests. In 1998, however, the situation changed completely. The office of ACLO 
on the main square was closed, the crew was reduced and collaboration with the local 
government – in the form of regular meetings and informal talks – stopped. Although it would 
seem that this change was brought about by a changeover from a left-wing (MBL) to a right-
wing (ADN) mayor, ACLO denies any coincidence.  
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A second potential bottleneck is the lack of coordination between the different NGOs. 
The number of NGOs in Chuquisaca increased considerably the last few years. The main 
difference with the older NGOs is that the new ones are dedicated primarily at the 
activities directly derived from the LPP, such as the elaboration of the municipal 
planning strategies and training municipal staff in administrative issues. Part of this 
increase in NGOs can be attributed to the change of national – and thus departmental – 
government in 1997. Many MNR/MBL militants, who worked at the departmental office 
for Municipal Strengthening during the period 1994-7, were aware of the demand for 
their expertise and decided to start an own consultancy, under the denominator of NGO. 
The increase of NGOs and the fragmentation of activities led to a lack of coordination 
regarding interventions and the working area, resulting in an overlap of activities and 
inefficient use of scarce financial resources. Although many NGOs complain about this 
development, up to now few attempts have been made by them to solve the problem. In 
some municipalities it is tried to combine forces by creating a coordinating committee 
consisting of various private and public municipal actors. An example of such a 
committee was established in Sopachuy by SNV (the Dutch development organisation) 
in collaboration with all the other NGOs in the area. However, the achievements of this 
committee have been limited, partly because the local government (both the mayor and 
the council) was not interested in consulting the NGOs and partly because the NGOs 
were not very cooperative. They refuse to be open about their affairs – such as their 
financial position and implementation figures – and do not want to limit themselves to 
jointly determined intervention lines.  
7.3.6 The private sector 
The private sector can play a role in local development, by actively becoming involved in 
local planning and project implementation, and as such stimulating the increase of 
employment and income. As detailed in Chapter 4, the characteristics of the private 
sector differ very much from municipality to municipality. In the municipalities of 
Poroma and Presto, the entrepreneurial sector is limited to a few retail shops. The other 
municipalities, and particularly Monteagudo, offer a more differentiated picture.  
So far, the role of the private sector in local decision-making is very limited, due to 
the lack of communication with the local government. Although representatives of the 
private sector, particularly in Monteagudo, expressed the wish to be involved in planning, 
they do not have a formal role in local-decision making in the context of the LPP, since 
they are not territorially organised. All the local governments in the research 
municipalities do not consider the private sector as a potential actor in achieving local 
development and refuse to incorporate this sector in negotiations. Another bottleneck is 
the lack of organisation of the private sector. It concerns mainly small-scale 
entrepreneurs such as constructors, retailers and providers of services who, due to lack of 
tradition, are not associated.  
Some initiatives are aimed at making local governments more conscious of the 
potential to collaborate with the private sector, such as PADER (the Project for the 
Promotion of Rural Economic Development), a joint effort by the Swiss Development 
Corporation and the Bolivian Government. This project is active in two of the research 
municipalities (Sopachuy and Monteagudo) and intends to promote the economic 
development of rural municipalities, by using the concept of the município productivo, 
the ‘productive municipality’. Rather than emphasising the development potential of 
natural resources, population or economic structure, PADER focuses on the role of 
human resources in local development. Its activities aim to stimulate communication and 
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coordination between different actors, through the organisation of seminars and 
workshops and the implementation of small projects. In practice, however, also the 
PADER project is confronted with a poorly organised private sector and, as a result, the 
economic potential of non-agricultural activities and spatial factors appear to be more 
important criteria in the selection of pilot projects than the potential of human resources.7  
7.4 The factors conditioning the effects of decentralisation in the six research 
municipalities: conclusions 
This chapter dealt with the conditioning role of three categories of factors which 
influence the impact of decentralisation on local governance and local development. The 
analysis shows that the role of some factors appears to be less significant than one would 
expect from the review of literature. Other factors appear to be much more important.   
The spatial context has an important impact on the participation of the population, the 
presence of NGOs, the distribution of investments within the municipalities and the 
aspect of accountability within the municipalities. It was shown that leaders and members 
of relatively well accessible OTBs have more knowledge about the LPP and are more 
involved in participatory planning. Also, in well accessible OTBs, relatively more 
projects are implemented. In addition, accessibility impacts on the presence of NGOs, 
since NGOs tend to select municipalities and OTBs, which are well accessible. Lastly, 
accessibility influences the degree to which accountability can be exerted. This is easier 
in municipalities where OTBs are easily accessible and the members can meet frequently. 
Also, the supervision of projects in easily accessible OTBs is more convenient. A last 
factor is that information about the performance of local government with respect to 
investments is better in well accessible OTBs than in less accessible OTBs.      
We also analysed the impact of population size and the features of the economic 
structure of the municipalities on the performance of decentralisation. The impact of the 
size of the municipality on the size of the budget is relatively small, since there is hardly 
any relation with the capacity to generate own resources. It is much more the economic 
structure that impacts on the mobilisation of own resources, by offering a tax base for the 
mobilisation of funds. The degree of poverty, expressed in HDI, appears to have little 
impact on the type of investments made, since all research municipalities face more or 
less the same constraints.  
The role of the spatial and socio-economic context in the contribution of 
decentralisation to local governance and local development is differentiated and 
relatively small. Much more important is the institutional context of the municipalities, in 
particular the presence of NGOs, the power structure and the role of political parties. It 
was shown that the presence of NGOs is very important for the size of the budget, and is 
a determining factor in the successful implementation of the planned budget. The power 
structure conditions the access of the population to positions in local government and to 
participatory planning. The administrative capacity of all the research municipalities is 
relatively small. However, the municipalities handle different strategies to overcome this 
problem.   
 
The analysis in this chapter showed that, of the three contexts studied, the institutional 
context has the greatest influence on the impact of decentralisation on both local 
governance and local development. The spatial context might be classified as the second 
conditioning role, influencing in particular local governance, but also the issue of 
inequality within municipalities. The socio-economic context appeared to be the least 
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important, as this only affects the ability of municipalities to generate own resources, an 
element that is of minor importance in the total budget of the municipalities.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Well accessible OTBs are those that can be reached with motorised transport and within a three-hours 
walk from the municipal capital and less accessible OTBs are those that can not be reached with 
motorised transport or that are located at least a three hours walk from the municipal capital. See 
Appendix I for the classification of both types of OTBs in the research municipalities. 
2. In a study on the impact of the size of the municipality in Mexico and Bolivia, Rowland (2001) 
demonstrates that units of government that include small populations are more accountable than larger 
ones because people can – and do – have closer interactions with local government officials. On the 
other hand, smaller municipalities appear to face greater constraints under decentralisation because of 
limited local sources of finance. 
3. The Law 1178, or SAFCO (Sistema de Administracion Financiera y Control Gubernamental) of the 
system for financial administration and governmental control came into effect in 1990. This law 
establishes the norms for the planning and organisation of administrative and budgetary issues of 
governmental policy at all level (Medina and Galindo 1997, p.136).  
4. Interview with F. Sarabia, Director Fortalecimiento Comunitaria. 
5. Interview with F. Sarabia and L. Flores, Units for Communal and Municipal Strengthening. 
6. In 1999, the former sub-prefect was elected president of the Comité de Vigilancia in Monteagudo. 
7. Interview with E. Zelada, Director PADER-Chuquisaca. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has analysed the impact of decentralisation policy on local governance and 
local development, and the factors behind this impact. This final chapter has four 
purposes. Firstly, to summarise the background, objectives and approach of the study. 
Secondly, to present the main findings concerning the impact of decentralisation policy 
on local governance and local development in the Bolivian context. Thirdly, to put the 
findings in the context of the academic debate presented in Chapter 2, and to clarify what 
insights this study contributes to decentralisation, local governance and local 
development. Fourthly, to reflect on relevant issues to be considered in the design of 
decentralisation policies.    
8.1 Background, objectives and approach  
Since the 1980s, decentralisation – defined in Chapter 2 as “the transfer of authority, 
responsibility and funds for public functions from the central government to subordinate, 
lower government organisations or the private sector” – has received much attention both 
in academic research and in the political arena. It is difficult to make generalisations 
about the impact of decentralisation policies, since decentralisation involves different 
backgrounds, forms, motives and results. In Latin America, the decentralisation drive 
should be interpreted against the background of traditional state centralism. Since the end 
of the 1970s, the developmental centralist state has suffered a loss of legitimacy because 
of its inability to implement policies that respond to the needs of the vast majority.  
Decentralisation was considered an effective policy measure in overcoming the 
problems caused by excessive centralism, and the reasons were predominantly economic. 
In the course of the 1990s, however, this predominantly economic view on 
decentralisation became increasingly inspired by political motives. This shift was 
expressed in the growing importance of “governance”, calling for a more comprehensive 
approach to decision-making at the different government levels. In contrast to 
government, ‘governance’ explicitly refers to the relationships between the state and civil 
society in the management of economy and society. Governance goes beyond the public 
sector, and as such includes the wider population. 
Governance has been conceptualised as a four-dimensional issue. It is considered to 
be ‘good’ when four conditions are met: accountability, transparency, participation and 
equity. Civil society should have a voice in decision-making, and equal access to and use 
of resources should be policy priority. The increasing attention paid to both 
decentralisation and governance led to a focus on the role of local government, since this 
government level is viewed as the most responsive to a population’s demands, being the 
best suited to achieve good governance and stimulate local development. Local 
development is understood as increasing the development opportunities, in terms of 
general well-being, employment and income for the population, and ensuring that these 
opportunities are evenly distributed among the different groups.  
In this study, we dealt with the implementation of decentralisation policy in Bolivia. 
The objective of this study, as set out in Chapter 1, was to analyse the impact of 
decentralisation policy on local governance and local development in Bolivia, and to 
identify the factors that explain this impact.  
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Therefore, three research questions were formulated: 
 
1. What are the main characteristics of the Bolivian decentralisation process, and 
how do these compare with the characteristics of decentralisation in other 
Latin American countries?  
 
2. To what extent does decentralisation policy result in local governance that is 
participatory, transparent and accountable and contributes to equity?  
 
3. To what extent do decentralisation and governance contribute to increased 
local development opportunities? 
 
We have analysed the impact of decentralisation in six municipalities in Chuquisaca, one 
of the poorest departments in Bolivia. The six research municipalities can be described as 
poor, predominantly rural and relatively small. These municipalities, ranging in size from 
6,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, are situated in different agro-ecological zones, comprising 
higher valleys, lower valleys and the subtropical lowlands of the Chaco. They form a 
diverse sample with respect to spatial, socio-economic and institutional characteristics. 
Subsistence agriculture is the main source of employment. Migration, temporary as well 
as permanent, forms an important additional source of income for the peasant 
households, in particular in the higher zones.  
The municipalities encompass three types of territorially based organisations 
(Organizaciones Territoriales de Base – OTBs), of which the peasant communities are 
the most important. Neighbourhood organisations are found in the towns, while 
indigenous communities are only present in the two municipalities in the subtropical 
zone. These are recently established Guaraní communities. The OTBs represent the 
territorially based institutionalisation of the relationship between civil society and the 
state. Another important actor in the study area are NGOs, which have an enduring 
history of development activities in most research municipalities. 
8.2 The main characteristics of the Bolivian decentralisation process in the 
regional perspective 
The first research question – What are the main characteristics of the Bolivian 
decentralisation process, and how do these compare with the characteristics of 
decentralisation in other Latin American countries? – was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
The Bolivian decentralisation policy, which was launched in 1994, was embraced – 
particularly at the international level – as a model that complied with all the conditions to 
achieve both good governance and local development. Like other Latin American 
countries, the political-administrative structure of Bolivia used to be organised in a very 
top-down manner. At the local level, only the country’s three largest cities received funds 
from the central state. Moreover, the pre-1994 municipalities were purely urban 
municipalities, with a municipal administration covering the urban settlements only, thus 
excluding the rural population from local decision-making.  
The Bolivian decentralisation model has been formalised in two laws: the 1994 Law 
on Popular Participation (LPP) and the 1995 Law on Administrative Decentralisation 
(LDA). Although suggesting a particular focus on participation, the LPP aims primarily 
at the transfer of responsibilities and funds from the central to the local level. The three 
main elements of this law are (1) the creation of 311 urban-rural municipalities that are 
assigned a number of responsibilities mainly concerning the social and production 
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infrastructure. These municipalities receive funds from the central government, but are 
supposed to generate additional resources through taxes and the acquisition of external 
funds, from both non-governmental organisations and national funds. The participatory 
objective of the law is expressed in (2) the assignation of responsibilities in the field of 
priority-setting to the population, through the existing territorially based peasant 
communities, neighbourhood organisations and indigenous communities, now referred to 
as OTBs. To secure the participatory and fair implementation of the LPP (3), at the local 
level the Comités de Vigilancia were established, composed of representatives of the 
local population. The LDA is mainly directed at the departmental level and assigns 
specific functions to the prefectura, the departmental government. Both laws had 
important consequences for the structure and functions and performance of the 
departmental and local government.  
Comparing the Bolivian decentralisation model with those applied in other countries a 
number of similarities and differences can be observed. Most Latin American countries 
started decentralisation in the 1980s, mainly for economic reasons, that is, to increase 
efficiency of public policy implementation. More recently, since the 1990s, measures 
have been added which aim more at political decentralisation. Compared to other Latin 
American countries, Bolivia introduced decentralisation relatively late, in 1994. The 
introduction of Bolivia’s decentralisation project can be traced back to political motives. 
By decentralising power and functions to the lower levels, the government responded to 
the call for more autonomy at the subnational level, as well as the call for a more 
participatory approach of local decision-making that emerged at the end of the 1980s.  
The design of decentralisation in Bolivia has resulted in a relatively high level of 
decentralisation, with 27% of total public expenditure managed at the local level. 
However, with respect to the functions involved and the authority of allocation remaining 
at the central level, the Bolivian model largely follows the way decentralisation has been 
implemented in other Latin American countries. Decentralisation in Bolivia can be 
characterised as devolution, since an important share of decision-making functions has 
been transferred to the local level, although the central government retains most authority 
of resource allocation.    
The most outstanding component of the Bolivian model, compared to other Latin 
American models, is the institutionalised form of popular participation, through the 
OTBs. Only in few other Latin American countries is there such an integrative approach 
to popular participation. The success of the Bolivian model – in terms of popular 
participation – may be attributed to the fact that the institutions for popular participation 
were existent organisations with a tradition in social organisation, a strategy that proves 
to function better than one that would involve new institutional structures, as has been 
done in Mexico and Brazil (Nederveen Pietersen 2001). In achieving participation, the 
level of social capital (i.e. the characteristics of social organisation, such as traditions, 
norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions) of the different communities is considered a critical condition. Access to 
resources is much easier to realise in communities that show a high level of cohesiveness 
and organisational development and that share the same norms and traditions  (Canel, 
2001, p. 37; see also Putnam 1993). Where this social capital is absent, popular 
participation, although sometimes formalised in laws, is much more weakly developed, 
and only has a limited consultative character (Canel 2001, p. 34). This is the case in 
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador.  
Moreover, the Bolivian model was implemented nation-wide. Other experiments in 
Latin America that include far-reaching popular participation – such as the mesas de 
concertación in Colombia, the partnership model in Chile and participatory budgeting in 
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Porto Alegre and Montevideo – have been applied on a much smaller scale and involve 
only a small part of the total number of municipalities. 
Another issue in which the Bolivian model differs from other models is the 
establishment of popular organisations that control local government actions. The 
Bolivian Comités de Vigilancia are a unique instrument, as Blair (2001) observes. In 
other Latin American countries, the issue of accountability has often been limited to 
traditional forms, such as referenda and the media. Formal, institutionalised popular 
control, like in Bolivia, is absent in all other countries, or it is left to the municipal 
councils. 
8.3 Decentralisation and local governance 
The second research question – To what extent does decentralisation policy results in 
local governance that is participatory, transparent and accountable and contributes to 
equity? – was answered in the Chapters 5 and 7. To qualify as ‘good’ governance, local 
governance must be participatory, transparent and accountable and lead to equity. This 
study took the element of participation as point of departure, by identifying the different 
forms of popular participation in local governance. We analysed to what extent these 
different forms lead to an increased participation of formerly excluded segments in local 
decision-making, and to an increase of accountability, transparency and equity. 
First, popular participation is possible through municipal elections. The findings of 
this study show that turnout at municipal elections has increased since the 
implementation of decentralisation policy in 1994. Although it is tempting to attribute 
this to the increased attractiveness of the local level for both the population and political 
parties, measures taken by the central government aimed at increasing the number of 
people entitled to vote appear to have played a major role.  
A second important way for the population to participate in local governance is 
through the election of OTB members for positions in local government. Before the 
implementation of the LPP, municipal elections resulted in local governments composed 
of urban mayors and councillors. Since 1994, there has been a shift in the composition of 
the local government in the six research municipalities, resulting in an increased number 
of mayors and councillors with a rural background – a formerly absent segment of the 
population in local government. Despite this increase, however, the large majority of 
local government still consists of urban representatives.   
The third form – the participation in OTBs  – appeared to be the most comprehensive 
form of popular participation. We demonstrated that the OTBs in the research 
municipalities quickly adopted the new planning procedures and presented their priorities 
to the municipalities. Over the course of time, there has been a shift in the way these 
priorities are set. In the early years, priority-setting was done annually, with OTBs 
presenting a list of communally defined priorities to the local government. To overcome 
this shopping-list character of priorities and to make planning more efficient, also on the 
longer term, the participatory planning methodology was introduced in 1996. The five-
year municipal development strategy, which is based on an extensive process of problem 
identification carried out by the OTBs, is the product of this methodology. However, 
since this methodology had only recently been implemented, the OTBs in the study area 
had not had much experience with it.   
The fourth form of participation involves OTBs taking part in the implementation of 
projects. This form is thought to have a positive effect on the viability of projects. The 
contribution of OTBs can take two forms: in kind (i.e. labour or materials) and in cash. It 
was shown that particularly the peasant communities participate in the implementation of 
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projects by contributing in kind. The neighbourhood organisations contribute much less 
and their contribution mainly takes the form of providing financial support.  
The Bolivian decentralisation model includes a potentially powerful mechanism 
which was created to ensure the transparency and accountability of local government 
actions, through the establishment of the Comités de Vigilancia, the fifth form of popular 
participation. These Comités consist mainly of representatives of the rural OTBs, 
indicating a high degree of participation of the rural population. In practice, however, the 
added value of these committees appears to be very limited. The committees in all the six 
research municipalities are seriously hindered by a lack of legitimacy in their task to 
control the actions of local government. In some of the municipalities, local governments 
refuse to provide information on budgets and projects, the committees do not have the 
funds to exercise their functions properly, and practical problems – such as the difficult 
access to rural areas – seriously inhibit their performance. Transparency – creating the 
information flow on the way public policy-making is being made and implemented – is a 
weak element in the Bolivian model. Since the Comités have not been able to provide 
this information, the population depends on other instruments, such as newspapers and 
television in the towns of the municipalities and radio in the peasant communities.  
In general terms, the implementation of decentralisation in Bolivia has resulted in 
local governance that is much more participatory with respect to formerly excluded 
segments of society and compared to the situation prior to 1994. However, with respect 
to participation this impact is not the same for all groups among the population, resulting 
in unequal access to local decision-making processes.  
First, the Bolivian decentralisation model advocates genuine participation, structured 
according to a blueprint. Although it provides space for the different usos y costumbres 
within the three types of OTBs, it fits the peasant and indigenous communities more than 
the urban neighbourhood organisations. Traditionally, the peasant and indigenous 
communities have an intensive deliberation structure, with frequent meetings and 
officials who are changed each year. This facilitates the process of problem identification 
and priority-setting at the communal level. Also, the solid organisational structure of 
peasant communities, with high attendance levels at communal meetings, provides the 
conditions for representative participation, including the entire communal population. 
Within the neighbourhood organisations, deliberation is not so common, and these 
organisations are characterised by a low degree of attendance at meetings. In addition, 
decision-making is mainly done by the board.   
Second, the impact of decentralisation on the participation of population in local 
decision-making is highly dependent on the accessibility within the municipalities. 
Neighbourhood organisations in the village and well accessible peasant communities are 
much better informed on the possibilities to become involved in local decision-making 
than the less favourably located communities. This is also related to the larger presence 
of NGOs in well accessible areas. The unintended consequence of this all is that 
decentralisation appears to promote the inequality between communities. 
Third, the impact of decentralisation on local governance is differentiated due to the 
prevalent traditional power structures in the six research municipalities. The variance is 
strongly related to the degree to which the land tenure systems were affected by the 1953 
Land Reform. In the subtropical lowlands the majority of the large properties remained 
untouched by this reform. As a result, the large landowners were able to maintain their 
position of power and even strengthen it, taking advantage of the LPP by controlling 
local government. In the more densely populated regions, those located in the higher 
zones and the valleys, the land reform led to the dismantling of large properties and the 
establishment of new communities. Although some of the former landowners still derive 
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some power from their historical background, there is much more room for new power 
groups, especially since 1994. 
In sum, decentralisation in Bolivia resulted in a local governance system that is aimed 
at a dialogue between the public sector, the local government and the local population, 
organised in OTBs. The emphasis on OTBs resulted in the exclusion of other, functional 
organisations in local decision-making, such as producer associations and women groups. 
This implies that these other groups are not involved in planning and as such are not able 
to express their demands. This is a weak aspect of the Bolivian model, especially since 
there are no other ways for these organisations to become involved in local decision-
making. The emphasis on OTBs as the main actors in participatory planning also resulted 
in a bias towards communal priorities, which are often projects in the social sector, 
benefiting the community as a whole. As such, the decentralisation policy applied in 
Bolivia stimulates mainly social sector investments. 
A bottleneck in the implementation of decentralisation is the instability of local 
government, with frequent changes of mayors – urban as well as rural – due to a 
conflictive political environment and the lack of capacity. This instability leads to the 
instability of the local governance system as a whole, since new mayors refuse to use the 
same policies set out by their predecessors. They tend to adjust the priorities set before, 
and change the municipal staff, leading to a loss of experience and knowledge. 
Moreover, this also results in a wavering style of municipal management, leading to 
disruption of the planning and implementation.  
We may conclude that decentralisation in Bolivia has contributed positively to local 
governance. This applies in particular to participation, certainly compared to the situation 
prior to 1994, when the rural population was not involved in local decision-making. With 
respect to accountable and transparent local governance, the impact of decentralisation is 
somewhat disappointing, however, since the Comités de Vigilancia are not able to 
control local affairs, due to a lack of cooperation of local government.  
Moreover, decentralisation appears to have a differentiated impact with respect to 
equity, with neighbourhood organisations and well accessible peasant communities being 
much better informed and able to participate. This is reinforced by the fact that NGOs 
prefer to work in relatively well accessible OTBs, resulting in a relatively larger presence 
of NGOs these OTBs.  
8.4 Decentralisation and local development 
The third research question – To what extent do decentralisation policies and governance 
contribute to an increase of local development opportunities? – was dealt with in 
Chapters 6 and 7. In these chapters we discussed the financial position of the 
municipalities, the characteristics of local investments, the performance in investments, 
the impact on employment generation, and the conditioning role of the spatial, socio-
economic and institutional context.   
The concept of local development in this study refers to improved access for people to 
development opportunities, such as income, employment and living conditions, by both 
increasing the amount of opportunities and ensuring that they are evenly distributed. 
Compared to the pre-1994 situation, decentralisation has undoubtedly contributed to an 
increase of opportunities, when expressed in the size of the budget of the municipalities. 
The six research municipalities receive considerably more funds than they did before the 
implementation of the LPP, when the budget was almost zero. Surprisingly, the funds 
stemming from the central government – the LPP funds (coparticipación tributaria) – are 
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not the most important source of income for the six, relatively small municipalities. In all 
municipalities these funds only account for 28-43% of the budget. The municipalities 
have managed to acquire considerable additional funds from NGOs and/or one of the 
national funds. The share of own resources – collected by tax levying – in the budget is 
limited, and is highest in those municipalities having a larger urban area and a more 
diversified economic structure. 
Only a limited part of the annual budget of the municipalities was effectively spent 
during the period 1995-9. The main reasons for this were the uncertain access to funds 
and the inefficient way of planning. With respect to the uncertain access to funds, we 
observed that particularly those municipalities that depend on contributions from national 
funds experience delays in the transfer of money. In contrast, municipalities with a 
relatively large presence of NGOs have much more success in spending the planned 
budget. This crucial role of NGOs is explained by the fact that since the implementation 
of the LPP, NGOs only gain access to one of the national funds if they form a partnership 
with local government. This means a shift in the relation between the NGOs and the 
state. In order to have access to national funds, NGOs now have to cooperate with the 
local government. This shift also resulted in a changing relationship between NGOs and 
the OTBs. Before 1994, NGOs decided on the projects to be implemented in the peasant 
communities. Now, in the context of participatory planning, this relationship is perceived 
as more equal by the peasant OTBs. Nevertheless, the financial interdependence of 
NGOs and local governments created by the LPP may also constitute a threat to 
participatory planning. Local government may decide to collaborate with an NGO 
regardless of the priorities of OTBs, in order to secure its own financial position. 
With respect to inefficient planning we discovered that particularly during the first 
years of decentralisation, the planning of the budget at the local level was done without 
having checked that external funds would be forthcoming. As a result of a lack of 
knowledge and the limited capacity of administrative staff, local governments expected 
to acquire funds, unaware of the procedures operated by the funds and the long project 
pipeline. Requests for financial support were often declined or postponed, leaving the 
local governments without the necessary funds to execute the projects.    
In the first five years of decentralisation, the focus of local investments was mainly on 
infrastructural projects, with an emphasis on the social sector (education, health and basic 
sanitation). Production-oriented projects, which are intended to directly increase 
agricultural production in the predominantly rural municipalities, accounted for a limited 
share of the investments. The emphasis on social projects is the result of several factors.  
Firstly, it is related to the communal focus of the participatory planning methodology. 
This approach resulted in demand-driven investments aimed at communal needs. 
However, the projects do not reflect the main problems experienced by individual 
households in the OTBs. This is most evident in peasant communities, where the 
problems of the households are mainly related to their main source of employment, 
agriculture. Before the implementation of the LPP, most projects were executed by 
NGOs, which often only worked with a selected group of households. As such, projects 
aimed at increasing the agricultural production were possible. Now, within the context of 
the LPP, this is difficult to realise due to the communal focus. Within the neighbourhood 
organisations, the situation is different, since these organisations are traditionally more 
focused on the acquisition of common goods, and generally the member households do 
not consider the neighbourhood organisation as an instrument to solve problems related 
to the economic activities of the members.  
Secondly, the relatively complexity of projects intended to increase agricultural 
production (e.g. small-scale irrigation projects) leads to local governments preferring 
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projects that are relatively easier to implement, such as the upgrading of school buildings 
and health posts. This is particularly so in election periods, when mayors, with an eye to 
their re-election, concentrate on ‘visible’ projects that can be executed in a relatively 
short period.  
Thirdly, the way the central government presented the Bolivian decentralisation 
project – as a measure to improve general living conditions – stimulated social sector 
projects. Fourthly, the exclusion of functional organisations, such as producer 
associations, as formal actors in the process of participatory planning means that specific 
economic demands are not emphasised.  
Local investments in the municipalities mostly go to relatively small projects. This 
leads to a dispersion of funds. From a developmental perspective, it would be more 
efficient to concentrate investments in larger projects and thus make a substantial 
contribution to local development. However, the participatory planning methodology 
results in the annual allocation of funds that tends to favour all the OTBs in the 
municipalities. Recently, local governments have started to concentrate funds in fewer, 
larger projects, thereby benefiting from economies of scale. This is enhanced by the 
elaboration of five-year development strategies.   
The impact of decentralisation on the generation of employment in the municipalities 
is limited. It is largest in the construction industry, and also evident in the local public 
sector and services (hotels). The success in generating employment in the construction 
industry is largest in those municipalities with a relatively high share of qualified 
construction workers. In municipalities with less experienced construction workers this 
impact is less. In these municipalities, the majority of the projects are contracted out to 
large, external construction firms, often from La Paz or Santa Cruz. Since these firms 
tend to bring their own workers and materials, the multiplier effect, with local funds 
being invested in the municipality, is limited. 
The impact of decentralisation on the even distribution of the development 
opportunities was analysed at two different levels: the distribution of investments 
between the urban and the rural OTBs, and that between relatively well and relatively 
less accessible OTBs. With respect to the former, there is an even distribution – in 
proportion to the population – of investments between urban and rural OTBs. With 
respect to the latter, the distribution of investments favours the well accessible OTBs in 
all research municipalities. Three factors explain this. First, the limited participation of 
the leaders of less accessible OTBs in municipal meetings results in fewer priorities 
being presented to the local government. Second, the larger presence of NGOs in well 
accessible OTBs leads to a larger number of investments in these OTBs. Third, projects 
in less accessible OTBs experience more logistical problems in project implementation, 
such as the difficult and expensive transport of materials and the impassable roads in the 
rainy season.     
To sum up, decentralisation has resulted in an increase of the development 
opportunities, by increasing the investment capacity of local governments, compared to 
the situation prior to 1994. The local development actions concern particularly the 
improvement of the economic and social infrastructure, with an emphasis on the social 
sector. There appears to be no equal access to development opportunities, particularly 
between well and less accessible OTBs. The institutional context appears to be most 
important in explaining the differentiated impact of decentralisation, particularly the 
presence of NGOs. Although the capacity of local government, including the 
administrative staff, impacts on the ability of municipalities to acquire additional funds, it 
was revealed that local governments apply different strategies to overcome capacity 
problems, such as the hiring of part-time specialists. In contrast, the local political culture 
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impacts dramatically on the stability of local government, resulting in the loss of 
qualified and experienced administrative staff. The spatial and socio-economic contexts 
appear to be of minor importance in explaining this differentiated impact.   
8.5 The link between decentralisation, governance and local development: 
recommendations for policy design 
As most studies on decentralisation have shown, it is not realistic to expect that 
decentralisation in the simplest form – that is, the transfer of functions and funds to lower 
government levels – results in good local governance and local development. In fact, 
such administrative decentralisation only provides the conditions for the increase of 
development opportunities: the increase of funds. The funds available at the local level 
are often insufficient to cover the expenses needed for development actions. Mechanisms 
that aim at an increase of funds are therefore necessary. This can be the power to raise 
additional funds at the local level (e.g. a local tax system), but also the creation of 
mechanisms that bundle different channels for co-financing, such as national funds or 
NGOs. The Bolivian case showed the crucial role of such decentralised co-financing 
systems in the success that municipalities have in the acquisition of additional funds and 
the implementation of the budget. 
 This study showed that the analysis of the impact of decentralisation on local 
development through the concept of governance is a valuable approach. Local 
development is impossible without simultaneous measures that aim at achieving good 
governance: equal access to development opportunities through participatory, transparent 
and accountable decision-making. In this way, local governance can be considered as the 
missing link between decentralisation and local development. Political decentralisation is 
a necessary condition for this, since it also transfers decision-making processes to the 
lower level. 
Efforts to achieve good governance through political decentralisation are, however, 
not the panacea for development problems, if structural problems are not addressed. 
Spatial and socio-economic factors, such as differences in accessibility and existing 
inequalities between resource rich and resource-poor regions, and historically determined 
features of the institutional context, such as unequal power structures and differences in 
social capital, proved to be major obstacles in achieving both good governance and local 
development. With this in mind, some elements can be identified that impact on the 
efforts of decentralisation policies and that should be taken into account when designing 
future policies.  
Firstly, the Bolivian case shows that the contribution of decentralisation to the 
reduction of inequalities both within and between municipalities is quite disappointing. 
Decentralisation has resulted in a more equal distribution of funds between municipalities 
compared to the pre-1994 situation and in an improvement of the investment capacity, a 
first condition to increase development opportunities, but existing differences between 
resource-poor and resource-rich municipalities have not been evened out. The fact that 
the decentralisation of funds in Bolivia is based on the number of heads per municipality 
explains this. Nor has decentralisation reduced inequalities within municipalities or 
ensured that different groups within the municipalities have equal access to development 
opportunities. The population in less accessible areas receives relatively fewer projects 
and fewer investments. This could be addressed by incorporating other distribution 
criteria into the design of decentralisation policy. A viable option is to distribute funds 
according to poverty level (e.g. the HDI) between and within each municipality. Some 
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efforts are currently being made to introduce such measures, through the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy introduced in 2001.     
Secondly, the accountability of local government appeared to be the Achilles’ heel in 
achieving good local governance in Bolivia. One can create different instruments to 
secure accountability of public actions, such as the Comités de Vigilancia in Bolivia, or 
referenda and media in other countries, but until these instruments are given the facilities 
and authority to properly carry out their job, it is not realistic to expect these 
accountability measures to produce miraculous results. To achieve accountability, such 
institutions as the Bolivian Comités de Vigilancia should be facilitated in two ways. 
First, they should be assigned a fixed budget to oversee projects, and with an allowance 
to cover some of the time and energy spent. These funds should not be allocated by the 
local government, since this involves the risk of political co-optation, but come from 
higher government levels. Second, such institutions should be assigned formal authority 
to impose measures. Examples of such measures could be the establishment of a national 
institute for accountability, facilitating the local institutes in imposing measures.  
Another way to increase accountability at the local level is to grant local parties access 
to municipal elections. Previous experiments with local parties show that these are much 
more sensitive to the demands of the population, and thus more accountable. 
Thirdly, decentralisation has failed to respond adequately to the problems of the 
population related to the production sphere. Most of the investments are directed at 
infrastructural projects in the social sector, such as education and health. In the long term, 
these investments can have a positive effect on employment and income opportunities. 
However, to achieve local development, the structural problems of the municipalities 
should also be addressed, in particular those concerning the lack of alternative 
employment and the uneven local power structures. These fundamental problems deserve 
more attention from the central government. This would be a viable approach as is shown 
by the announcement of the INRA law in Bolivia, which will regulate the tax levying on 
land. Although not yet approved, many large landowners have already reacted to it by 
selling parts of their property to avoid huge tax bills. This has changed the local power 
structure and empowered new communities.  
Another way to address more structural, economic, problems is to make the planning 
system less exclusive and less focused on communal social demands, by incorporating 
representatives of the private sector in local planning, such as producers’ associations.  
Given the character of decentralisation in Bolivia and the problems surrounding its 
implementation, it is too early to establish whether the original formal objectives – 
achieving good governance and local development – have been realised. One thing is 
clear, however: Bolivian municipalities acquired decentralisation within a very short 
period. Although counteracting developments have taken place at the central level (i.e. 
through the actions of the Banzer government), the local level has kept on going and has 
even been able to develop its own dynamics. This is the case for local governments, but 
probably even more for the population. The support of international development 
agencies, directly and through NGOs, strengthened these local dynamics considerably.  
However, the character of the decentralisation policy has changed since 1997. At the 
national level there has been a shift to a more technical approach, with the issue of 
participation being played down. In reaction, international donor organisations, 
particularly bilateral donors, threatened to cease their support and some of them actually 
freed the channelling of funds. All this happened in the context of increasing economic 
malaise and social unrest. The Banzer government, afraid of losing a considerable 
amount of funds, responded to this by establishing a renewed dialogue between the state 
and civil society, which served as the basis for the Poverty Reduction Strategy, which 
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was launched in 2002. However, the law regulating the channelling of funds has not been 
approved yet. 
In June 2002 national elections will be held, with Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada again 
standing for the MNR. Most of the election campaigns focus on how the economic crisis 
will be combated. Further decentralisation – in particular the more equal distribution of 
funds between resource-rich and resource-poor regions, in favour of the resource-poor 
regions – is considered in most programmes as way to tackle the problem, by satisfying 
the main basic needs of the population. To ensure the dynamics of local governance and 
local development, the new Bolivian government is also playing an essential role in 
encouraging participation, by facilitating administrative capacity-building, stimulating 
participatory planning and developing actions aimed at the structural problems faced by 
the Bolivian economy and the Bolivian society.   
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APPENDIX I.  METHODOLOGY 
Bibliographical research was carried out in the Netherlands and Bolivia during three periods 
(January-July 1997, July 1998-January 1999 and September 2000). During the first period, 
interviews were held with a large number of national and international experts in the field of 
popular participation. Based on these interviews, Chuquisaca was chosen as research area. 
Subsequently, six municipalities within this department were selected for an in-depth study.  
A large part of this study is based on the analysis of secondary sources, that is, annual and 
five-year development plans, and financial records (implementation reports and balances). These 
were gathered from the municipalities and the archive of the Departmental Unit for Municipal 
Strengthening at La Madonna, Sucre. The data contained in these plans, reports and balances 
were analysed with the support of the programme SPSS. Variables considered include the type of 
project, total costs, the location, the period of implementation, the beneficiary OTB and the 
characteristics of the execution of the project. This resulted in a database of 2,014 programmed 
and 1,393 implemented projects.   
During each period of fieldwork semi-structured interviews were held with the mayor, 
councillors and presidents of the Comités de Vigilancia of the six municipalities, with respect to 
their personal background, municipal management and the planning process. Also, NGOs 
working in the municipalities were interviewed about their history of working in the 
municipality, their activities and their relation with local government, especially with respect to 
planning.     
During the second period of fieldwork a survey was held among 101 leaders of OTBs in the 
six municipalities. The sample was determined as follows. Of the total number of OTBs, a 
distinction was made between the three types of OTBs, that is, peasant communities, 
neighbourhood organisations and indigenous communities. This allowed for the determination of 
the sample fraction of, respectively, peasant communities, neighbourhood organisations and 
indigenous communities (the last are present only in Monteagudo and Huacareta): 
 
- Yotala:    1:3 peasant communities, 3 neighbourhood organisations; 
- Poroma:   1:3 peasant communities, 1 neighbourhood organisation; 
- Sopachuy:  1:2 peasant communities, 1 neighbourhood organisation; 
- Presto:   1:2 peasant communities, 1 neighbourhood organisation; 
- Monteagudo:  1:5 peasant communities, 1 neighbourhood organisation,  
3 indigenous communities; 
- Huacareta:   1:2 peasant communities, 1 neighbourhood organisation,  
3 indigenous communities. 
 
The OTBs were randomly selected from each type of OTB present in the municipalities. The 
selection included easily accessible and less accessible OTBs. Non-response was zero.  
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Table I.I Composition of the sample in the six research municipalities 
Municipality Total 
number 
OTBs 
 OTBs in sample 
   Peasant 
communities 
Neighbourhood 
organisations 
Indigenous 
communities 
Total 
Yotala   52   16   1 -   17 
Poroma   79   22   1 -   23 
Sopachuy   23   12   2 -   14 
Presto   27   12   2 -   14 
Monteagudo   80   16   4 1   21 
Huacareta   29   10   1 1   12 
Total 290   87 11 2 101 
 
 
 
The survey consisted of three parts: the first concerned questions about the main characteristics 
of the OTBs, such as number of households, economic activity (including migration), the 
presence and activities of NGOs, and the main problems experienced. The second part focused on 
the characteristics of the leader of the OTB, such as background and experience. The third part 
contained questions about the process of planning within the OTB, the projects planned and 
implemented, and the relation with local government and NGOs.  
 
 
Definitions 
 
Well accessible OTBs: OTBs that can be reached with motorised transport or are within a three-
hour walk from the municipal capital. 
Less accessible OTBs: OTBs that cannot be reached by motorised transport or are more than a 
three-hour walk from the municipal capital. 
Production-oriented projects: projects directed at strengthening the production structure of a 
municipality. Examples are projects in the agricultural sector (irrigation), marketing and 
commercialisation, veterinary services, seed supply, forest management and non-agricultural, 
alternative employment (e.g. weaving and pottery). In this study, roads are not considered 
production-oriented investments, nor are investments in education, health, sports, culture or 
urban improvement. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
National government 
 
M. Lea Plaza, Director Participatory Planning, Secretary of Popular Participation. 
N. Vejara, Coordinator of the project for Communal Strengthening of the Secretary of Popular 
Participation. 
V. Balcazar, Head of the Unit for International Cooperation of the Secretary of Popular 
Participation. 
 
 
Departmental government of Chuquisaca 
 
J. Bonifaz, Advisor prefect of Chuquisaca 
J. Zapata, Advisor Participatory Planning 
D. Pacheco, Director Departmental Unit for Municipal Strengthening 1996-1997 
G. Salguero, Advisor Communal Strengthening, 1994-1997 
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J. Duran, Advisor Unit for Municipal Stregnthening 1994-1997 
M. Ibañez, Advisor Unit for Municipal Strengthening 1994-- 
L. Flores, Director Departmental Unit for Municipal Strengthening 1997-1999 
J. Villegas, Director Departmental Unit for Productive Development, 1994-1997  
F. Sarabia, Director Departmental Unit for Communal Strengthening 1997-- 
A. Villagomez, Departmental Unit of Budget, 1997-- 
 
 
Provincial government 
 
R. Calvimontes, subprefect of the province of Hernando Siles 
J. Quiroga, subprefect of the province of Tomina 
L. Arancibia, subprefect of the province of Oropeza 
 
 
Non-governmental organizations 
 
ACLO  
CARE 
CARITAS 
CCCH 
CEDEC 
CIAC 
ETAPAS 
Peace Corps 
PLAFOR 
Plan Internacional 
PROSCAM 
SNV-Regional Office Chuquisaca 
TREVERIS 
UNISUR 
 
 
Other 
 
M. Pumar, Director Fund for Rural Development (FDC)-Chuquiasaca 
D. Borda, Director Social Investment Fund (FIS)-Chuquisaca 
E. Zelada, Departmental Coordinator PADER Chuquisaca 
L. Ramirez, member of the group of 12 that prepared the Law on Popular Participation 
T. Beetstra, Director CDID 
J. Michel, President of the Association of Municipalities in the department of Chuquisaca 
M. Galindo, member of the group of 12 that prepared the Law on Popular Participation and 
former Vice Minister of Popular Participation 
E. Petersen, Director INRA-Chuquisaca 
R. Porcel, Director PDCR-Chuquisaca  
L. Noort, Dutch Embassy La Paz 
J. Cortez, Dutch Embassy La Paz 
 
 
Municipality of Yotala 
F. Vera, mayor  
J. Sandy, mayor  
M. Miranda, President Comité de Vigilancia 1996-1998 
B. Galeano, President Comité de Vigilancia 1998-- 
J. Lopez, Head technical department municipality 
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C. Mamani, Constructor 
D. Perez, Constructor 
 
 
Municipality of Poroma 
J. Michel, former mayor and councillor 
B. Torihuano, mayor 
P. Saavedra, mayor 
R. Cabrera, councillor 
J. Fiengo, councillor 
J. Hurtado, practitioner health post 
M. Cruz, President Comité de Vigilancia 1998-1999 
P. Flores, President Comité de Vigilancia 1996-1997 
 
 
Municipality of Sopachuy 
A. Jimenez, mayor  
A. Mercado, mayor 
J. Mendoza, Corregidor 
J. Daza, municipal councillor   
D. Campos, former mayor 
R. Sifuentes, Supervisor of projects 
P. Campos, President Comité de Vigilancia 1996-1998 
P. Galarza, President Comité de Vigilancia 1998-2000 
H. Diaz, Constructor 
J. Ortega, Constructor 
 
 
Municipality of Presto 
H. Pari, mayor 
J. Davila, former mayor 
Y. Tapia, President Comité Civico 
L. Batista, President of the Comité de Vigilancia 
R. Perez, Supervisor of projects municipality 
A.Castro, Priest 
M. Martinez, Constructor 
 
 
Municipality of Monteagudo 
J. Vargas, mayor 1996-1998 
J. Hinojosa, mayor 1998-1999 
J. Abdelnur, Subprefect province of Hernando Siles 1993-1997 
M. Ortuno, President Comité de Vigilancia 1996-1999 
H. Abdelnur, president Civic Committee 
G. Campos, head technical department municipality 
D. Sensano, President of the Integral Association for the Development of Women 
F. Garibaldi, Constructor 
B. Lopez, Constructor 
B. Florin, entrepreneur 
F. Rodrigeuz, entrepreneur 
 
 
Municipality of Huacareta 
C. Miranda, mayor 
J. Dorado, technician municipality 
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J. Delgadillo, councillor 1995-1999 
W. Ibanez, President Civic Committee 
B. Vasquez, member Comité de Vigilancia, 1995-1998 
C. Villegas, President Comité de Vigilancia 1996-1998 
M. Crespo, member Comité de Vigilancia 1995-1998 
G. Escobar, Supervisor of projects municipality 
G. Andrade, Corregidor  
R. Rojas, Oficial mayor municipality 
H. Stoffel, priest 
C. Quispe, constructor 
R. de la Cruz. constructor 
 
 
Survey among OTBs  
 
Yotala 
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Villa Santa Rosa Picantura 
Cachimayu Anfaya 
Cabezas Cancha Pampa 
Huasa Nucchu Higueras 
Pulqui Huayllas 
Tambo Achatilla Palamana 
Tuero Chico Calera 
Barrio 1 de Mayo Tasapampa 
 Ollisco 
 
Poroma  
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Copavilque Cucuri 
Chijmuri Portillo 
Alamos Palca 
Huanoma Tejawuasi 
Kolla Pucara Kolka 
Piocera Milluni 
Pomanasa Marcavi 
Horcas Chillchista 
Zanabria Challcca 
Salquina Tomavia 
Sacabamba Soicoco 
Barrio Poroma  
 
 
Sopachuy 
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Milanes Alizos 
Orcas Rio Grande 
Achatala Matela Baja 
Silva Sipicani 
San Antonio Sauceal Pampa 
Barrio Ayacucho San Juan 
Barrio Sarla Rio Grande 
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Presto 
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Corralon Mala Vista 
Khochi Wualla Pampa 
Pasopaya La Joya 
Pasopayita Molani 
Tomoroco Rodeo 
Motoya  
Barrio 14 de Enero  
Barrio 6 de Julio  
El Peral  
 
 
Monteagudo 
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Barrio 1 de Mayo Roldana 
Barrio Avenida Petrolero La Capilla 
Barrio los Naranjos Rodeo 
Barrio Los Pinos Potreros 
Sivinga Mayu Pucamayu 
Bohorquez San Lorenzo 
Bartolo Caravallo 
Cruce Piraimiri Fernández 
Zapallar Naureñda 
San Miguel del Banado   
Candua  
Pampas de San Miguel  
 
 
Huacareta 
 
Well accessible OTBs Less accessible OTBs 
Piraicito Añimbo 
Santa Maria Uruguay 
Pampa Grande Nacamiri 
San José Tacurvite 
Abra de Ivio Rosario del Ingre 
Yumao Huirasay 
 
 
Exchange rates: 
 
1995: 1 US$ = 4,8003 bs. 
1996: 1 US$ = 5,0746 bs. 
1997: 1 US$ = 5,2543 bs. 
1998: 1 US$ = 5,4501 bs. 
1999: 1 US$ = 5,8491 bs.  
2000: 1 US$ = 6,2782 bs. 
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APPENDIX II.  POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOLIVIA 
ADN - Acción Democrático y Nacionalista, founded in 1979 by Hugo Banzer. In the 1985 
national elections Banzer received most votes, but since the MNR formed a coalition with the 
MIR, Paz Estenssoro became president. The ADN also won the 1989 elections, but through a 
deal with Paz Zamora the MIR provided the president. In 1993, Banzer decided to retire, but 
returned in 1996 in the run-up to the 1997 elections. The ADN won these elections but was 
forced to form a broad and – as later became clear – difficult coalition with the MIR, CONDEPA 
and the UCS.  
 
CONDEPA – the populist Conciencia de Patria, founded in 1988 by Carlos Palenque, a 
charismatic television personality who by means of the daily broadcast Tribuna Libre provided 
the poor with an opportunity to speak freely about the injustices they face. Together with his then 
wife Monica Medína (former mayor of the city of La Paz) and the comadre Remedios Loza, who 
is of Aymara descent, CONDEPA forms an attractive alternative for the poor Aymara and 
Quechua population of El Alto and La Paz. Palenque died in 1998 and conflicts between Monica 
Medína, the comadre Remedios and Veronica (the daughter of Carlos) over the financial and 
political heritage led to internal problems.  
 
Eje Pachakuti – a radical party whose followers are mostly peasants in the high altitude areas of 
the departments of Potosí and Chuquisaca. 
 
MBL – Movimiento Bolivia Libre is a split-off from the MIR. Officially founded in 1991 and 
quite successful in the 1993 elections, particularly among the rural population of Chuquisaca. 
The leaders are Juan del Granado, Miguel Urioste and Antonio Araníbar. The MBL did very well 
in the 1995 municipal elections in Chuquisaca. In 1999, the party lost many municipalities to the 
ADN and the MIR.  
 
MIR – Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario, founded in 1971 by Jaime Paz Zamora. The 
MIR governed, with Paz Zamora as president, in the period 1989-93. This period saw increased 
corruption and links with narcotrafficers at the presidential level as well as that of several other 
high authorities.  
 
MNR – Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, founded in 1941 by Victor Paz Estenssoro, 
Hernan Siles Suazo and others. The MNR initiated the 1952 revolution and the 1985 new 
economic policy. In 1993, the MNR won the national elections with Gonzalo (‘Goni’) Sánchez 
de Lozada as presidential candidate and the Aymara leader Victor Hugo Cárdenas of the MRTKL 
(a small indigenous party which promotes the emancipation of the Indian population) as the 
candidate for vice-president. Its election campaign – the Plan de Todos – resulted in the 
implementation of decentralisation policy.  
 
UCS – the Unión Cívica Solidaridad, founded in 1989 by the self-made Cruceño beer magnate, 
Max Fernández. A populist party strongly linked with the national beer brewery, Cervecería 
Boliviana Nacional. The main target groups of the UCS are small traders, truck drivers and 
retailers. Fernández died in a plane crash in the mid-1990s. His son Johnny, former mayor of the 
city of Santa Cruz, succeeded him.  
 
Source: Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Zegada 1996 
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APPENDIX III.  TABLES 
 
Table III.1 Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Yotala, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds   44   45   85   41   42   28 
Own      2      4     4     4     7     7 
OTBs     6     -      -     5     4     1 
External       
NGOs   14   10      -   11   30   10 
Other gov.     4   17      -     6     5     2 
Funds   30   18   12    31     9   46 
Other     -      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.2 Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Poroma, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds    75   59    98   52   22   26 
Own       -     -      -     -     -     1 
OTBs      -   10      -     6     1     3 
External       
NGOs      -     -      -     1     2   27 
Other gov.   16     -      -     7   17     3 
Funds     2   31     2   32   51   33 
Other     7     -     -     2     6     8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.3 Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Sopachuy, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds   63   39   20   27   31   26 
Own       -     1     -     2     2     2 
OTBs      -     2     5     3     9     6 
External       
NGOs   37   31   26   47   26   47 
Other gov.     -     4   15     1     9     5 
Funds     -   10   21   20   17   12 
Other     -   13   11     -     7     1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
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Table III.4  Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Presto, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds 88   54   18   42   38   19 
Own  12     -     -     -     2     - 
OTBs -     2     7     -     5     8 
External       
NGOs -   10   33   24   35   52 
Other gov. -     7   10   14     8     4 
Funds -   27   32   19   12   13 
Other -     -     -     1      4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.5  Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Monteagudo, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds   34   40   36   34  22  36 
Own      6     7     5     3    5    8 
OTBs     3     1     1      -    4    3 
External       
NGOs     4     2     5     2   29   27 
Other gov.   13     7   10   12     6     2 
Funds   38   43   37   58   34   23 
Other     4      -     5      -     2     2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.6  Composition of the budget by source of the municipality of Huacareta, 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Internal       
LPP-funds   52   66   36   45   49   30 
Own      1     6     2     4     2     1 
OTBs     1     2     2     3     1     1 
External       
NGOs     -   15   12   12     2     3 
Other gov.   11     7   16   13   12     4 
Funds   35     5   33   18   28   59 
Other      -     -     -     5     6     1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-2000 municipalities. 
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Table III.7  Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Yotala, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education   17   14   31    29   32 
Health   16   13   14      9   14 
Roads   11   12    19      6     6 
Sport and culture     2      9     8      2     3 
Basic sanitation     -     1   14    21     8 
Energy     -     -     -      1     2 
Urban improvement   11   10     7      1     1 
Agriculture     3     -     1      8     5 
Communication     -     -     -      -     - 
Industry and tourism     -     -     -      -     - 
Institutional 
strengthening 
    8   14     -     2     - 
Other   10   13     3     4     - 
Local administration   22   14     5   17   29 
Unspecified      -     -      -     -     - 
      
Total investments (US$) 52,474 188,560 82,030 330,429 379,861 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
 
Table III.8  Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Poroma, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education   42  27   26   32   20 
Health      -    5     9     7     4 
Roads   35  24   23   31   21 
Sport and culture      -    8     2     3     1 
Basic sanitation      -  17   11     7     5 
Energy      -    -     -     -      - 
Urban improvement      -  10     7     6     8 
Agriculture      -    -      -     3     7 
Communication      9    -      -      -     - 
Industry and tourism      -    -      -      -     - 
Institutional 
strengthening 
     -    -      -      -   14 
Other      2    -     5     1     - 
Local administration    12    9   12     8   14 
Unspecified       -    -     5     3     7 
      
Total investments (US$) 196,381 370,947 220,140 367,467 728,998 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
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Table III.9  Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Sopachuy, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education   14   18     7    7   14 
Health     4     7     8    6     7 
Roads      9   22   18    6    12 
Sport and culture   25     2     1    2     2 
Basic sanitation     -     3     1    5     8 
Energy     -     1     -     -     - 
Urban improvement     6     3     6     -   15 
Agriculture     -     1   16     3     5 
Communication     4     0      -     1     - 
Industry and tourism     -     9     1     -     - 
Institutional 
strengthening 
    -     6     7     7   16 
Other   23     4     1     -     6 
Local administration   15   22   14     6   12 
Unspecified      -     2   20   57     3 
      
Total investments (US$) 120,167 176,930 689,713 654,399 509,224 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
 
Table III.10 Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Presto, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education   15    7   15   16     7 
Health     7    3   16     3     3 
Roads   11  26   43   38   12 
Sport and culture     0    1     1     1     1 
Basic sanitation     6    6     -     7     5 
Energy     9    1     -     2     - 
Urban improvement     6  14     3     5     4 
Agriculture     7    3     7     6     3 
Communication     -    -     -     -     - 
Industry and tourism     -    1     -     -     - 
Institutional 
strengthening 
    2  22     -     1     - 
Other     -     -     3   10   52 
Local administration   11   16   12   11   13 
Unspecified    26     -     -     -     - 
      
Total investments (US$) 77,859 224,287 370,558 437,774 392,918 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
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Table III.11 Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Monteagudo, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education    23     9   26   39   22 
Health      2     5   10     4   15 
Roads    44   17     7     7   24 
Sport and culture      4     5     2     3     2 
Basic sanitation       -     2     -   12     3 
Energy      3     2      -     1     - 
Urban improvement      6   14     7     2     2 
Agriculture    16     4     2     2     5 
Communication      1     -     -     -     - 
Industry and tourism      -   11   17     1     2 
Institutional 
strengthening 
     1   10     7     2   10 
Other      -     6     -     3     3 
Local administration      -   13   13   14   12 
Unspecified       -     2     9     0     -   
      
Total investments (US$) 1,017,552 1,207,124 908,781 1,500,397 1,383,377 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
 
Table III.12 Investments per sector as % of total investments in the municipality of Huacareta, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Education     5    16   12   26   25 
Health     3      9   13   13     8 
Roads   15    22   26   18   28 
Sport and culture     3      2     -     -     1 
Basic sanitation   10      2     -     1     - 
Energy   14      5     -     2     - 
Urban improvement     3      5     6   20     3 
Agriculture     2      1     -     2     1 
Communication     -       -     -     1     - 
Industry and tourism     -       -     -      -     - 
Institutional 
strengthening 
    3      2     3     2   22 
Other     -      2   13     1     - 
Local administration   12    11   10   14   12 
Unspecified    30    23   17     -     - 
      
Total investments (US$) 316,534 300,299 424,813 397,684 381,222 
Total 100  100 100 100 100 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
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Table III.13 Share of programmed annual budget that has been implemented, as % of total programmed 
budget in the research municipalities, 1995-9 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
Yotala 16 37 27 46 49 32 
Poroma 45 45 41 32 36 36 
Sopachuy 71 46 79 89 75 77 
Presto 46 46 26 75 60 52 
Monteagudo 53 66 41 46 35 44 
Huacareta 55 66 52 56 55 54 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.14  Yotala: municipal investments according to location, as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 27 59 14 
1996 21 54 25 
1997   4 55 41 
1998   5 57 38 
1999   6 32 62 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.15  Poroma: municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 16 64 20 
1996 11 70 19 
1997   8 57 35 
1998   7 44 49 
1999   9 40 51 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.16  Sopachuy: municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 30 12 58 
1996 14 40 46 
1997   8 22 70 
1998   6 12 82 
1999 24 24 52 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities. 
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Table III.17  Presto: municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 12 36 52 
1996 14 39 47 
1997 3 62 35 
1998 10 62 28 
1999 21 49 30 
Source: Financial records 1995-9 municipalities.  
 
 
Table III.18  Monteagudo: municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 45 37 18 
1996 29 21 50 
1997 25 24 51 
1998 24 35 41 
1999 12 35 53 
Source: Financial reports 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.19  Huacareta: municipal investments according to location as % of total investments 1995-9 
Municipal investments  
% in urban OTBs % in rural OTBs % beneficiary to entire 
municipality 
1995 35 45 20 
1996 22 50 28 
1997 28 23 39 
1998 30 23 47 
1999 15 11 74 
Source: Financial reports 1995-9 municipalities. 
 
 
Table III.20 Proportion of the population in urban and rural OTBs and municipal investments in urban and 
rural OTBs in the period 1995-9. 
Urban OTBs Rural OTBs  
Population as % 
of total 
population 
Investments as % 
of total 
investments 
Population as % 
of total 
population 
Investments as % 
of total 
investments 
Yotala 14   5 86 46 
Poroma   3   8 97 49 
Sopachuy 21 12 79 18 
Presto   6   9 94 38 
Monteagudo 26  23 74 32 
Huacareta 12 20 88 16 
Source: Financial reports 1995-9 municipalities.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Decentralisatie en bevolkingsparticipatie in Bolivia. De relatie tussen lokaal bestuur 
en lokale ontwikkeling. 
 
Decentralisatie is sinds de jaren ’80 een veel toegepast beleidsinstrument van overheden 
in Latijns Amerika. Decentralisatie staat in deze studie voor de overheveling van taken, 
verantwoordelijkheden en financiële middelen van het centrale overheidsniveau naar sub-
nationale niveaus. Decentralisatie wordt verwacht een positieve uitwerking te hebben op 
het ontwikkelingsproces. Het zou de met centralisme geassocieerde inefficiëntie van 
overheidsbeleid kunnen verkleinen, de overheid meer bewust maken van de behoeften 
van de bevolking op lokaal niveau en intra-regionale ongelijkheid kunnen verkleinen. 
 Meer recentelijk wordt decentralisatie tevens gezien als een voorwaarde om good 
governance, goed bestuur, te bereiken. Goed bestuur heeft betrekking op de relaties 
tussen de staat en de maatschappij, tussen bestuurders en hen die bestuurd worden. Het 
begrip doelt op de uitoefening van economische, politieke en bestuurlijke macht om 
staatsaangelegenheden op alle niveaus te beheren en omvat de mechanismen, processen 
en instituties waardoor burgers and organisaties hun belangen uiten, hun rechten opeisen, 
hun plichten vervullen en op één lijn trachten te komen. Bestuur kan als goed worden 
beschouwd minimaal aan vier voorwaarden wordt voldaan: 1) de bevolking kan 
participeren in lokale besluitvormingsprocessen; 2) de besluitvorming is een transparant 
proces met duidelijk afgebakende taken; 3) de bestuurders kunnen verantwoordelijk 
worden gesteld voor het gevoerde beleid; 4) burgers hebben in dezelfde mate toegang tot 
besluitvormingsprocessen. In deze zin zijn decentralisatie en goed bestuur onlosmakelijk 
met elkaar verbonden. Bovendien worden beiden gezien als voorwaarden voor lokale 
ontwikkeling. Bevindingen uit de literatuur laten zien dat decentralisatie vele vormen aan 
kan nemen en dat de invoering van decentralisatie op verschillende manieren uitpakt.      
 
Tegen deze achtergrond analyseert deze studie de invloed van decentralisatiebeleid op 
lokaal bestuur en lokale ontwikkeling in Bolivia, alsmede de factoren welke deze invloed 
bepalen. Hiertoe zijn de volgende onderzoekvragen geformuleerd:  
a) Wat zijn de belangrijkste kenmerken van het Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid, en 
welke verschillen en overeenkomsten zijn er tussen dit beleid en het 
decentralisatiebeleid zoals dit in andere Latijns-Amerikaanse landen gevoerd is? 
b) In hoeverre leidt het Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid tot lokaal bestuur dat 
participatief is, transparant en met duidelijk afgebakende verantwoordelijkheden, met 
gelijke toegang tot lokale besluitvormingsprocessen voor alle groepen van de 
bevolking? 
c) In hoeverre leidt het Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid tot een toename van de 
mogelijkheden voor lokale ontwikkeling? 
 
Het onderzoek voor deze studie werd uitgevoerd in zes plattelandsgemeenten in het 
departement Chuquisaca, één van de armste regio’s in Bolivia. Zoals beschreven wordt in 
hoofdstuk 4 vertegenwoordigen de zes onderzoekgemeenten verschillende ruimtelijke 
contexten, met betrekking tot agro-ecologische condities, toegankelijkheid, sociaal-
economische kenmerken (bevolkingsomvang, economische structuur en etniciteit) en 
institutionele context (zoals aanwezigheid van NGO’s en de achtergrond van de 
burgemeester). In de keuze van de onderzoekgemeenten is vooral gestreefd naar 
diversiteit, veel meer dan representativiteit.   
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De gegevens zijn gedurende drie veldwerkperioden in 1997-1999 verzameld door middel 
van gestructureerde interviews met vertegenwoordigers van lokale overheden, zowel 
burgemeesters als gemeenteraadsleden, een survey onder leiders van 
bevolkingsorganisaties en interviews met vertegenwoordigers van niet-gouvernementele 
organisaties en overige overheidsinstanties. Bovendien heeft er een uitgebreide analyse 
van secundair bronnenmateriaal plaatsgevonden, zoals korte- en middellange 
planningsdocumenten, budgettaire informatie, projectinformatie en balansen.    
 
Het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel 
In de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 komt de eerste onderzoekvraag aan bod. Hiertoe biedt 
hoofdstuk 2 een overzicht van het theoretisch debat dat zich de afgelopen jaren rondom 
het thema van decentralisatie, goed bestuur en lokale ontwikkeling in Latijns-Amerika 
heeft ontwikkeld. Daarbij werd ondermeer aandacht geschonken aan de achtergrond van 
het decentralisatiebeleid in Latijns-Amerika, de diverse vormen van decentralisatie en de 
ervaringen met decentralisatiebeleid en bevolkingsparticipatie in andere landen.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 werden de achtergrond en de kenmerken van het Boliviaanse 
decentralisatiebeleid behandeld. Het decentralisatiebeleid in Bolivia wordt gezien als een 
zeer innovatief model, dat tevens de basisvoorwaarden aanreikt om te komen tot goed 
lokaal bestuur en lokale ontwikkeling. Zoals de meeste Latijns Amerikaanse landen werd 
Bolivia van oudsher gekenmerkt door een sterk centralistisch ingerichte politiek-
administratieve structuur. Het lokale, gemeentelijke niveau had slechts beperkte 
verantwoordelijkheden en vooral ook middelen, waarbij alleen de drie grootste steden 
financiële middelen van de centrale overheid ontvingen. Bovendien waren de gemeenten 
voor 1994 puur urbane gemeenten, met een lokaal bestuur dat alleen de urbane 
nederzettingen in acht nam. Hierdoor was de plattelandsbevolking uitgesloten van lokale 
besluitvorming.  
Deze situatie veranderde met de invoering van decentralisatie in 1994. Een jaar 
eerder was Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada tot president gekozen met het ambitieuze 
verkiezingsprogramma Plan de Todos (Plan voor Allen). Dit programma behelsde een 
aantal hervormingen, zoals de privatisering van enkele staatsondernemingen, de 
herziening van landbezitverhoudingen en het pensioenstelsel en de invoering van 
tweetalig onderwijs. Het decentralisatiebeleid vormde de basis voor al deze 
hervormingen. Het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel is in twee wetten uitgewerkt: de 
Wet op de Bevolkingsparticipatie (LPP, april 1994) en de Wet op de Bestuurlijke 
Decentralisatie (LDA, juli 1995).  
De Wet op de Bevolkingsparticipatie heeft drie componenten. Allereerst werden 311  
gemeenten opgericht. Bijzonder is dat de nieuwe gemeenten (specifiek) urbaan-rurale 
gemeenten zijn en dus ook het voorheen buitengesloten platteland omvatten. Het 
takenpakket van deze gemeenten werd uitgebreid, waarmee de gemeenten vooral 
verantwoordelijk worden voor de infrastructuur op het gebied van gezondheid, 
onderwijs, sport en wegen. Daarnaast wordt de nieuwe gemeenten een belangrijke rol 
toegedicht wat betreft stimulering van de lokale ontwikkeling.   
Een tweede element betreft de overheveling van middelen naar de nieuwe 
gemeenten. Sinds 1994 wordt 20% van de nationale belastingopbrengsten gealloceerd 
aan de gemeentelijke overheden, op basis van inwonertal. Daarnaast kunnen gemeenten 
hun budget vergroten door samen te werken met niet-gouvernementele organisaties 
(NGO’s) of door een beroep te doen op één of enkele van de nationale fondsen voor 
ontwikkeling.  
Een derde element betreft de invoering van participatieve planning. Bestaande 
bevolkingsorganisaties, zoals de boerengemeenschappen op het platteland, de 
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wijkorganisaties in de steden en dorpen en de inheemse gemeenschappen in het laagland, 
mogen zich aanmelden als territoriale basisorganisatie (OTB). Als OTB kunnen zij hun 
prioriteiten voor projecten indienen bij de lokale overheid. Deze projecten kunnen met de 
verworven middelen worden gefinancierd.   
Om een correcte handhaving van de wet op lokaal niveau te garanderen, zoals een gelijke 
verdeling van middelen tussen het platteland en de dorpen, werd in elke gemeente een 
Comité de Vigilancia (Waakzaamheidcomité) opgericht, samengesteld uit 
vertegenwoordigers van de lokale bevolking.  
De Wet op Bestuurlijke Decentralisatie beoogt de reorganisatie van de overheid op 
met name het departementale niveau, door het toewijzen van functies die eerder op het 
nationale niveau werden uitgevoerd. Deze studie richt zich vooral op de invloed van de 
Wet op de Bevolkingsparticipatie, dat wil zeggen op de lokale bestuursprocessen in de 
zes onderzoekgemeenten.  
 
Als we het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel vergelijken met modellen zoals die in 
andere Latijns-Amerikaanse landen zijn toegepast kunnen we een aantal overeenkomsten 
en verschillen constateren. De meeste Latijns-Amerikaanse landen voerden in de jaren 
tachtig decentralisatiebeleid in, met een voornamelijk economische drijfveer, te weten 
een verhoogde efficiëntie van overheidsbeleid. Meer recentelijk, sinds het begin van de 
jaren negentig, gaan economische motieven vergezeld van maatregelen die meer gericht 
zijn op politieke decentralisatie en die democratisering voorstaan.  
Vergeleken met andere landen in Latijns Amerika heeft Bolivia relatief laat 
decentralisatiebeleid ingevoerd. De invoering van het Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid  
kan herleid worden tot politieke motieven. Door de overheveling van macht en functies 
naar lagere niveaus reageerde de Boliviaanse overheid op de roep van vooral 
maatschappelijke organisaties, waaronder NGO’s, om meer autonomie voor deze 
niveaus. Bovendien paste het concept van een meer participatieve benadering van lokale 
besluitvorming in de meer algemene, door internationale donoren ondersteunde, trend 
naar democratisering.  
Het Boliviaanse model heeft geresulteerd in een relatief hoog niveau van 
decentralisatie: 27% van de totale overheidsuitgaven wordt gerealiseerd door het lokale 
niveau. Echter, indien we de functies die overgeheveld worden en de autoriteit voor de 
toewijzing van fondsen in acht nemen, volgt Bolivia de meeste andere landen in Latijns 
Amerika. Decentralisatie in Bolivia kan gekenmerkt worden als devolutie, aangezien een 
belangrijk deel van de besluitvorming is overgeheveld naar het lokale gemeentelijke 
niveau, hoewel de centrale overheid de meeste macht heeft behouden ten aanzien van de 
toewijzing van de fondsen.  
Het meest opzienbarende in het Boliviaanse model is de wijze waarop participatieve 
planning is geïnstitutionaliseerd, via de territoriale basisorganisaties. In slechts een aantal 
Latijns-Amerikaanse landen is dit ook het geval. Het succes van het Boliviaanse model 
ten aanzien van bevolkingsparticipatie kan worden toegeschreven aan het feit dat het hier 
reeds bestaande organisaties betrof met een traditie in sociale organisatie. Dit is een 
strategie die beter blijkt uit te werken dan één waarin nieuwe organisaties voor dit doel 
worden opgericht, zoals het geval is geweest in Brazilië en Mexico. Bovendien werd het 
Boliviaanse model landelijk ingevoerd. Andere experimenten met bevolkingsparticipatie 
in Latijns-Amerika werden voornamelijk op kleine schaal toegepast en hadden 
betrekking op slechts een klein deel van de gemeenten.  
Een ander bijzonder element van het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel betreft de 
instelling van bevolkingsorganisaties die het beleid van lokale overheden controleren. De 
Boliviaanse Comités de Vigilancia zijn uniek in Latijns-Amerika. In andere Latijns- 
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Amerikaanse landen blijft dit veelal beperkt tot meer traditionele vormen, zoals referenda 
en journalistieke media. Formele, geïnstitutionaliseerde controle vanuit de bevolking is 
daar afwezig of wordt overgelaten aan de gemeenteraad.     
 
Decentralisatie en goed bestuur 
In hoofdstuk 5 komt de relatie tussen decentralisatiebeleid en lokaal bestuur aan de orde. 
Lokaal bestuur kan als goed gekwalificeerd worden indien de bevolking hierin kan 
participeren. Bovendien dient er sprake te zijn van transparant besluitvorming, waarbij de 
verantwoordelijkheden duidelijk afgebakend zijn en de betrokken actoren afgerekend 
kunnen worden op het gevoerde beleid. Dit laatste wordt ook wel accountability 
genoemd. Tevens is er bij goed bestuur sprake van gelijke toegang tot lokale 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Deze studie richtte zich vooral op het element van 
participatie, waarbij verschillende vormen van bevolkingsparticipatie in lokaal bestuur 
geïdentificeerd werden.  
De bevolking kan allereerst participeren door middel van gemeentelijke 
verkiezingen. De bevindingen van deze studie laten zien dat deelname aan deze 
verkiezingen is toegenomen sinds de invoering van het decentralisatiebeleid in 1994. 
Deze toename dient vooral te worden toegeschreven aan maatregelen van de centrale 
overheid om het aantal kiesgerechtigden te verhogen.  
Een tweede belangrijke vorm voor de bevolking om te participeren is door de 
verkiezing van leden van OTB’s als vertegenwoordigers in de lokale overheid, op de post 
van burgemeester of als gemeenteraadslid. Vóór de invoering van de LPP in 1994 
werden deze posten veelal bezet door afgevaardigden uit de stedelijke kernen van de 
huidige gemeenten. Vanaf 1994 kan hierin een verandering geconstateerd worden in de 
zes onderzoekgemeenten, hetgeen heeft geresulteerd in een toename van het aantal 
burgemeesters en gemeenteraadsleden van het platteland, een groep die hiervoor ontbrak. 
Desondanks bestaat de meerderheid van de lokale gezagsdragers nog steeds uit urbane 
afgevaardigden.  
De derde vorm, participatie van de bevolking in OTB’s, is de meest omvattende 
vorm. Deze studie laat zien dat de OTB’s al vrij snel bekend waren met de nieuwe 
vormen van lokale besluitvormen en hun prioriteiten voor projecten presenteerden aan de 
lokale overheid. In de loop der tijd is er een wijziging opgetreden in de manier waarop 
deze prioriteiten worden geformuleerd. In de eerste jaren van de LPP was dit een jaarlijks 
terugkerende exercitie, waarbij de OTB’s een lijstje van projecten indienden bij de lokale 
overheid. Deze lijstjes hadden vaak het karakter van een  ‘boodschappenlijstje’, een 
opsomming van gezondheidsposten, scholen en projecten gericht op de verbetering van 
wegen. Om dit te vermijden en om planning minder tijdsintensief te maken, werd in 1996 
de participatieve planningsmethodologie geïntroduceerd. Het eindproduct van deze 
methodologie is de gemeentelijke ontwikkelingsstrategie, welke gebaseerd is op een 
uitgebreid proces van probleemidentificatie door de bevolking die in OTB’s verenigd is. 
Omdat deze methodologie pas recentelijk op grote schaal wordt toegepast hebben de 
OTB’s in het onderzoekgebied nog niet veel ervaring met deze methodologie.  
De vierde vorm van participatie betreft de deelname in de praktische uitvoering van 
projecten. Algemeen geldt dat deze vorm een positief effect heeft op de 
levensvatbaarheid van projecten. De bijdrage van OTB’s kan op twee manieren 
plaatsvinden: in natura, door middel van arbeid en materialen, of in geld. De 
boerengemeenschappen leveren vooral een bijdrage door middel van arbeid en 
materialen. De wijkorganisaties in de dorpen dragen minder bij in natura dan de OTB’s 
op het platteland. Ze beschikken meestal over meer geld en hun bijdrage bestaat vooral 
uit een financiële tegemoetkoming in de kosten van projecten.  
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Het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel bevat een in potentie krachtig mechanisme dat was 
gecreëerd om de transparantie van besluitvorming en het afleggen van 
verantwoordelijkheid met betrekking tot de interventies van lokale overheden veilig te 
stellen, door de Comités de Vigilancia, de vijfde vorm van participatie. De Comités de 
Vigilancia in de onderzoekgemeenten zijn samengesteld uit vooral afgevaardigden van 
de plattelandsbevolking. De toegevoegde waarde van deze Comités is echter beperkt. In 
alle onderzoekgemeenten worden deze Comités gehinderd door de lokale overheid in de 
uitoefening van hun taken. In een aantal gemeenten hebben de Comités geen  toegang tot 
informatie over planning en implementatie en budgetten. Tevens belemmeren praktische 
problemen, zoals de slechte toegankelijkheid van de regio, een goede uitoefening van de 
taken. Transparantie, de informatievoorziening over de wijze waarop lokale 
besluitvorming plaatsvindt, is mede hierdoor een zwak element in het Boliviaanse 
decentralisatie model. De Comités de Vigilancia schieten hierin tekort en alternatieve 
mechanismen, zoals kranten, komen in de slecht toegankelijke gebieden met een hoog 
percentage analfabetisme, slechts moeizaam tot ontwikkeling.  
 
Vergeleken met de situatie voor 1994 heeft de invoering van decentralisatiebeleid in 
Bolivia in de zes onderzoekgemeenten geleid tot veel meer mogelijkheden voor de 
bevolking om te participeren in lokaal bestuur. De bevindingen van deze studie laten 
echter zien dat sommige bevolkingsgroepen meer toegang hebben tot lokale 
besluitvormingsprocessen dan andere groepen.  
Van de drie groepen OTB’s lijkt het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel vooral 
toegeschreven te zijn op de boerengemeenschappen. Van oudsher hebben deze 
organisaties een intensieve overlegstructuur, met wekelijkse vergaderingen. Dit 
vergemakkelijkt de besluitvorming op gemeenschapsniveau. Bovendien biedt dit systeem 
de beste mogelijkheden voor representatieve participatie, waarbij de totale bevolking kan 
participeren. De wijkorganisaties in de dorpen daarentegen hebben een minder hechte 
sociale structuur, vergaderen minder, waarbij tevens de opkomst relatief laag is en 
worden vooral geleid door het bestuur.  
Een tweede verschil is dat OTB’s die relatief goed toegankelijk zijn beter op de 
hoogte zijn van de mogelijkheden om te participeren in lokale besluitvorming dan de 
OTB’s die minder goed toegankelijk zijn.  
De nadruk op territoriaal georganiseerde organisatie heeft ertoe geleid dat 
functionele organisaties, zoals de vrouwengroepen en producentenorganisaties, worden 
uitgesloten van lokale besluitvorming. Dit impliceert dat deze, van oudsher belangrijke 
groepen op het Boliviaanse platteland, niet vertegenwoordigd zijn in lokale 
besluitvorming. 
 
Decentralisatie en lokale ontwikkeling 
De vraag in hoeverre decentralisatiebeleid leidt tot een toename van lokale ontwikkeling 
wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 6. Het concept van lokale ontwikkeling zoals dat in deze 
studie gehanteerd wordt heeft betrekking op de verbeterde toegang tot 
ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden voor de bevolking, zoals inkomen, werkgelegenheid en 
algemene levensomstandigheden. Hierbij wordt niet alleen de toename van het aantal 
mogelijkheden beoogd, maar vooral ook een gelijke verdeling van de mogelijkheden.  
Vergeleken met de situatie vóór 1994 heeft het Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid 
bijgedragen tot een vergroting van de mogelijkheden tot lokale ontwikkeling, doordat de 
omvang van het budget van de onderzoekgemeenten aanzienlijk gestegen is. Opmerkelijk 
is dat de middelen die de gemeenten in het kader van de LPP van de centrale overheid 
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ontvangen niet de enige middelen zijn: deze bedragen ongeveer 28-43% van het totale 
budget van het gemeenten. De onderzoekgemeenten zijn in staat aanzienlijke middelen 
uit andere fondsen te verwerven, onder andere via samenwerking met NGO’s en de 
nationale fondsen. Het aandeel van zogeheten ‘eigen middelen’, opbrengsten uit lokale 
belastinginkomsten, is beperkt. Het is relatief het hoogst in die gemeenten die een 
redelijk ontwikkeld voorzieningenstructuur hebben en een meer gediversifieerde 
economische structuur.  
Hoewel het budget van de gemeenten is toegenomen wordt slechts een beperkt deel 
van het geprogrammeerde jaarlijkse ontwikkelingsplan van de gemeenten ook 
daadwerkelijk uitgevoerd. De belangrijkste redenen voor de beperkte uitvoering is de 
onzekere toegang tot fondsen en de wijze van planning.  
Met betrekking tot de onzekere toegang tot fondsen blijkt dat met name die 
gemeenten die sterk afhankelijk zijn van de nationale fondsen te kampen hebben met 
vertraagde uitbetaling. Gemeenten die veel samenwerken met NGO’s ondervinden 
hiermee veel minder problemen, en slagen er beter in om het geprogrammeerde 
ontwikkelingsplan ook daadwerkelijk uit te voeren. Deze cruciale rol van NGO’s kan 
worden verklaard door het feit dat NGO’s sinds 1994 alleen toegang hebben tot middelen 
van de overheid indien zij samen met een gemeente een aanvraag indienen. Dit betekent 
ook een wijziging in de relatie tussen NGO’s en de OTB’s. Vóór 1994 waren het met 
name de NGO’s die besloten welke projecten zij uitvoerden op het platteland. Nu, tegen 
de achtergrond van participatieve planning, wordt deze relatie door de OTB’s opgevat als 
veel meer gelijkwaardig, waarbij de OTB’s zelf kunnen aangeven welke projecten zij 
willen.  
 Ten aanzien van de wijze van planning geldt dat de onderzoekgemeenten in de eerste 
jaren projecten planden zonder vooraf na te gaan of de benodigde fondsen ook 
daadwerkelijk beschikbaar waren.   
In de eerste vijf jaar van decentralisatie waren investeringen van de gemeenten 
vooral gericht op infrastructurele projecten, met name in de sociale sector, zoals 
schooltjes en gezondheidsposten. Productieve projecten gericht op een verhoging van de 
agrarische productie in de overwegend plattelandsgemeenten, vormden een minderheid. 
Deze nadruk op investeringen in de sociale sector komt voort uit een viertal factoren.  
Zo resulteert de methodologie van participatieve planning vooral in projecten die op 
gemeenschappelijke behoeften gericht zijn. Hoewel men hierbij kan spreken van 
vraaggestuurde projecten weerspiegelen deze projecten veelal niet de problemen van de 
individuele huishoudens. Dit is vooral het geval in de boerengemeenschappen, waar de 
problemen van de individuele huishoudens vooral gerelateerd zijn aan de belangrijkste 
bron van inkomsten: de landbouw.  
Daarnaast leidt de relatieve complexiteit van projecten welke zich richten op 
productie-verhoging (zoals irrigatiesystemen) ertoe dat gemeentelijke overheden een 
voorkeur hebben voor eenvoudiger uit te voeren projecten (zoals scholen en 
gezondheidsposten).  
Een andere factor die meespeelt is dat het decentralisatiebeleid met name in de eerste 
jaren vooral werd gepresenteerd als een beleid dat de verbetering van algemene 
levensomstandigheden centraal stelde.  
Een vierde factor is de uitsluiting van functionele organisaties in de 
planningsmethodologie. Wanneer bijvoorbeeld producentenassociaties een rol in de 
participatieve planning zouden hebben, dan lijkt het voor de hand te liggen dat 
economische projecten meer aandacht zouden krijgen. 
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De directe invloed van decentralisatie op een verhoging van de werkgelegenheid is 
beperkt. Deze studie richtte zich hierbij vooral op de bouwsector; daarnaast is er sprake 
van een toename van de werkgelegenheid in de lokale overheidssector en de horeca. Met 
betrekking tot de bouwsector blijkt dat in de meeste gemeenten de projecten uitgevoerd 
worden door externe aannemers en bouwondernemingen, die arbeid en materiaal veelal 
niet uit de gemeenten zelf betrekken. 
De invloed van decentralisatie op een meer gelijke verdeling van 
ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden is geanalyseerd op twee niveaus: de verdeling van 
investeringen tussen urbaan en rurale OTB’s en die tussen de relatief goed toegankelijk 
en minder goed toegankelijke OTB’s. De gemeentelijke investeringen worden relatief 
gelijkelijk verdeeld tussen de urbane en rurale OTB’s. Maar er bestaat een aanzienlijk 
verschil tussen de goed toegankelijke en de minder goed toegankelijke OTB’s, waarbij de 
eerste groep relatief meer investeringen ontvangt. Redenen hiervoor zijn de beperkte 
participatie van de leiders van de slecht ontsloten OTB’s, het grotere aantal NGO’s dat in 
goed ontsloten OTB’s werkt en de logistieke problemen van projectuitvoering in slecht 
ontsloten OTB’s. 
Op basis van het voorgaande blijkt dat decentralisatiebeleid niet per definitie 
resulteert in lokale ontwikkeling. Administratieve decentralisatie blijkt vooral  
voorwaardenscheppend te zijn voor een verhoging van de ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden: 
de toename van de beschikbare fondsen op het lokale niveau.  
 
Aanbevelingen voor beleid 
Decentralisatie in Bolivia heeft geleid tot een meer evenredige verdeling van fondsen 
tussen de gemeenten in vergelijking tot de situatie voor 1994. Tevens is er sprake van een 
verhoging van de investeringscapaciteit, een eerste voorwaarde voor een toename van 
mogelijkheden tot ontwikkeling. Maar de gehanteerde verdeelsleutel, te weten het aantal 
inwoners per gemeente, heeft ertoe geleid dat verschillen in rijkere en armere gemeenten 
niet werden gecorrigeerd. Bovendien heeft decentralisatiebeleid niet geresulteerd in 
vermindering van ongelijkheden binnen gemeenten: in vrijwel alle onderzoekgemeenten 
is er minder geïnvesteerd in die OTB’s die minder goed toegankelijk zijn.  
Deze situatie zou kunnen worden aangepast door andere verdeelsleutels voor de fondsen 
toe te passen in het ontwerp van decentralisatiebeleid. Eén mogelijkheid hiertoe is het 
verdelen van de middelen op basis van armoedeniveau van de gemeenten en van 
gebieden binnen de gemeenten. Dit wordt in Bolivia reeds toegepast door middel van de 
Armoede Bestrijdingsstrategie, waarbij armere gemeenten (uitgedrukt in niveau van 
basisbehoeften) relatief meer middelen ontvangen dan rijkere gemeenten. 
Accountability, de mate waarin de lokale overheid kan worden afgerekend op 
beleidsuitvoering, blijkt een zwakke plek te zijn in het Boliviaanse decentralisatiemodel. 
Om dit veilig te stellen kunnen verschillende instrumenten worden gehanteerd, zoals de 
specifiek hiervoor in het leven geroepen Comités de Vigilancia in Bolivia, of referenda 
en kranten zoals dat in andere Latijns-Amerikaanse landen gebruik is geworden. Zolang 
zulke instrumenten niet gefaciliteerd worden, en het deze instituties aan formele macht 
ontbreekt, is het niet realistisch om hiervan wonderen te verwachten. Om hun functies 
naar behoren uit te voeren dienen dergelijke instituties op twee wijzen gefaciliteerd te 
worden. In de eerste plaats dient er een budget te zijn, om de projecten te controleren, 
alsmede een onkostenvergoeding om in ieder geval een deel van de geïnvesteerde tijd en 
energie te compenseren. Dit budget dient niet afkomstig te zijn van de lokale overheid 
zelf, aangezien dit een afhankelijkheidssituatie in de hand werk. Het zou van hogere 
overheidsinstanties moeten komen. Daarnaast zouden deze instituties met formele 
machtsmiddelen uitgerust moeten worden.  
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Een andere wijze waarop accountability verbeterd zou kunnen worden is het toegankelijk 
maken van gemeentelijke verkiezingen voor lokale partijen. Ervaringen met lokale 
partijen laten zien dat deze veelal meer open staan voor lokale behoeften en dat zij 
hierdoor tevens meer accountable zijn.  
Decentralisatiebeleid in Bolivia heeft niet adequaat kunnen antwoorden op 
problemen gerelateerd aan de belangrijkste economische activiteit op het platteland: 
landbouw. De overgrote meerderheid van investeringen zijn gedaan in de sociale sector, 
gericht op een verbetering van de infrastructuur in onderwijs en gezondheid. Op de lange 
termijn kunnen deze investeringen een positief effect hebben op een toename van 
werkgelegenheid en inkomen. Maar om lokale ontwikkeling te bereiken dienen ook meer 
structurele problemen aangepakt te worden, in het bijzonder die problemen die 
betrekking hebben op het gebrek aan alternatieve werkgelegenheid en op de ongelijke 
machtsstructuren. Deze meer fundamentele problemen verdienen meer aandacht van de 
centrale overheid. Zoals de toepassing van de hernieuwde wet op de landhervorming 
(INRA), die het heffen van belasting op grond zal reguleren, in Bolivia laat zien is dit een 
doelmatige benadering: grootgrondbezitters hebben inderdaad al delen van hun land 
verkocht, hetgeen ten gunste komt van de bevolking zonder land. Dit heeft de lokale 
machtsstructuren gewijzigd en heeft tevens geleid tot een versterking van nieuwe 
boerengemeenschappen.  
Een andere mogelijkheid om meer structurele, economische problemen aan te pakken 
is het planningssysteem open te stellen voor functionele organisaties, zoals 
producentenassociaties.  
 
Het is nog te vroeg om vast te stellen of de beide centrale doelstellingen van het 
Boliviaanse decentralisatiebeleid, goed lokaal bestuur en lokale ontwikkeling, behaald 
zijn. Eén ding is echter duidelijk: de Boliviaanse gemeenten hebben zich het model zeer 
snel eigen gemaakt. Hoewel tegenwerkende krachten hebben plaatsgevonden op het 
centrale niveau, door het beleid van de regering-Banzer, heeft het lokale niveau een eigen 
dynamiek ontwikkeld. Dit is het geval van lokale overheden, maar het geldt nog meer 
voor de bevolking zelf. Internationale donororganisaties en niet-gouvernementele 
organisaties hebben dit krachtig ondersteund.  
Het karakter van decentralisatie is echter wel aan verandering onderhevig, met name 
vanaf 1997. Op het nationale niveau is er kentering zichtbaar richting een meer 
technocratische benadering, met veel minder aandacht voor het thema van 
bevolkingsparticipatie. In een reactie hebben veel donororganisaties gedreigd hun steun 
stop te zetten. Dit vond plaats in een periode van veel politieke en sociale onrust en 
economische malaise. De regering-Banzer, bang om een aanzienlijk deel van deviezen te 
verliezen, reageerde hierop door middel van een nieuwe dialoog (Dialogo Nacional) op 
te zetten tussen staat en maatschappij. Deze resulteerde in de Armoede 
Bestrijdingsstrategie, in 2002. De formele parlementaire goedkeuring, nodig om de 
overheveling van fondsen in werking te stellen, is echter nog niet rond. 
In juni 2002 staan er opnieuw nationale verkiezingen op de agenda, met ex-president 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada als kandidaat voor de MNR. De meeste nadruk van de 
verkiezingscampagnes ligt op het terugdringen van de economische crisis. Daarnaast 
speelt een aanpassing van het decentralisatiebeleid een rol, met bijzondere aandacht voor 
de problematiek van armere gemeenten.  
Eén ding is zeker: de richting die het lokale bestuur is opgegaan, met de toegenomen 
participatie van de bevolking, is onomkeerbaar, ongeacht de politieke identiteit van de 
toekomstige regering.  
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